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Abstract  
 
Introduction:  Mexico’s prevalence of adult overweight and obesity is 
72.5%, and 34.4% for school children. Mexico has one of the highest 
consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages globally.  In 2012, during the 
transition to a new President, a new obesity strategy was proposed and 
developed.  As part of this policy, a soda tax was implemented in Mexico in 
January 2014.  The aim of this thesis is to explore how the soda tax emerged 
as a policy issue in Mexico and how stakeholders influenced its development 
and implementation.  
 
Methods: Thirty-three semi-structured elite interviews were conducted 
with stakeholders involved in the obesity policy process.  Interview data 
was triangulated with data collected through a documentary analysis, using 
a systematic search of a wide range of reports, policy and organisations 
documents generated before and during the soda tax design and 
implementation phases (January 2011 to December 2015).  This resulted in 
the analysis of 145 documents. An iterative thematic qualitative analysis of 
both interviews and document data was conducted, guided by the policy 
network approach, framing theory and multiple steams theory.  
 
Results: Many contextual factors were found to have facilitated the soda tax 
policy development including: the new government needing to find 
additional sources of revenue; increased public and government awareness 
of the high sugar sweetened beverage (SSB) consumption in Mexico, and its 
relationship to obesity and diabetes trends: greater influence gained by 
national NGOs through use of the media and supported by international 
organizations, use of existing national networks and new collaborations 
within Mexico. Some key relationships and links influenced the agenda 
setting for important policy issues. This included how conflict of interests, 
accountability, and representations in the formal policy process were 
managed. This revealed power imbalances around the policy debates and 
shifts in the attitude, responsibilities and actions of major actors  The 
Ministry of Health (MOH) and Ministry of Finance (MOF) were initially 
ambivalent and resisted development of a soda tax,not always being strong 
advocates as would have been expected. The formal policy design process 
followed a multi-stakeholder approach which actively involved the food and 
beverage industry (F&BI). They were able to influence policy actions to 
mitigate the soda tax impact on the F&BI, undermining some outcomes.  
Actions by other non-state actors (e.g. ) to influence public perception about 
benefits and constraints of the tax included: the use of marketing strategies, 
calls for action using the media, framing of arguments as “the right to health” 
and “the multi-causality of obesity” rhetoric and implementation of 
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corporate social responsibility actions.  The effectiveness of the soda tax 
was highly debated in public before and after implementation, resulting in 
public polarization.  Until the soda tax emerged as a policy option, the 
influence of the F&BI on health policy had not been perceived as a conflict 
of interest or problematic and it continues to be ignored as such by some 
state policy actors. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis contributes to the debate on how power is exercised, framed and 
shifted throughout the health policy process.  It discusses the contextual 
factors that facilitated the soda tax development in Mexico, including how 
framing of evidence about obesity as a policy problem and possible 
solutions influenced the agenda setting. It identifies the key organisations 
and networks that were instrumental in policy making. This research 
provides evidence about how the F&BI have wielded their influence in 
regulatory actions within the national strategy for obesity prevention, and 
specifically the soda tax in Mexico.  It highlights how the soda tax also 
brought about new opportunities for some actors framed around the issue 
of provision of safe drinking water. The soda tax resulted in the 
empowerment of advocacy groups and networks nationally supported by 
international actors, which was counter-balanced by new public-private 
partnerships and corporate social responsibility actions.  This thesis 
demonstrates that corporate interests continued to have an influence on 
Mexican health policy after the introduction of the soda tax. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
The prevalence of obesity have been increasing globally over the last twenty years.  
According to a recent study age-standardised looking at population-based data 
sources from 186 countries, the mean BMI increased from 21·7 kg/m² in 1975 to 
24·2 kg/m² in 2014 in men, and from 22·1 kg/m² in 1975 to 24·4 kg/m² in in 2014 
in women (NCD Risk Factor Collaboration, 2016).  Current estimates suggest that 
1.9 trillion adults (38% of the world's adult population) and 41 million children 
under 5 are overweight (Hawkes, Demaio, & Branca, 2017; UNICEF, 2017).  
Worldwide concerns on the obesity ‘epidemic’ have led to several international 
policy calls to act upon rising rates of obesity, diabetes and other non-communicable 
diseases (NCDs) (Cecchini et al., 2010; Mozaffarian et al., 2012; Popkin, Adair, & Ng, 
2012; WHO, 2013b).  There have been many reviews of policy approaches that may 
be effective at tackling obesity including fiscal policies (subsidies on healthy foods, 
and levying unhealthy foods like high-caloric foods and sweetened beverages), 
marketing regulation for unhealthy food, food reformulation, food labelling, 
education on nutrition and physical activity,  individual behaviour change 
interventions (Cecchini & Sassi, 2012; Novak & Brownell, 2012; WHO, 2013a), and 
improving water access in public spaces (Rivera-Dommarco, Hernández-Ávila, 
Aguilar-Salinas, Vadillo-Ortega, & Murayama-Rendón, 2012). 
 
Defining what is meant by unhealthy food has been an ongoing debate among 
scholars and food producers, and it remains unclear in the context of overall dietary 
intake (Rayner et al., 2013; Rivera-Dommarco et al., 2012; Sacks, Rayner, & 
Swinburn, 2009).  However, there is growing evidence, and international consensus, 
on the link between the high consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) and 
rates of obesity and diabetes (Ebbeling, Willett, & Ludwing D., 2012; Malik, Pan, 
Willett, & Hu, 2013; Slavin, 2012; Te Morenga, Mallard, & Mann, 2013; Vartanian, 
Schwartz, & Brownell, 2007). Sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) include not only 
sodas or carbonated beverages but also sweetened fruit drinks, sports drinks, 
energy drinks and sweetened coffees and teas.  SSBs are a poor source of nutrients 
and contribute calories which do not have added value to health (Stern, Duffey, 
20 
Barquera, Rivera-Dommarco, & Popkin, 2012; Stern, Piernas, Barquera, Rivera, & 
Popkin, 2014). 
 
Literature reviews on population approaches to improving diet and reducing 
obesity have suggested that taxing SSBs beverages is likely to be an effective policy 
option to reduce a population’s caloric intake (Chaloupka, Powell, & Chriqui, 2011; 
Mozaffarian et al., 2012; Powell, Chriqui, Khan, Wada, & Chaloupka, 2013).  Few 
countries have implemented, or have considered implementing a SSB tax, as it is a 
‘hard policy’ which relies on statutory compliance.  In contrast, ‘soft policies’, 
favoured by many government and industry actors, rely on voluntary agreements, 
industry self-regulation and compliance monitoring (Le Grand & New, 2015, pp. 26-
27).  From governments’ perspective, both these approaches seek the similar 
outcomes but use different processes (Kennedy, Chan, & Fok, 2011), while soft 
polices are favoured by industry to avoid tougher regulations.  Previously, national 
policies responses to tackle obesity and diabetes have largely taken the form of ‘soft 
policies’, such as education campaigns and voluntary actions (Swinburn & Wood, 
2013).  However, evaluations have shown they are ineffective and are driven by 
commercial interests rather than health interests (Hawkes & Lobstein, 2011; Knai 
et al., 2015b).  Examples of voluntary policy actions on obesity include the EU 
Pledge, a voluntary industry action plan for marketing food to children, or the EU 
voluntary front-of-pack nutritional labelling using the Guideline Daily Amounts (EU 
Pledge, 2012, Updated July 2015).  In Central and South America, ‘hard policies’ have 
been implemented, including the regulation of food labelling systems in Chile and 
Ecuador, which have warning labels on unhealthy foods, or Brazil’s regulatory 
measures on food marketing (Camara, Marinho, Guilam, & Braga, 2008; PAHO, 2012; 
Perez-Escamilla et al., 2017 ).  Other examples of regulatory initiatives include the 
added sugars content on food labels in the United States, and the regulation of food 
marketing to children the United Kingdom (FDA, 2016; Knai et al., 2015a).  Few 
evaluations using empirical data have been published on the impact of ‘hard’ policies 
on obesity reduction (Lustig, Schmidt, & Brindis, 2012), however some case study 
evaluations have shown they have been effective in changing consumer behaviour 
( Colchero et al., 2015; Thow, Quested, et al., 2011; WHO, 2016a).   
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Food taxes are a potentially significant regulatory approach to tackle unhealthy 
eating, but they have not been widely implemented.  Denmark, Norway, France, 
Hungary and some Pacific Islands (Fiji, Samoan, Nauru, French Polynesia) pioneered 
the implementation of food taxes (Cornelsen & Carriedo, 2015), although in the case 
of Denmark it has subsequently been removed (Bødker, Pisinger, Toft, & Jørgensen, 
2015c; Snowdon, 2013).  Mexico was a front runner among low and middle-income 
countries (LMIC), and the first in Latin America to introduce a soda tax in 2013, 
becoming effective in January 2014.  Other countries such as Chile, and recently 
Saudi Arabia and South Africa  (Arab News, 2017; Ministerio de Hacienda, 2014a), 
have also implemented soda taxes.  In the US, there is no national tax but several US 
cities have implemented their own tax including Berkley, California, Philadelphia  
(Purtle, Langellier, & Le-Scherban, 2017), and the United Kingdom has put forward 
a levy on sugary drinks which is yet to be implemented (Gov. UK, 2011).  In contrast, 
several governments from high-income countries (e.g. Australia, New Zealand) and 
some others low and middle-income countries (e.g. Brazil, Colombia) have had 
national discussions but are struggling to get a similar policy on the agenda (Roache 
& Gostin, 2017). 
 
I. Food and obesity policy in Mexico 
 
In December 2013 Enrique Peña Nieto, the candidate of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional - PRI) took office as 
President of Mexico.  His party had ruled the country uninterruptedly for 71 years 
but lost power in 2002.  After 12 years in opposition under the government of 
National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional - PAN), Peña Nieto’s PRI regained 
power and proposed a new policy approach.  His overall plan for government was 
to implement what they called ‘structural policy changes’ largely related to 
economic stabilization  (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 2013).  This included a draft 
policy to tackle high obesity and diabetes rates, proposed in 2012 during the 
transition period before President Peña Nieto took office and launched in October 
2013 (SSA, 2013b).  This national regulatory initiative was called ‘National Strategy 
to Prevent and Control Obesity and Diabetes’ (Estrategia Nacional para la Prevención 
y el Control del Sobrepeso, la Obesidad y la Diabetes - ENPCSOD) and included three 
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pillars 1) public health, 2) health care, 3) regulation and fiscal policy.  It outlined 
three strategic pathways: 
 
a) Food advertising and marketing to children, 
b) A soda tax of 1 Mexican peso (MXP) per litre and a ‘snack tax’ of 8%, and 
c) A front of package food labelling strategy. 
 
In February 2014 guidelines for regulating food marketing to children and the 
regulation for front of package food labelling were published.  In January 2014 an 
excise tax (Impuesto Especial Sobre Producción y Servicios - IEPS) of 1 MXP per litre 
on sodas (including carbonated beverages, flavoured drinks containing sugar, and 
powders and concentrates to prepare sugary drinks) and an 8% tax on all snack 
foods with more than 275 kcal per 100g became effective.   
 
II. Aims and objectives 
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the emergence and implementation of the soda 
tax policy in Mexico.  The thesis explores the contextual factors influencing this 
process, the policy process itself, and the role of key stakeholders in shaping the 
policy outcomes.  This study highlights key aspects of the soda tax policy process in 
Mexico that may have implications for public health governance and on similar 
policies in other middle-income countries.  To understand how the Mexican soda tax 
emerged and developed as a policy issue, a policy analysis was undertaken using a 
qualitative methodology.  The specific objectives of the research are: 
 
1. To understand the contextual factors that facilitated and constrained the 
development of the soda tax policy. 
2. To analyse the policy-making process surrounding the soda tax as part of the 
national strategy to prevent obesity. 
3. To map and explore the stakeholders’ position and influence on the soda tax. 
4. To examine how actors attempted to influence the design, implementation 
and early outcomes of the soda tax policy.  
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The regulatory actions introduced in the national obesity strategy, ENPCSOD, are 
poorly understood and warrant further analysis.  Analysing the whole strategy with 
its broad range of policy interventions goes beyond the scope of this research.  
Therefore, the analysis presented below focuses on one key aspect of the strategy: 
the soda tax.  This particular policy has been chosen as the soda tax is a relatively 
novel policy and has been highly politicised due its implications  for the corporate 
food and beverage sector.   
 
III. Rationale of research and methodological approach 
 
Several factors that led to the soda tax policy need to be better understood. First, 
how the context influenced the policy change and set the scene for the processes and 
action which took place. For example, whether the lack of potable water supply by 
the state contributed to the increased sales of SSB and sodas, or if corporate 
economic interests of soda producers outweighed public health policy responses in 
Mexico regardless of the soda tax policy measure (A.P., 2013; Clark, Hawkes, 
Murphy, Hansen-Kuhn, & Wallinga, 2012; D Stuckler & McKee, 2012).  Second, how 
links between actors influenced the policy design and the policy outcome.  Third, 
how particular strategies were used to influence the policy process and to adapt to 
it.    
 
By exploring and understanding better the mentioned issues, evidence will be 
generated about a policy that, from a public health perspective, aims to safeguard 
the health of Mexicans. This work will help to reflect on the advantages and 
disadvantages that this policy has in a specific context, so that they can be 
considered in similar contexts in the future.  Health taxes, and particularly soda 
taxes are gaining momentum around the globe, but particularities about empirical 
applications are not yet broadly documented.  
 
A policy analysis is the approach to research.  Policy analysis does not have any 
specific approach, and it can use different lenses (Parsons, 2005; Spicker, 2008). To 
do so, this thesis uses a complementary approach to theories relevant to the policy 
process.  It uses a qualitative methodology by applying interviews to key 
stakeholders, and a documentary analysis to triangulate accounts and to have a 
24 
broader understanding on how the process occurred, who was involved and how 
the policy developed.  
 
This thesis provides insights and lessons learned from the introduction of a health 
tax in a LMIC.  Finally, as the global momentum for sugar reduction increases, 
governments and public health advocates need better understanding of the 
implications of the soda tax, as a potential intervention to tackle further the 
economic, social, and situational drivers of soda consumption (Roache & Gostin, 
2017).  
 
IV. Positionality 
This thesis was originally motivated by two main reflections during my work as a 
public health nutrition researcher working at the National Institute of Public Health. 
In this role I provided evidence and advice to advocacy and civil society groups 
supporting the regulation, and to the Senators' teams that drafted the soda tax policy 
starting in June 2012.  This helped me reflect on the observed participation of 
Mexican civil society during the policy process, and the interest and focus of 
international policy and academic organisations to the soda tax development in 
Mexico. Additionally, it is based on reflecting on what I observed as a former 
participant compiling and presenting evidence for the soda tax to various policy 
actors involved which motivated my interest to explore this topic in depth. 
 
V. Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of obesity as a policy issue and population-level 
approaches to tackling obesity.  It presents an overview of the evidence on food 
taxation policies including taxation of sugar sweetened beverages.  Chapter 3 
presents the theoretical framework and methods used, and discusses their 
limitations, and quality assurance considerations.  Chapter 4, examines the context 
in which the Mexican soda tax was developed and implemented, including the 
prevalence and determinants of obesity, the political and economic situation of the 
country; and structural factors such as availability of potable water.  It includes 
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sections on international trade agreements, the market for SSBs and the existing 
polices related to obesity and health.  
 
Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 present the findings of this research.  Chapter 5 presents the 
key actors involved in the soda tax policy process, how they link to each other and 
how these networks might have influenced the soda tax development and outcomes.  
Chapter 6 presents an analysis of how obesity was framed as a policy problem, and 
the policy solutions which emerged from these framings.  It also presents the 
arguments used by policy actors for and against the soda tax, before and after the 
soda tax was implemented.  Chapter 7 analyses the policy design and agenda setting, 
focussing on the participation of non-state actors in the policy formulation process, 
led by the government.  Chapter 8 analyses the main actions shaping the 
implementation used by non-state actors that were taking place parallel and after 
the policy formulation, either to influence the proposed policy or to adapt to it and 
their underlying interests.  Finally, Chapter 9 presents the discussion of the findings 
and the main recommendations which emerge from these.   
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Chapter 2. Obesity trends, causes and policy responses 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the obesity crisis, as well as the background for the soda tax 
policy.  First it gives an overview of the prevalence of obesity globally.  Second, it 
discusses the aetiology of obesity and the major risk factors associated with it, 
including evidence on the effects of sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) consumption.  
Third, it summarises some of the population-level approaches and international 
policy initiatives proposed to tackle obesity, and presents an overview of the 
evidence supporting health taxes on food and beverages.  Fourth, it discusses 
considerations that have been considered when designing a health tax.  Finally, this 
chapter presents examples of countries which have applied health taxes, and a 
summary of the emerging evidence on the effectiveness of health-related food and 
beverage taxes on health and other outcomes. 
 
II. The burden of obesity  
 
Obesity trends 
Currently, LMICs suffer 80% of the total burden of non-communicable diseases 
(NCDs) worldwide (WHO, 2008, 2014a).  These diseases include diabetes, cancer, 
cardiovascular diseases, and chronic respiratory diseases.  According to the World 
Health Organization (WHO) in 2008, of the 57 million deaths that were registered 
globally, 36 million (63%) were attributed to NCDs, and almost 28 million occurred 
in low- and middle-income countries.  It is estimated that at least 3.4 million of these 
deaths were the consequence of having an increased body weight (WHO, 2008). 
 
The WHO defines overweight and obesity as ‘abnormal or excessive fat 
accumulation that may impair health.’  The most widely recognised measure of 
overweight and obesity is the body mass index (BMI) which is calculated as an 
individual’s weight in kilograms divided by the square root of their height in metres 
(kg/m2).  The general guideline to identify when a person is overweight is a BMI 
between 25 and 29.9, and obesity is defined when a person’s BMI is above 30 (WHO, 
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2008).  Being obese can lead to metabolic abnormalities that contribute to 
cardiovascular disease, diabetes mellitus, hypertension, some types of cancer and 
other chronic diseases (Grundy, 1998; WHO, 2004, 2008).  Obesity has been 
estimated to lead to higher health service costs (Cecchini et al., 2010; Hernandez-
Licona, Minor, & Aranda, 2012).  Considering the relationship between obesity and 
multiple chronic diseases, the cost of obesity has been rising for countries at all 
levels of economic development (Cecchini et al., 2010; Sassi, Cecchini, & Devaux, 
2012).  
 
During the past 20 years, obesity prevalence has increased rapidly worldwide (NCD 
Risk Factor Collaboration, 2016).  In 2014, it was estimated that 1.9 billion adults 
older than 18 years were overweight, and of these over 600 million were obese 
(WHO, 2016b).  Overall global obesity prevalence was 10% in women and 14% in 
men (WHO, 2016b).  The WHO also estimated that 41 million children under five 
years worldwide were overweight and, of these, at least 30 million were living in 
developing countries (WHO, 2016b).  However, the highest regional prevalence was 
in the WHO Americas region with 62% prevalence of overweight and 26% obesity 
prevalence in adults. Recently a report found that for 2016 obesity rates in children 
and adolescents younger than 19 years are 6% in girls (50 million) and nearly 8% 
in boys (74 million).  Combined, the number of obese five to 19 year olds rose more 
than ten times, from 11 million in 1975 to 124 million in 2016 (Abarca-Gómez et al., 
2017). 
   
The aetiology of obesity  
Obesity is caused by multiple factors, including genetic, physiological, 
environmental and economic factors, which relate to each other in a complex way.  
Different authors have created frameworks of the causal path of obesity to illustrate 
its complexity (Swinburn et al 2011; Hawkes, 2007; Popkin, Adair, & Ng, 2012; 
Rivera & Barquera, 2002,).  These frameworks also highlight the importance of 
context, emphasising the interaction of political, social and individual factors in 
shaping the prevalence of obesity (Grundy, 1998; Lang & Barling, 2013; Popkin et 
al., 2012; Rivera & Gonzalez de Cossio, 2013). 
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Given the importance of context, this research employs Rivera and Gonzalez de 
Cossio’s explanatory model of the main causes of obesity (Rivera & Gonzalez de 
Cossio, 2013) instead of other  more well-known models because this framework 
was developed particularly  for the Mexican context (James, 2008; Lang & Rayner, 
2007; Ulijaszek, 2007).  Some of the specific contextual factors which are relevant to 
this research include poor water quality and lack of free drinking water, the free-
trade agreement with the USA and Canada, and trade policy loopholes allowing 
import of any food and commodity from the USA (Clark, Hawkes, Murphy, Hansen-
Kuhn, & Wallinga, 2012).  
 
According to Rivera’s model the causes of obesity are divided into either basic, 
underlying or direct causes (Rivera, Perichart, & Moreno, 2012).  Basic causes are 
factors that fall into the macro-level of the society’s organisation (cultural values, 
customs, and laws).  Underlying causes are derivations from this macro-system and 
part of the micro-systems (for example, the immediate surroundings of the person) 
and meso-systems (connections between microsystems).  Finally, direct causes are 
related to individual behaviour (McLaren & Hawe, 2005).  
 
The basic causes are associated with technological changes, political agreements 
(agriculture, trade, and marketing), industrialisation and communication, the legal 
framework and poverty.  The underlying causes may arise from political and 
population sources.  Political and regulatory factors include lack of access to safe 
drinking water and to healthy foods as well as low prices and extended availability 
of high-density foods and sweetened beverages (Digest, 2014).  Population factors 
concern people’s behaviour and changes in lifestyles such as the increase of 
sedentary activities, less time to cook, the influence of marketing and cultural 
changes in food intake, and reduced impact of current health promotion strategies 
on behavioural change (Rivera & Gonzalez de Cossio, 2013).  Finally, Rivera’s 
conceptual model refers to the direct causes of obesity that develop from the basic 
and underlining problems mentioned before.  People tend to increase consumption 
of energy and limit their energy expenditure; therefore, a positive balance of energy 
results in overweight and obesity.  Figure 2.1 shows the conceptual model. 
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Figure 2.1 Conceptual model of obesity aetiology with relevance to Mexico 
 
Source: adapted from Rivera J. & Cossío T, 2013 (Rivera & Cossio, 2013) 
 
Key risk factors for obesity 
The World Cancer Research Fund (WCRF & AICR, 2007) and the WHO (2003) are 
two international sources who have summarised the evidence for obesity risk 
factors.  These publications arranged risk factors into groups (convincing, probable, 
possible and limited evidence) based on the strength of their association with 
obesity and weight gain (WCRF & AICR, 2007; WHO, 2003).  The main convincing 
factors that increase the risk of overweight and obesity are eating high-density foods 
and not being physically active.  The reviews classified consumption of SSB and 
exposure to high levels of marketing of processed foods as probable risk factors for 
obesity and other cardiovascular diseases (CVDs).  Since these publications, 
evidence on SSB consumption as a risk factor for obesity and diabetes has grown 
showing more convincing results (Ebbeling, Feldman, et al., 2012; Gibson, 2008; 
Harrington, 2008; Malik, Schulze, & Hu, 2006; Moise, Cifuentes, Orozco, & Willett, 
2011). 
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As Rivera’s model describes, political factors are underlying causes of obesity.  In 
this thesis, they are described in relation to SSB consumption (including sodas) and 
to obesity in Mexico.  The principle behind SSB taxation as a political strategy is to 
increase the price of a product in order to reduce its affordability, and therefore its 
consumption.  Many political, economic and structural factors are related to this 
policy measure that go beyond this principle and need to be examined to understand 
the specific context of the case study of the soda tax in Mexico.  This is further 
developed and analysed throughout this work in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 8.  
 
As the focus of this thesis is the tax applied to sugary drinks, the next section will 
describe existing evidence on the relationship of such beverages with obesity and 
diabetes, as this has been the main argument proposed for taxing them. 
  
Sugar-sweetened beverage consumption as a risk factor 
It is important to clarify that SSBs include not only sodas or carbonated beverages 
but also beverages such as fruit drinks, sports drinks, energy drinks and sweetened 
coffees and teas (Ebbeling, Willett, & Ludwing D., 2012).  There is growing evidence 
of the relationship between SSB consumption and obesity, as well as the relationship 
of SSB consumption with diabetes.  The WCRF had previously classified it as a 
probable cause of obesity in 2007 (Slavin, 2012; WCRF, 2007), with more recent 
reviews summarising evidence that SSB are a convincing risk factor for obesity 
(Malik, Pan, Willett, & Hu, 2013; Slavin, 2012; Te Morenga, Mallard, & Mann, 2013; 
Vartanian, Schwartz, & Brownell, 2007).  Nonetheless, several statements by the 
soda industry, sugar producers, and organisations sponsored by food corporations 
in the past few years have continued to suggest that there is only weak public health 
evidence (Andreyeva, Long, & Brownell, 2010).  
 
The health impact of excess SSB consumption, specifically related to type 2 diabetes, 
has been demonstrated in several cohort studies (Ebbeling, Feldman, et al., 2012; 
Palmer, Boggs, Krishnan, Hu F, & Rosenberg, 2008; Slavin, 2012; Te Morenga et al., 
2013).  Most of the evidence from cohort studies comes from the US.  For example, 
the Nurses Health Study that followed more than 50,000 women for eight years 
showed that women consuming one or two portions of SSB daily had an increased 
adjusted relative risk of 83% (CI [1.42, 2.36], p < .001) for diabetes than women 
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consuming less than one SSB per month (Schulze et al., 2004).  The Health 
Professionals follow up cohort study following 40,000 men for 20 years indicated 
that consumption of SSB was associated with a 24% (CI [1.09, 1.40], p < .01) increase 
in diabetes, after adjusting for confounders such as use of vitamins, family history 
and other health outcomes (de Koning L, 2011).  A study of African-American 
women in the United States showed similar results, where the consumption of two 
or more SSBs per day was associated with an increased rate ratio of 24% (CI 
[1.13,1.52]) for type 2 diabetes compared with non-drinkers (Palmer et al., 2008). 
 
In a number of randomised controlled trials (RCTs) and intervention studies with 
children and adolescents published since 2012, the substitution of SSB for other 
non-sugary drinks has shown positive changes on body weight (Ebbeling, Feldman, 
et al., 2012; Koning, Malik, Rimm, Willet, & Hu, 2011; Ruyter, Olthof, Seidell, & Katan, 
2012).  An intervention study (Ruyter et al., 2012) with 641 school children 
demonstrated that replacing a SSB for a non-sugary drink among the intervention 
group (104 kcal/day less) for 18 months resulted in less weight gain on average in 
the intervention group (6.3 kg) than in the control group (7.37 kg), a difference of 
1.07kg , 95% CI (-1.54. -1.48). Other RCTs have shown the same relationships; for 
example, Ebbeling, Feldman et al (2012) showed that, after one year, between SSB 
consumers versus not consumers, there were significant differences between 
groups for changes in BMI of almost half BMI point (−0.57, p = .045) and weight, with 
a mean reduction of almost 2kg (−1.9 kg, p = .04) (Ebbeling, Feldman, et al., 2012). 
 
Five recent systematic reviews and one meta-analysis have updated the evidence, 
showing a positive relationship between SSB and increase in weight or BMI (Gibson, 
2008; Malik et al., 2013; Malik et al., 2006; Te Morenga et al., 2013; Vartanian et al., 
2007).  Gibson found 12 out of 27 cross-sectional studies showed a significant 
positive association between SSB and BMI or weight gain, and of the longitudinal 
studies reviewed 8 out of 17 showed positive associations between SSB 
consumption and BMI or weight gain in at least one subgroups (Gibson, 2008).  
Maliki’s meta-analysis found that of 32 studies, 20 in children (15 cohort studies, 
and 5 trials) and 12 in adults (7 cohort and 5 trials) found positive associations of 
SSB consumption and BMI or weight in both adults and children (Malik et al., 2013).  
These results supported a previous systematic review of 30 publications (15 cross-
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sectional, 10 prospective and 5 experimental studies) finding experimental 
evidence indicated the same type of association (Malik et al., 2006).  Te Moregan 
(2013) reviewed 30 trials and 38 cohort studies and found that among adults with 
ad libitum diet those with a reduced consumption of sugars were associated with a 
decrease in body weight of approximately 800g, while the opposite was also 
observed: as consumption of sugars increased, an increase of approximately 750g 
in body weight was observed.  A meta-analysis of Vartanian et al. (2007) found an 
association of SSB consumption and increased energy intake and body weights and 
a decrease of milk consumption impacting on calcium intake.  However they 
mentioned that some studies that had funding from the food industry reported 
smaller effects (Vartanian et al., 2007).  Massougbodji et al. (2014) asses the quality 
of evidence 7 years later, and concluded on the causal relation between SSB 
consumption and body weight.  Of 5 meta-analysis, 3 qualitative systematic reviews 
and 12 qualitative non-systematic reviews, they found that four received funding 
from the food industry.  Using a scoring system with a Likert scale to assess quality 
of the evidence, they found that the causal consumption of SSB consumption and 
weight was positive.  They found that four studies received funding from the food 
industry and those were more likely to suggest the causal relationship was weak, 
pointing out it was relevant to minimize threats to scientific objectivity and quality 
of research (Massougbodji, Le Bodo, Fratu, & De Wals, 2014) , and concurred with 
findings from Vartanian et al (2007) published 7 years earlier, who found that on 
average the over effect size for industry funded studies was significantly smaller 
than the average effect size of non-funded studies.  Additionally, they found the 
quality of the systematic reviews  had some mistakes in the analysis: the relative 
weight given to certain studies, inadequate statistical power, and adjusted 
coefficients due to total energy consumption, and the effect of SSB contribution on 
total energy consumption (Massougbodji et al., 2014). 
 
III. Population approaches and policy actions to tackle obesity  
 
As the evidence of environmental factors influencing obesity has strengthened in 
recent years, academics and international organisations have called for 
governments to take a range of policy actions (Mozaffarian et al., 2012; OECD, 
2010b; WB, 2011; WHO, 2004, 2007b, 2008, 2012).  However, only in the past 6 
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years fiscal policies that change prices such as taxing or subsidising foods have 
emerged (Cecchini et al., 2010; Sassi, Cecchini, Lauer, & Chisholm, 2009; WHO, 
2016a). 
 
In particular, three publications from international organisations influenced the 
development of a Mexican strategy to tackle obesity (SSA, 2013b).  The first was a 
scientific statement issued by the American Heart Association, advocating a public 
health approach (Mozaffarian et al., 2012); the second was a report by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Sassi et al., 
2012), with an economic evaluation approach; and the third was a set of 
recommendations outlined by the WHO in the past decade urging governments to 
promote responsible marketing of foods and non-alcoholic beverages to children, in 
order to reduce the impact of foods high in saturated fats, trans-fatty acids, free 
sugars, or salt’ (WHO, 2008, p. 20). 
 
The American Heart Association Scientific Statement (AHSS) called ‘Population 
Approaches to Improve Diet, Physical Activity, and Smoking Habits: A Scientific 
Statement From the American Heart Association’ was published at the beginning of 
2013 on behalf of several organisations, including the Council on Epidemiology and 
Prevention, Council on Nutrition, Physical Activity and Metabolism, Council on 
Clinical Cardiology, Council on Cardiovascular Disease in the Young, Council on the 
Kidney in Cardiovascular Disease, Council on Peripheral Vascular Disease, and the 
Advocacy Coordinating Committee.  The AHSS reviewed the evidence on population 
approaches aimed at improving diet, physical activity, and smoking.  It provided a 
framework for policymakers and advocacy groups to better translate evidence into 
action (Mozaffarian et al., 2012).  The document summarised the consensus on the 
evidence for (a) media and educational campaigns; (b) labelling and consumer 
information; (c) taxation, subsidies and economic incentives; (d) school and 
workplace approaches; (e) local environmental changes; and (f) direct restrictions 
and mandates.  A number of the reviewed studies suggested that media and 
educational campaigns or labelling were less effective in lower education or 
minority subgroups.  However, direct restrictions and mandates, such as restricting 
unhealthy foods in schools or workplaces, appear especially promising for 
influencing the entire population, while also having an effect on reducing inequality.  
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For taxation and subsidies on foods evidence was more consistent in suggesting 
stronger effects in youth or lower-income or disadvantaged populations 
(Mozaffarian et al., 2012). 
 
The 2010 OECD report published the results of an economic evaluation conducted 
by the OECD to outline the benefits of group interventions and policy interventions 
to tackle obesity (Sassi, 2010).  It specified the cost-benefit of each intervention and 
the cost-benefit of a group of interventions for each OECD country member.  For 
example, the assessment for Mexico demonstrated that the best obesity prevention 
programs that could be implemented for improving DALYs were: (a) counselling 
provided by a physician and dietician with 150,000 DALYs per year; (b) physician 
counselling alone, with less than 40,000 DALYs per year; (c) fiscal policies; (d) food 
and beverage marketing regulation; (e) interventions at workplace; (f) food 
labelling; (g) information campaigns; (h) self-regulation of food marketing; and (i) 
school-based interventions (OECD, 2010a). 
 
According to the OECD, individual prevention programs in Mexico could avoid 
47,000 deaths by chronic disease, but a comprehensive prevention strategy could 
prevent 55,000 deaths, with a cost of 12 USD per person (OECD, 2010a).  The 
approach recommended tackling the ‘root causes of obesity and overweight’ (as 
framed by the authors) by implementing a set of comprehensive strategies involving 
all key stakeholders and communities.  The main strategies implemented 
internationally include: 
 
 
 
 
 Health education and health promotion (mass media  
campaigns, school-based interventions, and worksite 
interventions)1-4; 
 Legislation to promote breastfeeding4;  
 Regulation of food advertising to children1-4; 
 Mandatory nutrition labelling1-4; 
 Counselling of individuals at risk in primary care1-4; and 
 The use of taxes on unhealthy food and sweetened beverages1-4. 
 
(1Cecchini et al., 2010; 2Mozaffarian et al., 2012;3 WHO, 2010a, 42014b) 
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The WHO has published several calls for actions to all governments to implement 
programs and policies to tackle NCDs and associated risk factors.  These 
recommendations have been updated and discussed on a regular basis by the WHO 
members, as well as with the public through open consultations (WHO, 2014c; WHO 
& FAO, 2014).  
 
The first document published by the WHO to address diet and nutrition for NCDs 
was the Technical Document on Diet, Nutrition and the Prevention of Cardiovascular 
Diseases, published in 2003 followed by the Global Strategy for Diet, Physical 
Activity and the Prevention of Chronic Diseases, published in 2004.  The first 
document contained all the evidence and suggested action that relates diet and 
physical activity with NCDs. Further, it outlined some prerequisites for effective 
strategies, such as improving research and increasing public resources for this 
matter (WHO, 2003).  The second document urged the Member States to ‘develop, 
implement and evaluate actions recommended in the Strategy, and to promote 
healthy diet and physical activity to individuals and to the community to reduce the 
risk and incidence of NCDs’ (WHO, 2004).  It was not until 2008 that a plan was 
published to implement the Global Strategy (WHO, 2004, 2008) called The Action 
Plan for the Global Strategy for the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable 
Diseases 2008-2013.  
 
In 2010, the WHO published its recommendations on marketing foods and non-
alcoholic beverages to children.  This document included specific policy 
recommendations to restrict any advertising of foods to children (WHO, 2010a).  In 
2013, the Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of NCDs 2013-2020 was 
published by the WHO as an update of the 2008 document.  It outlined a set of policy 
options for members of the United Nations.  These policy recommendations were 
more comprehensive than the recommendations in previous documents.  They 
included policies aimed at: (a) reducing salt intake, (b) replacing trans fats and 
saturated fats with unsaturated fats, (c) implementing public awareness 
programmes on diet and physical activity, (d) following the WHO recommendations 
on food marketing to children, and (e) managing food taxes and subsidies to 
promote a healthy diet (WHO, 2013a).  This was the first time food taxes were 
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mentioned by the WHO explicitly in any of their written reports or resolutions 
(WHO, 2013a). 
 
During the opening session of the 8th Global Conference on Health Promotion in 
Helsinki, Finland on June 2013, the WHO Director General Margaret Chan addressed 
the topic of health promotion, noting that ‘prevention must be the cornerstone of 
the global response to these costly, deadly, and demanding diseases’ and that ‘[their] 
root causes reside in non-health sectors. Collaboration among multiple sectors is 
imperative’ (WHO, 2013b).  Here recommendations included the application of 
policy actions focused on social determinants.  Above all, the chief executive of the 
WHO stressed avoiding food industry self-regulation and embedding goals for 
industry within government actions.  The aim was to avoid the prioritisation of 
private economic interests over public interests in food policymaking: ‘the current 
threat now is not only Big Tobacco, but public health should also challenge the Big 
Food, Big Soda, and Big Alcohol. These industries threaten regulation and protect 
themselves using the same tactics’ (WHO, 2013c). 
 
Over the years, the WHO’s recommendations concerning population approaches to 
reduce NCDs, including obesity, have changed in style.  Previously, they were more 
general recommendations (WHO 2004) while recently they have become more 
specific, even suggesting several indicators for evaluation and monitoring policy 
actions to decrease NCDs (WHO, 2008, 2013a).  Some of the recommendations were 
included in a  framework of action at the second International Conference on 
Nutrition ICN2 (WHO & FAO, 2014), which is the United Nations’ goal of mobilising 
actions towards reducing hunger and improving nutrition globally (UN, 2016).  Also, 
in 2016 the WHO published recommendations urging member states to include 
fiscal policies for sugary drinks on national agendas (WHO, 2016a).  
 
These and other publications calling governments to act on NCDs and obesity 
published before 2012 influenced the Mexican obesity agenda, as will be discussed 
in Chapters 4 and 7 (Barquera, Campos, & Rivera, 2013; SSA, 2013b).  The way in 
which such policy recommendations were used to frame arguments for and against 
the soda tax and to raise the issue on the policy agenda are discussed in Chapters 5 
and 6 of this thesis as part of the policy analysis.  
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Health-related food and beverage taxes 
Food prices play an important role in purchasing decisions.  Research on the price 
of unhealthy foods and costs of diets has suggested that the healthiest diets cost 
double the price of the least healthy diet in some countries (UK, US, South Africa) 
(Drewnowski, 2009; Jetter & Cassady, 2006; Morris, Hulme, Clarke, Edwards, & 
Cade, 2014; Rao, Afshin, Singh, & Mozaffarian, 2013; Temple, Steyn, Fourie, & De 
Villiers, 2011).  In the United Kingdom the price of unhealthy foods has decreased 
over time, while the gap between the price of healthy and unhealthy foods has 
widened (Jones, Conklin, Suhrcke, & Monsivais, 2014).  The rationale for using price 
interventions on food and beverages lies in the ability to change consumption, 
decrease the gap of prices between unhealthy and healthy foods, and decrease the 
incidence of NCDs related to diet (Capacci et al., 2012; WHO, 2016a).  Subsidising 
healthy foods like fruits and vegetables or taxing unhealthy foods such as saturated 
fat have been considered as public health interventions.  
 
Evidence about the effects of taxing health-related products, such as tobacco, alcohol 
and unhealthy food and beverages, has suggested that this approach can be a 
powerful tool for health promotion.  However, arguments for and against health-
related fiscal measures have been contested in the media, in academic publications 
and by policymakers.  The main argument in favour of fiscal measure is that they 
attain public health objectives using a population level approach which is straight 
forward to implement.  The main arguments against are concerns about possible 
substitution effects (especially for SSBs), the fact that such taxes are regressive (they 
affect people with low incomes more severely than people with high income) and 
that demand is inelastic (an economic term used to describe the situation in which 
the quantity demanded or supplied of a good or service is unaffected when the price 
of that good or service changes).  These arguments are explained ahead and 
throughout this thesis as they are considered as some of the main narratives in the 
policy debate for soda taxes. 
 
Health taxes can potentially have both positive and negative effects.  Because both 
modelling studies and empirical evaluations have produced conflicting results, 
policymakers need to consider several factors when designing a health-related 
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commodity tax.  Some of these considerations include the amount of the tax, how to 
frame the aim of the tax and the context in which the tax was designed and 
implemented (Bødker et al., 2015c; Wright, Smith, & Hellowell, 2017). 
 
Designing health-related food and beverage taxes 
The main consideration when designing health-related food and beverage taxes is 
the scope of  the tax.  A distinction can be made between taxes on individual products 
and taxes on ingredients.  For example, for SSB’s the tax could be imposed on drinks 
with added sugars, or it could be imposed on sugar as an ingredient (as is the case 
in Norway).  Between the two options, there is a trade-off between the ease of 
implementation, administration, and its effectiveness.  A tax on a specific product 
(e.g. SSB) is easier to determine and administer but, since there will be alternatives 
that are not taxed but still have a high sugar content, substitution to untaxed 
products is likely (e.g. natural juices or sweet foods in general).  Conversely, taxing 
added sugar as an ingredient brings a significant administrative burden as it affects 
a large range of products, but its health effect will be larger as substitutions are less 
likely to occur because the price of all products containing sugar increases (Harding 
& Lovenheim, 2014; Sassi, Belloni, & Capobianco, 2013). 
 
The next consideration is the type of tax to apply.  A health-related food or beverage 
tax is an indirect tax.  It could be either as a Value Added Tax (VAT) or as an excise 
levy.  The discussion is to consider between increasing the rate of an existing Value 
Added Tax (VAT) or introducing an excise levy that can be in addition to an existing 
VAT on the product.  VAT is applied ad valorem,  proportional to the sales price of 
the product, meaning that the value of the tax is smaller if the price of the product is 
lower (Chaloupka, Powell, & Chriqui, 2011; Chaloupka, 2012; Chaloupka, Yurekli, & 
Fong, 2012; Cornelsen & Carriedo, 2015).  An excise is applied to a product when 
manufactured, rather than at the sales point (as the VAT), but the producer can 
recover by raising the price to the buyer.  Excise levy can be applied in addition to a 
VAT,  and it is typically a ‘per unit’ tax, costing a specific amount per volume or unit 
of the item purchased.  This type of tax is commonly used to raise government 
revenue and is levied upon goods for which demand is relatively less responsive to 
price changes and for which few substitutes exist.  For example, tobacco, fuel and 
alcohol are all taxed via excise duty in addition to VAT.  It is also argued that excise 
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duties correct negative externalities, or harm caused by consumption on third 
parties (Chaloupka et al., 2011; Chaloupka, 2012; Chaloupka et al., 2012; Cornelsen 
& Carriedo, 2015).  
 
An excise duty is likely to have a larger impact on consumption as it is imposed on a 
unit of product (e.g. per litre of SSB) and at the same rate regardless of its price (e.g. 
branded and non-branded drinks would be taxed equally).  As VAT is levied based 
on the product price, it incentivises purchases of larger quantities (e.g. the price per 
litre is typically lower for a 1 L bottle in comparison to 0.33 L bottle).  Both types of 
taxes are regressive, but taxes based on volume of consumption, rather than value, 
have indicated they  have a lower tax burden (Cornelsen & Carriedo, 2015; Sharma, 
Hauck, Hollingsworth, & Siciliani, 2014). 
 
Finally, policymakers should consider whether the tax rate will change over time.  
The advantage of VAT is that it is already linked to inflation (Cornelsen & Carriedo, 
2015; Sharma et al., 2014).  An excise duty, linked to a unit of consumption, has to 
be indexed to inflation; otherwise, it will become less significant as prices rise.  
Furthermore, an excise duty can be introduced gradually, meaning that the tax rate 
is set to increase by increments for a number of years, a policy that has been applied 
to tobacco and alcohol products.  Gradual implementation of the duty allows time 
for consumers to change their habits and soften the impact on households and 
businesses (Cornelsen & Carriedo, 2015; Sharma et al., 2014).  
 
A model constructed to look at the potential effects of VAT on food consumption in 
the UK (Mytton, Gray, Rayner, & Rutter, 2007) examined three different types of 
food taxation schemes: (a) extending VAT to saturated fat (nutrient/ingredients of 
foods), (b) increasing VAT on foods treated as unhealthy by a nutritional score and 
(c) adding VAT to foods with high content of fat, salt and sugar.  This model showed 
that food expenditure could increase by 3.2%, 4% and 4.6%, respectively, but the 
authors stated that ‘taxing foodstuffs can have unpredictable health effects if cross-
elasticity of demand are ignored’.  For example, the model showed that all types of 
taxation predicted a reduction in fruit and vegetable consumption of approximately 
2% to 4% due to cross-elasticity effects (Mytton et al., 2007; Nnoaham, Sacks, 
Rayner, Mytton, & Gray, 2009a). In contrast, the modelling study by Nnoaham et al. 
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for the UK using the Expenditure and Food Survey and the National Food Survey 
1988-2000 showed reductions of 0.5% of energy intake, 2.4% of saturated fats, 
2.3% of sodium and 2.7% of fruits and vegetables with a VAT of 17.5% on saturated 
fats (2009a). 
 
As the tax is generally levied upon the producer or the seller, the impact depends 
also on whether the tax is passed through to consumers.  Taxes can be passed on 
fully or be over-shifted or under-shifted.  If the tax is over-shifted, the price increase 
passed on to the consumer is higher than the current tax.  In the case of under-
shifting, the tax is not fully passed on to the consumer.  Over-shifting is likely to 
occur when the demand for taxed foods or beverages is inelastic (i.e. less price 
responsive), as for example has been observed in the case of alcohol taxes.  In these 
cases, it is usual for companies to use this opportunity to coordinate price increases 
equivalent to the tax or greater as one of the main strategies to mitigate the tax 
impact on them but not on the consumer (WHO, 2010b).  It has also been found that 
under-shifting is likely to occur for cheaper products and over-shifting for more 
expensive products as the price responsiveness varies depending on the price of the 
product (Ally et al., 2014).  Prospective modelling studies generally assume that the 
tax is fully passed on to the consumers.   
 
The use of taxes to prevent adverse outcomes (such as NCDs and obesity) must be 
close to the behaviour being targeted.  For example, a levy aimed to reduce 
consumption of a certain food would have a higher impact if it were lower in the 
supply chain, such as at the point of purchase for the consumer (Cornelsen & 
Carriedo, 2015; Sassi et al., 2013; Wright et al., 2017). 
 
Countries which have introduced food and beverage taxes  
Only six national governments and one US city have passed legislation to use 
existing taxes for influencing food or soft drink consumption, or have introduced 
new taxes on foods or beverages.  Table 2.1 summarises the places where taxes on 
unhealthy foods and beverages have been proposed or implemented.  Taxes on 
commodities are seen as a source of fiscal revenues and a way to address 
consumption externalities (Sassi et al., 2013).  However, in recent years, the policy 
emphasis has been increasingly placed on the potential health benefits.  Excise and 
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duty are often related to changing behaviour and often referred as ‘sin taxes’ (Haavio 
& Kotakorpi, 2011).  Finland is the only country where revenue collection is 
reported as the primary objective (ECORYS, 2014).  
 
All food and drink taxes that have been implemented were excise duties except for 
those in Mexico, as the soda tax is a special type of excise called Special Tax for 
Products and Services (Impuesto Especial sobre Productos y Servicios- IEPS), and 
the snack tack uses a VAT rate.  Hungary and Mexico have taxes on foods high in salt, 
sugar or fat content and on sugary drinks/soft drinks/drinks with added sugar. 
Finland has a tax on sweets, ice cream and soft drinks, whereas Norway, France, 
Chile, and the City of Berkley (California, USA) have implemented taxes on soft 
drinks only (Wright et al., 2017).  The UK has proposed a SSB tax to start in 2018 
(Gov. UK, 2017).  Other countries such as Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Australia, and 
the region of Catalonia in Spain are currently discussing the introduction of SSB 
taxes (Wright et al., 2017). 
 
In many cases such taxes have been introduced against strong opposition, requiring 
strong political will.  This can be a problem if there are changes in the government 
or in the political landscape in a country.  For example, Denmark’s tax on saturated 
fat was introduced in October 2011 following experts’ recommendations (Bødker et 
al., 2015c), as a national survey suggested 79% of the Danish population was eating 
more than their recommended intake from saturate fat. The tax became effective in 
2011, at was DKK 16 (2.9 USD) per kg of saturated fat.  The tax was introduced as a 
government finance initiative rather than a public health policy.  Initially it had a 
strong political support, but was highly contested by the food industry through the 
whole process (Bødker et al., 2015c).  The tax was rescinded in 2013 because of 
sustained industry lobbying, a failure of political and public support and a lack of 
policy actors to defend the tax.  The tax was contested by food industry actors using 
several tactics including threatening lawsuits, using media to predict negative 
consequences such as welfare or revenue losses, casting doubt on evidence for the 
tax, diverting focus by suggesting the tax should be placed on other products, and 
requesting postponement (Bodker,  2012).   The tax also became highly unpopular 
publically as it was felt it led to inflation and high administrative costs, despite 
evidence using retail sales data that showed it only decreased sales by 0.9% 
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(Bodker, 2015).  The main argument used to abolish the tax was to promote business 
and create jobs.  Also argument about the lack of an effect on the consumption of 
saturated fat was attributed to Danish shoppers downgrading to cheaper brands 
from budget supermarkets, or increased cross-border shopping in cheaper 
countries (Bødker, Pisinger, Toft, & Jørgensen, 2015a).  As Caraher et al argue, a new 
way of looking at policy formation is required in this and similar cases, and this 
includes addressing the power of corporate interests and the role of professionals 
in shaping or combating these influences (Caraher & Cowburn, 2015). The Danish 
debate was highly influenced by the agricultural and food industry which also 
affected public perception (Bødker et al., 2015c; Wright et al., 2017). Another similar 
case occurred in Finland, as the Finnish government rescinded a planned tax 
increment for 2015 in the sweets tax due to a complaint filed with the European 
Commission by the Finnish Food and Drinks Industries Federation calling into 
question the lawfulness of the tax, which has reportedly hindered the government 
in expanding the scope of the tax (Tettinen, 2014).  
 
The amount of levies introduced varies between countries.  Hungary has the lowest 
fiscal tax, while Finland has the highest (which is also progressive).  Also the scope 
of the taxes (ingredients vs food/beverages) and the rates in each of the countries 
varies.  In absolute values, and with the evaluations available from the current 
health tax interventions, Mexico has gained the highest income, as revenues doubled 
the expected, in the first two years (Wright et al., 2017)(Wright et al., 2017).  
 
43 
Table 2.1 Health-related food taxes implemented by 2014 
 
 
Effectiveness of food and beverage taxes  
To evaluate the effectiveness of taxes, the target outcome must be clearly 
established. The immediate responses are mainly a reduction in food/beverage 
Country Year What are 
taxed 
Rate of tax Type of tax and 
reasoning 
Revenues 
raised 
Hungary 
 
2011 Foods high in 
sugar, fat or 
salt and 
sugary drinks  
Soft drinks: ~£0.02 per/L  
Syrups or concentrates: 
~£0.5 per/L  
Energy drinks: ~£0.64 
per/L  
Pre-packaged sugary 
products: ~£0.33 per/kg  
Salty snacks (salt > 
1g/100g): ~£0.64 per/kg 
Jam: ~£1.28 per/kg  
Excise; public 
health/revenue 
for health 
services 
2011: ~£8m 
2012: ~£47m 
2013: ~£46m 
Denmark 
 
2011  
(abolish-
ed in Jan 
2013)  
Products 
with more 
than 2.3% of 
saturated fat 
(meat, dairy, 
animal fats 
and oils) 
Saturated fat: ~£1.76 
per/kg  
 ~£115m;  
Estimated 
administrative 
cost ~£5m-19m 
 
France 
 
2012 Drinks 
containing 
added sugar 
or sweetener 
Sugared and non-sweetened 
drinks: 
2012: ~£0.057 per/L  
2013: ~£0.058 per/L 
2014: ~£0.059 per/L 
Energy drinks: ~£0.79 
per/L 
Excise, adjusted 
annually to 
inflation;  
public health and 
revenue 
£268m 
Finland 
 
2011 Sweets, ice 
cream and 
soft drinks 
Soft drinks; sweets and ice 
cream: 
2011: ~£0.06 per/L; ~£0.6 
per/kg  
2012: ~£0.09 per/L; ~£0.75 
per kg  
2014: ~£0.17 per/L; ~£0.75 
per/kg  
Excise with 
gradual increase; 
revenue 
collection 
/public health 
2011: £95m 
2012: £129m 
2013: £144m 
 
Mexico 
 
2014 Sugary 
drinks and 
high-calorie 
foods (e.g. 
chips, sweets, 
breakfast 
cereals) 
Sugary drinks: £0.04 per/L  
High-calorie foods: 8% 
increase in VAT 
Excise/VAT; 
health (2014) 
2014: ~£1,252m 
(58% tax from 
sodas and 42% 
from high-calorie 
foods; (IMCO., 
2015) 
US, 
California, 
Berkley 
2014 Sugar-
sweetened 
beverages 
~£0.24 per/L (City of 
Berkley Finance 
Department, 2014) 
Excise; 
health 
$692,000 in 
revenues were 
raised in the first 
six month (Ng et 
al., 2015) 
Chile 2014 Sugar-
sweetened 
beverages  
10%  
If >15g/240ml of sugar 18% 
(Ministerio de Hacienda, 
2014b)  
Excise; 
revenue, health 
Not data yet 
UK 2018 Sugar-
sweetened 
beverages 
Sugar content: 
< 5g per 100 ml 18p/liter 
 < 8g per 100ml 24p/liter 
Excise *An estimated 
£520m a year 
(Triggle, 2016) 
 Sources other than specified: 
1.Ecorys. Food taxes and their impact on competitiveness in the agri-food sector. Final report for DG Enterprise and Industry. 2014. 
2.Ecorys. Food taxes and their impact on competitiveness in the agri-food sector. Final report for DG Enterprise and Industry. Annex - 
Case Studies in Member States. 2014. 
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consumption, a decrease in expenditures on that particular good, and the income 
obtained by the tax. Current evidence on the effectiveness and impact of soda taxes 
is limited.  Most evidence has arisen from modelling studies, but comprehensive 
reviews of empirical evaluations of implemented health taxes are not yet available.  
In 2009 a literature review of empirical evidence on food price sensitivity and 
weight outcomes, showed a statistically significant association between prices and 
weight changes, though the magnitude of the effect was small (Powell & Chaloupka, 
2009).  Sturm et al. also related the presence of existing taxes on products of vending 
machines with the BMI of adolescents controlling for socioeconomic status, gender 
and education, and found a weak association and a negative one when looking only 
at vending machines (Sturm, Powell, Chriqui, & Chaloupka, 2010).  However, 
measuring the effectiveness of such taxes on health outcomes (such as prevalence 
of IMC, obesity and NCDs) is possible only after several years.  Long-term and well-
designed studies will be needed for inferring causality between taxes and health 
changes (Wright, 2017). 
  
Evidence on effectiveness of food price interventions  
Modelling and simulation studies on the impact of prices on food have suggested 
that an increase of prices on unhealthy foods and SSBs could reduce risk of obesity, 
and reduce health costs (Beydoun, Powell, Chen, & Wang, 2011; Finkelstein, Zhen, 
Nonnemaker, & Todd, 2010; Fletcher, Frisvold, & Tefft, 2010b; Sturm et al., 2010).  
Sturm et al. found that increasing state level taxes in the US by 1%, which were at 
the time less than 4%, did not substantially affect the levels of SSBs consumption in 
children, with an average reduction of 0.013 BMI (Sturm et al., 2010).  However at-
risk children (i.e. those who are overweight, come from low-income families, or are 
African American) were more sensitive than other children to soda taxes.  Beydoun 
et al. (2011) examined the association of the price of fast-foods and the price of fruits 
and vegetables with dietary intakes and BMI among U.S. children and adolescents 
using data from the Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals from year 
1994 to 1998.  They found that in children between 2-9 y a higher price on fast-foods 
(by 1USD) was associated with lower intakes (β ± SE: - 0.9 ± 0.3 count/d), and an 
increased price of fruits and vegetables inversely related to fibre intake (β 6, SE: 23.3 
6 1.5 g/d) and positively associated with BMI (4.3 ± 1.2 kg/m2) (Beydoun et al., 
2011). These associations were almost equally balanced between low and high 
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income families.  Finkelstein et al. studied the impact of targeted beverage taxes on 
higher and lower-income households using the Nielsen Homescan Panel on Food 
and Beverage Purchases 2006.  They measured weekly purchases for a 12 month 
period.  They assessed associations among beverage prices, energy intake, and 
weight using multivariate regression models and found 20% and 40% tax on SSBs 
would reduce beverage purchases by a mean (SE) of 4.2 (1.6) and 7.8 (2.8) kcal/d 
per person, respectively (Finkelstein et al., 2010).  
 
Mytton et al. (2007) suggested that, a fat tax could produce a small change in food 
consumption and cardiovascular diseases (CVDs) or cancer, but only if accompanied 
with other measures to subsidise fruits and vegetables.  Another modelling study 
found that taxing sources of dietary saturated fat in the UK is unlikely to reduce CVD 
or cancer mortality.  If unhealthy foods are taxed and subsides applied to fruits and 
vegetables by 17.5%, this could avert up to 2,900 CVD or cancer deaths yearly.  The 
same study found that taxing ‘less healthy’ foods and using all tax revenue to 
subsidize fruits and vegetables could increase prevented deaths to 6,400 per year, 
but that any of these two options would be economically regressive, and positive 
health effects will not necessarily be greater in lower income groups (Nnoaham, 
Sacks, Rayner, Mytton, & Gray, 2009b).   
 
Finally, food and beverage taxes may decrease costs associated with NCDs and 
obesity.  Sanchez Romero et al. used the Cardiovascular Disease Policy Model-
Mexico (a state transition model of Mexican adults aged 35-94 y), to project the 
potential future effects of reduced SSB intake by 10% on diabetes incidence, CVD 
events, direct diabetes healthcare costs, and mortality. They found that a 10% 
reduction in SSB consumption with 39% calorie compensation among Mexican 
adults over 10 y could save Mexico 983 million international dollars (95% UI $769 
million-$1,173 million (2016).  Expenditures were converted into 2011 US dollars 
using a purchasing power parity rate of 7.67 Mexican pesos = 1.00 international 
dollar, and inflated to 2012 currency using a 3.57% inflation rate (Sánchez-Romero 
et al., 2016). 
 
A meta-regression analysing 136 studies to assess the effect of income levels 
between and within countries on the strength of the relation between food price and 
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demand, and predicted price elasticities adjusted for differences across studies, 
concluded that an increase in the price of all foods causes a major reduction in food 
consumption among poorer counties.  For example, an increase of 1% on the price 
of cereals would reduce consumption by 0.61% (CI [0.56% to 0.66%]) in low-
income countries and by 0.43% (CI [0.36% to 0.48%]) in high-income countries.  
Furthermore, price elasticity is more responsive in lower-income countries than in 
high-income countries for several types of foods, including meat, dairy products, 
cereal, and fish suggesting contextual conditions (economic and political) particular 
to the country might be associated  (Green et al., 2013), as it has been suggested for 
the soda taxes (Thow, Heywood, Leeder, & Burns, 2011).  In relation to foods’ price 
elasticity of demand, defined as the percentage by which the demand changes in 
response to a 1% increase in price. The analysis found that in low income countries 
the lowest elasticities were for cereals (-0.43.-0.48) and fats/oils (-0.42, 95% CI-0.48 
to -0.35); and the highest elasticities were for animal source foods such as meat (-
0.78,95% CI -0.83 to -0.73) and fish (-0.80, 95% CI -0.85 to -0.74) and dairy (-0.78, 
95% CI -0.84 to -0.73); indicating people are more likely to stop buying this food if 
prices increase (Green et al., 2013). 
 
Modelling effectiveness of sugar-sweetened beverage taxes 
Several modelling studies have found a negative association between an increased 
price of SSBs and consumption of SSBs (Etilé & Sharma, 2015; Miao, Beghin, & 
Jensen, 2012), especially among heavy drinkers, concluding that an excise tax is 
effective for health purposes (Etilé & Sharma, 2015).  Two studies from the US 
modelled an increase in the price of SSB and found it reduces SSB consumption 
(Andreyeva et al., 2010; Powell, Chriqui, Khan, Wada, & Chaloupka, 2013a, 2013b; 
Smith & Jukes, 1997).  The first, by Powell, et al estimated the mean SSB price 
elasticity of −1.21 implied that a tax raising the price of SSBs by 20% (a penny per 
ounce) would reduce overall consumption of SSBs by 24%; it found that revenues 
from this tax in the US could generate 79 billion USD between 2010 and 2015 
(Chaloupka et al., 2011; Powell et al., 2013b).  Further, Andreyeva et al. (2010) found 
that an increase of 10 % in the price on soft drinks reduces their consumption by 
8% and 10%.  As mentioned by Chaloupka et al. (2011), ‘assuming that it takes a 
reduction of 3500 kcal to reduce body weight by a pound (2kg), a daily deficit of 50 
kcal could translate into significant losses in average body weight’.  
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In Mexico, two studies have reported on the possible elasticity and regressive nature 
of a tax on SSB.  One study using empirical simulations with statistical modelling and 
sensitivity analysis using the National Survey of Household Living Standards found 
that price elasticity of sweetened beverages increases as the income of a population 
decreases (Cahuana, Rubalcava, & Sosa, 2012).  The second study used two different 
surveys and found that sodas had an elasticity of -1.29 (SE 0.11) and -1.01 (SE 0.02), 
respectively, and both were significant at 1%.  When dividing the population into 
three income subgroups, the elasticity was still significant among all income 
categories (Colchero et al., 2012). 
 
Finally, two studies estimated the possible impact of soda taxes on obesity and 
diabetes.  One study using data of the National Nutrition Survey 2012 estimated the 
average Mexican person’s weight was 71.3 kg and could be reduced to 70.9 kg in 10 
years with a soda tax of 10%, to 70.5 kg with a 20% tax, and to 70.1 kg with a 30% 
tax (Barrientos, 2013; Colchero et al., 2012).  Additionally they estimated the 
current prevalence of adult obesity (34.1%) would decrease by 3% with a 10% tax, 
by 7% with a 20% tax, and by 8% with a 30% tax.  For overweight, the current 
prevalence (35.6%) would fall by 3% with a 10% tax, by 5% with a 20% tax, and by 
8% with a 30% tax.  With a 30% tax, almost 10.5% of the adult population would 
reach a normal weight (less than 25 IMC) in 10 years (Barrientos, 2013; Colchero et 
al., 2012).  In 2016 another study reported that with a decrease of 10% in SSB 
consumption and a 39% decrease in calorie compensation, would result in about 
189,300 (95% uncertainty interval [UI] 155,400-218,100) fewer type 2 diabetes 
cases; 20,400 fewer strokes and myocardial infarctions; and 18,900 fewer deaths 
occurring in Mexican adults from 2013 to 2022 (Sánchez-Romero et al., 2016).  
 
Empirical evaluation of food and soda taxes  
Some countries have already implemented taxes; however, to date, few evaluations 
are available to document the impact of these taxes on consumption, body weight or 
other health outcomes (Falbe, Rojas, Grummon, & Madsen, 2015; Ng et al., 2015).  In 
2011 the Hungarian Parliament approved a tax on pre-packed foods containing high 
salt and sugar to be implemented in September of that year to tackle rising obesity 
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rates.  When applied, Hungary estimated they would obtain revenues of about 20 
billion Hungarian forints (€74 million), but no evaluation is available. 
 
In Denmark, Smed et al. found that, while the tax on several high-fat products might 
have led to a decrease in demand, it was accompanied by a substitution effect with 
sugar (Smed, Jensen, & Denver, 2007).  A recent evaluation of the tax demonstrated 
that, during its implementation, saturated fat consumption was reduced by 4.0%.  
Vegetable consumption increased, and salt consumption increased for most 
individuals, except younger females.  Smed et al, also modelled a reduction in 
mortality with 123 lives saved annually, 76 of them below 75 years equal to 0.4% of 
all deaths from NCDs.  Recently, a group of researchers found the fat tax affected 
consumption and health, though causality was not presumed (Smed, Scarborough, 
Rayner, & Jensen, 2016).  
 
Finally, research conducted in the US offers a few examples of the possible effects of 
a SSB tax on body max index (BMI),  using the US states’ taxation of soft drinks, and 
using a fixed effect framework methodology applied previously for tobacco taxes 
(Fletcher, Frisvold, & Tefft, 2010a; Fletcher et al., 2010b).  Price had a statistically 
significant impact on behaviour and weight; however, the magnitude of the effect 
was small.  An increase in the state soft drink tax rate of one percentage point led to 
a decrease in BMI of 0.003 points and a decrease in obesity and overweight of 0.01 
and 0.02 percentage points, respectively (Fletcher et al., 2010a, 2010b).  Short-term 
results are available from Berkeley, California, indicating that the first US 1-cent-
per-ounce excise tax on the distribution of SSBs led to an increase in retail prices 
that affected Berkeley more than nearby cities that did not have the tax (Falbe et al., 
2015), indicating the taxes were passed on to the retail price (Ng, et al 2015). In 
Mexico, evaluations of the soda tax have indicated varying results, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
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IV. Summary 
 
This chapter highlights the current worldwide crisis of obesity.  It presents the 
aetiology of obesity and discusses research linking obesity and diabetes to the 
consumption of sugary drinks.  It also presents how international agencies and 
public health experts have called on countries to act upon the global obesity 
epidemic.  The OECD, the American Heart Association and the WHO have provided 
recommendations influencing the development of a Mexican soda tax.  The chapter 
also summarises the evidence from modelling studies related to the projected 
impact of soda taxes.  It reflects how modelling studies have indicated that a 
minimum increase in price of 20% is needed to have an impact on obesity.  Even 
though soda taxation has been implemented in some countries, there is little 
empirical evidence of the impacts. Some examples where this tax has already been 
implemented are presented with their main outcomes.   
50 
Chapter 3. Research methods 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the study design and the methodological approach used to 
answer the research questions.  First, the selection of theoretical frameworks used 
for the research is presented.  Second, the methods used and the data collection 
process are described.  Third, the analytical approach and data analysis are set out, 
together with the ethical considerations involved in the conduct of this research and 
the data management plan.  Finally, the main strengths and limitations of the data 
collection and analysis approaches are discussed.   
 
To understand fully the complexities of the policy explained here, different 
theoretical frameworks were considered.  The following section details how this 
case draws on a range of theoretical frameworks.  
 
II. Theoretical framework 
 
Policy theories and frameworks guide policy analysis (outlined in Table 3.1), and 
they enable to move from describing what happened during the process to 
explaining it and answering the question of why it happened (Cairney, 2013b; 
Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009, p. 17).  The term ‘theory’ refers to as ‘a set of 
analytical principles designed to structure our observations and explanations of the 
world’ (Cairney, 2013b, p. 2); and the term ‘framework’ as ‘one which identifies 
concepts and helps organise analysis and theoretical comparisons’ (Cairney, 2013, 
p. 2) or ‘ a conceptualization that provides a set of variables and the relationships 
among them that presumably account for a set of phenomena’(Sabatier, P 207, p. 6). 
Both theories and frameworks aided to explain the empirical research of this thesis.  
For example, theories were used for analysing results (as detailed in page 61), and 
aspects of the framework developed by Ritchie and Spencer for conducting policy 
research, were used to design the interview guide (explained in page 59-60). Among 
other theories  (Table 3.1) the framing theory was used for analysing results.  This 
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theory helped to conceptualise and facilitate analysis of how policy actors engaged 
in the process of framing the policy problem and policy responses.   
 
Within the social and political sciences, different theoretical frameworks exist, 
which help explain policymaking, as a complex process that spans levels of 
government, contextual settings, and geographical and socioeconomic conditions 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2014).  As John (2013b, p. 483) argues, policymaking is complex 
owing to the interplay of several factors, including the role of institutions, policy 
networks, exogenous factors, choices made by actors; and ideas that guide their 
behaviour.  All theories try to bring these factors together to explain the policy 
process, though some emphasize different factors or units of analysis (Cairney, 
2013b; Howlett et al., 2009, p. 31; John, 2013b; Gill Walt et al., 2008).  Theories 
sometimes overlap, yet they have different perspectives and provide different 
lenses to the policy process (John, 2013b, p. 12).  Under this assumption, several 
theories and concepts used in this study will be introduced.  Table 3.1 lists the 
theoretical frameworks used in this study, the main elements of each one, and how 
they were applied to drive the research questions and explain the findings. 
 
The use of different theories affords several advantages.  First, the ‘multiple lenses’ 
approach provides a more complete explanation of policy change.  Not all theories 
focus on the same aspects of the policy process.  Second, it provides more than one 
perspective and shows how different theories have comparative benefits.  Third, it 
is useful to become more aware of the assumptions that support each theory.  
Finally, as mentioned by Cairney et al. (2012), it provides different answers to the 
same question and prompts us to seek more evidence.  The purpose of using several 
theories or theoretical approaches to the data is to look in detail and through 
different lenses, the policy process and different parts of it, as the theories selected 
for this work do (see Table 3.1).   For example, the Social Network Approach (SNA) 
strongly focuses on stakeholders’ contacts, relationships, and dynamics and how 
these are either a part of structural factors (Rhodes, 1996, 2008; Rhodes & Bevir, 
2003) or of agency in policy formulation and decision-making (Rhodes, 1996). In 
this research the SNA helped to guide and reflect both the structure of the 
relationships as part of the political context, and into how these relationships 
evolved or changed throughout time as part of the policy process and how they 
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reflected in the policy outcome.    Other example is the advocacy coalition framework 
(ACF) which aims to analyse the effect of commonly represented beliefs (in 
coalitions) on policy outcome (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 2013; Sabatier & Weible, 
2014).  By contrast, the Multiple Stream Theory (MST) considers stakeholders (in 
this theory called ‘policy entrepreneurs’) as part of the politics, problem 
identification, and building of policy (Marsh & Smith, 2000).  For this thesis, the MST 
is also used to look in details to the politics behind the agenda setting, the problem 
identified and how the policy documents reflect those issues.  And an additionally 
this work uses framing theory too.  With this lens, the analysis looks in detail to the 
arguments about the policy problem and arguments used either to support or not 
the soda tax. 
 
For instance, one of the main potential problems is the issue of epistemological 
compatibility; however, different approaches are available for combining theories.  
Cairney (2012) identifies three ways of combining different approaches: the 
‘complementary approach’ which uses multiple concepts or theories to produce a 
series of perspectives with which to explain empirical outcomes; the ‘synthetic 
approach’ which is used to produce a theory or a hybrid theory, and the 
‘contradictory approach’ which aims to relate each individual theory to its empirical 
research agenda and, for example, use it in a multiple-case study. 
 
This thesis uses the ‘complementary approach’. This approach was selected because 
it encourages to relate different understandings of the world whereas some 
difference in the meaning attached to key terms, it is  manageable when we seek to 
compare a range of perspectives with this approach and, in doing so, recognize their 
different intellectual origins (Cairney, 2016, personal communication).  Sometimes, 
combining several theories might imply a practical problem for the research design 
(Cairney, 2013b), though it is not the case for this project, as several theories were 
considered before selecting the ones that were used. 
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Table 3.1 Theories, frameworks, and models used for research, main factors; purpose of using it; and research questions addressed  
Overall purpose of 
using  it  
Framework/theory/ model 
(authors) 
Main aspects of the policy 
process examined  
Rationale for use  Research question it helps 
to answer 
Design 
tools/research 
questions 
Elements considered for 
applied policy research 
(Ritchie & Spencer, 1994) 
Contextual, diagnostic, 
evaluative, strategic elements. 
To identify all parts to be 
included in the analysis. 
NA 
Categorize/organi
se material 
Stages-Heuristic Model 
(Lasswell, 1956) 
Five stages of policy process: 
problem identification, 
agenda setting, policy 
formulation, policy 
implementation, and policy 
evaluation. 
To organise empirical data.  
 
To illustrate the process of the 
soda tax within a period. 
NA 
Health Theory Triangle 
(Walt & Gilson, 1994) 
Context, actors, content, 
process.  
To identify all parts to be 
included in the analysis. 
 
To identify all factors and units 
of analysis needed for policy 
analysis. 
NA 
Analyses of 
empirical data 
Policy Networks (Adam & 
Kirsen, 2007; Schneider, 
2006;Tantivess & Walt, 2008) 
Actors and networks  To describe interactions and 
interconnectedness between 
groups of actors. 
 
To explain actors’ relationships 
and power, and the role of 
institutions in the case study. 
(O.3) What were the 
positions and influences of 
key actors toward the soda 
tax policy?  
 
(O.4) What were the role of 
the actors in shaping the 
design and implementation 
of the soda tax? 
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Multiple Stream Theory 
(Kingdon, 1984) 
Agenda setting 
 
To explain the ‘streams’ that 
influence the agenda setting. 
 
To explain the process, actors 
(policy entrepreneurs), and 
agenda setting of the soda tax. 
 
(O.1) What contextual 
factors facilitated or 
constrained this process in 
Mexico? 
 
(O.2) What was the process 
through which the soda tax 
became a policy option and 
part of the obesity strategy? 
 Framing Theory 
 
 
Examines problem definition, 
agenda setting, policy design, 
and evaluation of results 
To describe policy actors’ 
conceptualisation of ‘the policy 
problem’ and its solutions. 
 
To describe which ideas were 
promoted and judgements 
made throughout the design 
and implementation of the 
soda tax. 
 
To explain how actors perceive 
and talk about the policy and 
governance processes. 
 
To explain how the context of 
the Mexican situation is 
constructed by different actors. 
 
To explain the main objectives, 
assumptions, values, and the 
perceived impact of the soda 
tax regulation. 
(O.1) What contextual 
factors facilitated or 
constrained this process in 
Mexico? 
 
(O.3) What were the 
positions and influences of 
stakeholders toward the 
soda tax policy? 
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Selecting theoretical frameworks 
Two main criteria were used for selecting the theories.  First, the purpose of each 
theory was identified, as some of them are used only to classify information; others, 
to explain information; and still others, to predict information (Buse, Mays, & Walt, 
2012b). Second, the type of theory or framework that could best address the 
research questions was understood.  To explain the policy process of the soda tax, 
factors identified by Peter John (role of institutions, policy networks, exogenous 
factors, choices made by actors; and their ideas that guide their behaviour) were 
considered in this thesis (John, 2013b).  
 
The aim was to explore what influences the policymaking process, including the 
values of the actor involved, and their choices as they are key determinants of how 
the policy process starts and evolves (Kingdon, 1995).  For instance, as described in 
Chapter 6, the use of scientific evidence to inform policy decisions often becomes a 
political issue and not just a foundation for taking policy decisions (Stewart & Smith, 
2015). 
 
Furthermore, because the soda tax policy process is ongoing in Mexico, this project 
is what Buse calls a ‘prospective policy analysis’ (Buse, 2008, p. 325) or an account 
that considers politico-economic factors, forward-looking, real-time 
documentation, immediate lessons learned, and feedback on engendered strategies 
to engage in the policy process.  It includes accounts before the policy was 
implemented and the immediate reactions after it became effective.  It provides a 
set of snapshots of the ‘period of major policy change’ (Kingdon, 1995)  in Mexico 
aimed at addressing obesity only 12 years after obesity and diabetes rates in Mexico 
attracted the attention of health researchers.  Before going into details of how the 
theory has been applied in the empirical research, the next section explains all the 
elements and concepts considered in policy analysis. 
 
Elements of policy process considered for analysis 
This analysis considers certain elements of the policymaking process which have 
been suggested by scholars in the past to make it as comprehensive as possible 
under a defined scope.  This section identifies such elements and sets their 
boundaries. 
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In the mid-90s, Walt et al (2008) noted that the assessment of health policy in 
middle- and low-income countries was mainly focused on technical content and 
design without explaining how and why certain policies succeeded and others failed.  
The authors also called for a new paradigm of thinking to be applied to health policy 
analysis to understand the factors that influence the experiences and results of the 
policy change (Gilson & Raphaely, 2008).  For such an analysis, certain factors and 
concepts need to be considered, such as the policy ‘process’ and ‘context’ (Walt & 
Gilson, 1994); interaction of interests, ideas, and institutions (John, 2013a, pp. 12-
13); actors and the way in which they relate to each other (Rhodes, 2008); the 
choices they make (Ostrom, 2007; Weible, 2014); the power and influence of such 
actors (Erasmus & Gilson, 2008; Reich, 1995); and other events where the policy 
takes place (Cairney & Heikkila, 2014, pp. 364-365).  These concepts interplay in the 
policy process and in the choices and elections made to develop a policy and its 
content (Cairney & Heikkila, 2014).  In addition to these concepts, a particular space 
is given to ‘governance’ in this thesis, as this concept is related to what scholars 
define as a ‘new way of doing policy’ (Peters & Pierre, 1998) where various actors 
stress the importance of networks, partnerships, and markets (Hufty, 2010).  
Governance comprises ‘the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions 
through which citizens and groups articulate their interest, mediate their 
differences and exercise their right and obligations’ (Siddiqi et al., 2009). As Siddiqi 
et al. suggest, governance is the ‘least well-understood aspect of health systems’ 
(Siddiqi et al., 2009, p. 14).  As this research analyses networks during the soda tax 
policy and the influence of non-state actors, it is also relevant to consider aspects of 
governance, as it is a form of government into which citizens and groups are 
involved.  Table 3.2 provides a brief description of each concept used in this thesis 
and a brief explanation of how it is used. 
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Table 3.2 Concepts considered for policy analysis, definition, and application 
in this thesis 
Context Context is the setting in which the 
policy process occurs.  There are 
different contextual factors to 
consider when conducting policy 
analysis.  They include historical 
traditions, socio-structural 
determinants, self-interest of 
politically powerful sectors, 
political system, institutions, 
influence of economic ideologies, 
logic of particular sequential 
processes, and various ad hoc 
considerations (Whitehead, 
1990) (Walt & Gilson, 1994). 
 
For this thesis, the context includes 
the change in government, how the 
centralized policy worked within 
policy reforms, and the framing 
actors apply to the political problem, 
along with the other factors 
described in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Policy 
problem 
The policy problem refers to the 
perception of an issue as a public 
matter requiring government 
action and is influenced by 
previous efforts of government to 
respond to the. government 
officials learn from them through 
feedback of existing programmes, 
pressure groups, or sudden 
crisis(Buse, Mays, & Walt, 2012a).  
The problem identified in this thesis 
was the crisis of obesity Mexico had 
and the recent issues pointed out by 
pressure groups about the excessive 
sugary drinks consumption.   These 
problems not always are perceived 
similar by all the actors involved in 
the policy process, so it is key to 
understand stakeholders’ 
perceptions about the health issue 
discussed in this thesis. 
 
Policy process The policy process involves 
actors with different values 
involving spans of time, debates 
between policy actors, and 
complex structures (involving 
different levels of government) 
(Sabatier, 2007, p. 3). 
 
One of the main aims of the thesis is 
to explain the policy process of the 
soda tax. It considers factors from 
the problem identification, agenda 
setting, and some of the main 
reactions to the policy change. 
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Actors Actors are all the institutions or 
persons representing an 
institution or an organisation that 
were involved in the policy 
process.  During the policy 
process, numerous actors 
participate, though in practice, 
only those who are members of 
specific policy sub-systems tend 
to participate. 
 
Different theories use different 
names to refer to actors 
depending on their specific role 
in the policy process.  For 
example: veto players, policy 
entrepreneurs, or interest groups 
(Howlett et al., 2009). 
 
By focusing on actors, this analysis 
provides an overview of the political 
culture of the country.  States and 
institutions interplaying in this case 
are influenced by public actions and 
other mechanisms as explained in 
Chapters 6 and 7 and, in turn, they 
provide the means through which 
these actions are sustained or 
modified (Gilson, 1994). 
 
 
Power Power is defined ‘as an actor’s 
ability to induce or influence 
another actor to carry out his 
directives or any norms he 
supports’(Etzioni, 1961).  Power 
is the ability to influence others 
by shaping their preference or 
the ability to achieve a desired 
action (Buse et al., 2012b; 
Galston, 2006; Lukes, 2005). 
The use of power by several 
government and non-government 
actors in this case study is 
considered to explain to a certain 
degree how policy processes occur 
and how the power of some actors 
changes throughout the process.  
The theories selected for the 
analysis help to build on how groups 
of actors are portrayed as powerful 
or not by policy makers. 
 
Governance Governance refers to the 
mechanisms, processes, and 
institutions through which 
citizens and groups of actors 
articulate their interests, mediate 
their differences, and exercise 
their legal rights and obligations 
(United Nations Development 
Programme, 1997, p. 8).  Or ‘the 
actions and means adopted by a 
society to promote collective 
action and deliver collective 
solutions in pursuit of common 
goals’ (Dodgson, Lee, & Drager, 
2002, p. 6). 
 
The dynamics of actors and their 
relationships are portrayed as a key 
part of the policy process and the 
governance process of the soda tax 
throughout the analysis. 
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Institutions Institutions are organisations, 
laws, and rules that are central to 
every political system or area in 
which policy-making is done (de 
Leon, 1991, pp. 5-6; John, 2013b, 
p. 39).  Sometimes, certain 
institutions have an implicit 
group of norms of rules rather 
than an explicit form of them 
(Ostrom, 2007). 
 
These elements are considered 
throughout the analysis.  The change 
in some organisations, rules, and 
laws as well as ‘institutionalized’ 
frames of the problem and solution 
are explained in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
In this case, the acquired power of 
civil society was fast; however, in 
some other cases, it might take 
years.  As Carney mentions, ‘overall, 
past policies, based on rapid 
emotional judgements and 
policymakers’ values, provide key 
context for policymaking’ (Cairney, 
2016). Under these assumptions, 
this concept is applied to explain the 
values and perceptions that lead and 
drive the soda tax in Mexico. 
 
 
Defining and explaining the concepts considered for this policy analysis sets 
parameters to explain findings and aid the analysis that may otherwise be unclear 
to the reader.  This is particularly helpful as authors can attach ‘different meanings 
to the same concepts’ (Cairney, 2013a, 2013b; Cairney & Heikkila, 2014) and one 
must not assume that each theory refers to each term in the same way (Cairney & 
Heikkila, 2014).  When developing the policy analysis and using different theories 
to explain it, defining concepts becomes particularly relevant, as noted in the 
previous section and as stressed by Cairney (Cairney, 2013b).   
 
The following section describes how this empirical work used theory to organize 
and analyse the results.  It addresses the different theoretical considerations made 
to include the concepts mentioned above. 
 
Use of theory to organise units of analysis and temporality 
To organise the information, the Health Theory Triangle (Walt & Gilson, (1994)) and 
the Stages-Heuristic Theory (Lasswell, 1956) was followed.  The first one helped to 
map and classify all the factors influencing the soda tax policy, and the second one 
provided a simplification of the policy, as Schlacger describes it: ‘in a temporary and 
continuum of actions and decisions’ (Schlacger, 2007). 
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By using Walt and Gilson’s Health Theory Triangle, several variables were 
considered: actors, context, processes in policy-making, and content of the policy. 
These variables were considered to ‘achieve a comprehensive scope of the variables 
influencing the policy process’ (Walt & Gilson, 1994). 
 
Furthermore, Lasswell’s Stages-Heuristic Theory divides the policy process into 
agenda setting (including problem identification), policy formulation, policy 
legitimation (adoption), policy implementation and policy evaluation, and policy 
change or termination (de Leon, 1991, p. 8).  It was applied ‘as a guide or image of 
the phases that any collective act has’ (de Leon, 1991, p. 6).  This proposal has been 
criticized since the early 90s for not meeting the criteria of a scientific theory, and it 
has been rejected as a useful approach either for developing a model or for proving 
any hypothesis (Sabatier, 2007, p. 8).  Nonetheless, it is useful as ‘it is not so easy to 
give such a straightforward approach as it is intuitive appealing; and also to help us 
identify what part of the stages we are focusing on’ (Cairney, 2013a).   
 
Additionally, four categories that Ritchie and Spencer (1994) identified were 
considered when developing the ‘framework’ analytical approach for applied policy 
research.  These categories include questions about the contextual, diagnostic, 
evaluative, and strategic areas of the policy being studied.  Previous work on food 
policy analysis has considered them irrespective of using the framework as an 
analytical approach in the methodology (Milo, 1990; Seed, 2011).  For this research, 
these categories were included when designing the semi-structured interview topic 
guide, and they are described in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Elements considered for the semi-structured interview guide 
adapted from Ritchie and Spencer’s (1994) analytical approach for applied 
policy research 
Category Sample of questions (Ritchie & 
Spencer, 1994) 
Questions used to guide semi-
structured interview 
Contextual What are the dimensions and 
perceptions that are held? 
Elements that operate within the 
system 
 
e.g. How he/his organisation frames 
‘obesity’ and/or ‘soda consumption’ 
and/or ‘free drinking water’?  
Diagnostic Why do particular needs arise? 
 
What factors underline particular 
attitudes and perceptions? 
Beliefs and actions during the 
problem, policy formulation, and 
agenda setting. 
 
e.g. How did he/his organisation 
perceive the soda tax? 
(positive/negative, and why?) 
 
Did they/he participate in any part 
of the process, and if so, how?  What 
does he think of other actors? 
Evaluative How are objectives achieved? 
 
How do experiences affect 
subsequent behaviour? 
Beliefs and actions after the soda 
tax implementation. 
 
e.g. Have you seen or perceived any 
changes related to water provision 
at schools? 
Strategic What actions are needed to make it 
more effective? 
Current plans/views/positions 
about the future of the soda tax in 
Mexico. 
Adapted from ‘Qualitative data analysis for applied policy research’ by Jane Ritchie and Liz 
Spencer in A. Bryman and R.G, Burgess (eds.) ‘Analysing qualitative data.’ 1994. pp.173-194. 
 
In addition to categorising the units of analysis, the theory also aided the analysis 
per se.  The next section describes the theories and frameworks used for this 
purpose. 
 
Use of theory to analyse findings 
To analyse the accounts of the documents and elite interview transcripts to answer 
the research questions, the following theoretical approaches were used: the policy 
network approach (PNA), the multiple stream theory (MST) and framing theory 
(FT).  These approaches and the rationale for their use in this study are described in 
brief below. 
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Policy network approach 
The Policy Network Approach (PNA) became popular in the mid-70s; it was 
developed based on social sciences’ social network analysis (SNA) (Parsons, 2005, 
p. 185).  SNA focuses on patterns of relationships between actors and examines the 
availability of resources and the exchange of resources between actors (Wasserman 
& Faust, 2003; Wellman & Berkowitz, 1988).  PNA applies the same principles but 
focuses on the links and interdependence of government and social actors with the 
aim of understanding the policy-making process and its outcomes (Rhodes, 2008; 
Rhodes & Marsh, 1992).  Networks of all types consist of a set of nodes (actors) 
linked by some form of relationship (or ties), and delineated by some specific 
criteria (Diani, 2003).  This work uses Rhodes’ definition for ‘policy network’ as ‘a 
set of formal and informal linkages between government and between other actors 
structured around shared beliefs, interests and resources for policy making’ 
(Rhodes, 2008, p. 425).  
 
The PNA can either be considered to describe the structure of the relationships in 
which a policy takes place (normally also mapped through quantitative methods) 
and/or give a connotation of agency in the policy process in terms of how these 
relationships behave and evolve throughout the policy process as a form of 
governance (Tantivess & Walt, 2008).  For instance, PNA helps to identify clusters 
of complex organisations and the deep structure that either shares or exchanges 
resources, frames issues, and considers biases of the different interests groups in 
the process (Parsons, 2005, p. 484).  Resources may be finance, knowledge, 
expertise, technologies, or the capacity to mobilize any of these as well as support 
from members of the network and from those outside it.  By understanding resource 
exchange in the network, influence over policy outcomes can be understood 
(Rhodes, 1996), including conflicting interests throughout the process, which some 
authors have particularly flagged for the case of food politics (Mialon, Swinburn, 
Allender, & Sacks, 2016; Mialon, Swinburn, & Sacks, 2015; Newton, Lloyd-Williams, 
Bromley, & Capewell, 2016; Swinburn et al., 2015). 
 
This analysis integrates both structure and agency for PNA (Marsh & Smith, 2000; 
Swinburn et al., 2015).  The focus of this analysis is presented in Chapter 5, and 
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Chapters 6 and 7 show some dynamics of such networks while describing the 
actions taken by different actors in the policy process.  For this case study, some 
elements of governance (as defined in table 3.2) in relation to power/influence (as 
defined in table 3.2) and the cooperation of non-state actors during the policy 
process are considered for the analysis, including three principles of governance: 
responsiveness, participation, and accountability taken from a broader analytical 
framework for assessing health system governance (Siddiqi, 2009). Responsiveness 
refers to the policy response to population health needs, participation refers to how 
the actors take part in decision-making process and how they voice their views, and 
accountability refers to how actors involved in policy making (government officials, 
academics, private sector and civil society) are liable to the public. These principles 
are in some sense a combination of the results of power or how power/influence is 
exercised during the policy process. 
 
Also, this analysis uses the PNA typologies described by several authors to explain 
their findings.  These categories depend on the degree of integration, membership 
size, and distribution of resources (Rhodes, 2008; Rhodes & Bevir, 2003).  Policy 
communities, for example, refer to networks defining the context of policy-making 
in specific policies where boundaries are clearly defined.  In contrast, issue networks 
are less tight networks with a large number of stakeholders, including academics, 
interest groups, and experts.  The latter changes constantly, and interdependence is 
always asymmetric (Adam & Kriesi, 2007).  These differences between 
typologies/categories of networks also depend of the closeness between actors, 
degree of cooperation, resources exchange, and lack or existence of confrontation.  
The characteristics observed through the analysis are pointed out in the 
corresponding chapters. 
 
PNA is more ‘an analytical toolbox rather than a theory’ (Adam & Kriesi, 2007, p. 
146), and it has been criticized owing to its limited theoretical basis, although it has 
been incorporated into other frameworks (Dowding, 1995; Peters & Pierre, 1998; 
Thatcher, 1998) as part of the analysis. PNA has been applied in this case, as this 
approach complements the MST.  It helps to explain the relationships and coalitions 
built during this particular policy process.  After considering PNA for this thesis (at 
the beginning of the PhD in 2013), literature on this approach was published 
64 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2014). This approach has also been used recently in the area of 
food policy (Handforth, Hennink, & Schwartz, 2013; Wood, 2016) and tobacco policy 
(Weishaar, Amos, & Collin, 2015). 
 
Multiple stream theory 
Kingdon's Multiple Streams Theory (MST) mainly focuses on agenda setting. It is 
inspired by organisational theory (Stages-Heuristic) and yields insights into the 
dynamics of the entire policy process (agenda setting, decision-making, and 
implementation) (Buse, 2008; G. Walt et al., 2008).  It assumes three streams flowing 
in the policy system: problem, policies, and politics.  At critical points in time, called 
‘windows’, streams are coupled by actors (policy entrepreneurs).  The unit of 
analysis is the entire system or a separate decision.  For this case, MST helps explain 
the three streams that clash and how this ‘window’ opened for the soda tax to 
become effective.  It also explains the problem, politics, and policy flowing 
independently.  Though the problems and the policy are also analysed through the 
accounts of actors by using framing theory too. 
 
The empirical findings of this thesis relate to the MST, which also deals with the 
condition of ambiguity.  Ambiguity is a state of having many ways of thinking about 
the same circumstances or phenomena, and it refers to ambivalence rather than 
uncertainty.  This theory refers to choice as a garbage can into which participants 
dump unrelated problems and solutions. No one controls the process, while 
fluctuating opportunities interact. The point is to stress the dynamic, complex, and 
chaotic nature of political life. 
 
One of the main concerns when considering this approach is that it has been 
criticized for not explicitly including the role of institutions and individuals in policy-
making.  Kingdon stated that though the emphasis is not made, the institutions 
under the politics stream are present and that the institutions are present 
specifically for access and decisions when referencing the garbage can model. In 
addition, he points to the importance of policy entrepreneurs and human cognition 
(Zahariadis, 2014).  Nevertheless, a clear advantage is to supply analytical tools to 
explore how and under what conditions entrepreneurs manipulate the policy 
process and not only purse their own self-interest but also provide meaning to 
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policy makers with problematic preferences.  This approach has largely been used 
in recent years for health policy analysis in a number of fields (Gilson & Raphaely, 
2008; G. Walt et al., 2008).  In nutrition policy the use of policy theories to aid 
analysis has increased in recent years (Cullerton, Donnet, Lee, & Gallegos, 2016b).  
The MST has been applied for analysing public health nutrition polices in Australia 
and New Zealand including food labelling food , school food programs (Cullerton, 
Donnet, Lee, & Gallegos, 2016a; Swinburn & Wood, 2013).  It has also been used in 
low- and middle-income countries, including the study of school food polices in the 
Philippines (Reeve et al., 2018), and in Brazil for a broad range of policies related to 
obesity (Gómez, 2015).  In Europe  the MST has been used to analyse physical 
activity promotion (Rütten et al., 2012), in England for polices aimed to promote 
walking (Milton & Grix, 2015), and in the US for childhood obesity polices in 
Arkansas (Craig, Felix, Walker, & Phillips, 2010).  Therefore, it is considered a 
suitable theoretical approach to apply in this thesis as it has been useful in similar 
work (Clarke, Swinburn, & Sacks, 2016; Gilson & Raphaely, 2008; G. Walt et al., 
2008).    
 
Framing theory 
Framing theory presents a set of concepts which can be employed to understand 
how meaning is created inter-subjectively within social world.  Framing is  a post-
positivist  theory that uses interpretive and critical approaches to analyse 
policymaking as a contested meaning-making enterprise (Fischer, 2003). 
 
A frame, as described by Koon (2016), ‘is a label used to describe ideas, packaged as 
values, social problems, metaphors or arguments’.  ‘Frames’ are an important unit 
of analysis in idea-based policy research as they constitute either a package of ideas 
or a central organizing idea (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).  Frames have been used 
to organize meaning and concepts in a wide variety of settings; and have various 
levels of abstraction, ranging from general ideological orientations to the framing of 
specific policy problems and policy debates (Koon et al., 2016).  Frames, in this 
context, are heuristic devices which shape our understanding and evaluation of the 
world around us based upon the extent to which they are cognitively available, 
accessible, applicable, and appropriate (Druckman & Bolsen, 2011). 
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Framing is sometimes overlooked in policy analysis, but framing theory and the 
examination of framing conflicts – when different policy actors seek to set the terms 
of a policy debate – is vital to understanding policy controversies (Hawkins & 
Holden, 2013a).  Framing theory has been used most extensively by scholars 
focusing on the importance of ideas in explaining policy dynamics (John, 2013b).  
Ideas are causal beliefs that shape our understanding of policy problems and help 
to make sense of political debate (Hay, 2011).  They also help in handling abstract 
concepts such as power as reflected in the data. 
 
Additionally, frames highlight certain aspects of a problematic situation while 
obscuring others to define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and 
suggest remedies (Scheufele, 2004).  This is intended for this thesis, owing to the 
importance of normative perceptions in policy-making.  Frames can be either 
emphasis frames or equivalency frames.  The former type of frame assigns weights 
in the preference formulation of an issue, such as the different possible ways to 
attend a problem (e.g. obesity or diabetes) (Scheufele & Iyengar, 2012).   The latter 
represent value-based evaluations within a single set of dimensions, thereby 
causing a frame to be portrayed either negatively or positively, as is the case with 
perceptions about the negative or positive views on food industry actors 
participation on the policy design (Scheufele & Iyengar, 2012).  
 
In this thesis, framing theory is used to describe how actors involved in the policy 
process sought to shape perceptions and understandings of (or frame) the policy 
problem and the solution to that problem.  In addition they sought to shape 
perceptions of themselves and other policy actors in order to influence the resulting 
policy process on the soda tax.  This policy analysis, focuses on the struggle of 
competing values and beliefs (ideas) in relation to the definition of the policy 
problem and the proposed solutions. 
 
Alternative theoretical frameworks 
Other theoretical frameworks were considered in this thesis including the advocacy 
coalition framework (ACF).  The main focus of the ACF is on how organisations, 
institutions and actors act according to the policy subsystem.  It maps the beliefs of 
policy elites and the conditions under which coalitions occur.  In addition, it explains 
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the changes under a political system and institutional arrangements (Jenkins-Smith 
& Sabatier, 2013).  This was considered but has not been used because it has an 
economical approach and divides the political arena into systems and subsystems.  
The theory requires an observation of the case for long periods of time as the 
framework has a very complex analytical structure.  In this thesis, time and 
resources restrict the application of the ACF, although it has acquired popularity 
among health researchers outside USA, as when it was first developed (Jenkins-
Smith & Sabatier, 2013). 
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III. Methodological approach 
 
A policy analysis of the introduction of the Mexican soda tax policy was conducted 
using a qualitative case study methodology  (Yin, 2013).  There have been numerous 
definitions of the case study approach (Simons, 2009; Thomas, 2011). All such 
definitions share three concepts: (a) case studies look at the complexities of real 
situations in real time, such as a project, a policy, an institution, a program, or a 
system (Simons, 2009; Stake, 2005); (b) they set up boundaries around the place 
and time and define the case (Ragin & Becker, 1992); and (c) they apply multiple 
sources of data to explore the case (Yin, 2013).  
  
Study design and methods 
First, a scoping review was performed to review existing literature on health-related 
fiscal policies, and current obesity prevention polices and recommendations.  This 
scoping review fed into the background of the research and helped to formulate the 
research questions and define the study design and methods. 
 
The main research question is an explanatory rather than a descriptive one. The 
study design uses qualitative elite interviews and documentary analysis as data 
collection methods.  Elite interviews were conducted, as they provide accounts and 
views of actors who were involved in the policy process or who have had a direct 
benefit or loss as a result of the policy measures (Hochschild, 2009).  Elite, in this 
case, refers to persons who are chosen by name or position for a particular reason 
(Hochschild, 2009), rather than people selected randomly or anonymously.  A 
purposive sample was used to include informants considered to be elite because of 
their involvement in the specific case study, as described below. 
 
Documentary analysis was also used.  In this method, written data which is already 
available is analysed.  Documents are defined for qualitative research as the ‘whole 
range of written sources that might be available relating to a topic’, and they provide 
a vast source of information on developments about the phenomenon studied 
(Bailey, 1994). Documents included in this analysis are both published and 
unpublished documents (grey literature) that were freely available, such as 
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speeches, manifestos, corporate reports, laws and regulations, and press releases or 
public statements concerning the soda tax (Mogalakwe, 2006). 
 
The use of multiple methods helped to triangulate data and improve the validity of 
the thesis (Green & Thorogood, 2012a; Milo, 1990; Pope & Mays, 2009).  The views, 
positions, and relationships between different actors as well as the similarities and 
discrepancies of the actions, beliefs, and positions regarding the soda tax could be 
better understood by using both data collection methods.  Elite interviews and a 
document analysis were appropriate methods for a study on recent historical 
changes and for identifying the role of stakeholders (actors) in political processes 
(Hochschild, 2009). 
 
Other methods such as focus groups, media analysis, and ethnography were 
considered but ultimately excluded.  Focus groups and ethnography were excluded 
as this research does not focus on analysing group views or the perceptions of an 
intervention, nor is it the main aim to provide a theory grounded on obtained data. 
Instead, the present study aims to understand a phenomenon and provide insights 
based on theories to provide evidence for policy recommendations.  Furthermore, 
constraints of time and budget played a role in the decision to exclude media 
analysis for this thesis. 
 
Table 3.4 summarises the research questions, aim and objectives of the research, 
and main methods used to address them as well as the theories considered to 
construct the research questions.  The first three research questions were mainly 
answered through interviews with stakeholders and the next three, through 
documentary analysis.  However, the two methods complement each other, and 
some core information obtained from each method was triangulated to fill gaps in 
information when needed. 
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Table 3.4 Research questions, objectives, research methods, and theory used for the analysis 
 Research question  Objective Methods Theory for analysis 
1 What contextual factors 
facilitated and constrained this 
process in Mexico? 
To understand the contextual 
factors that facilitated and 
constrained the development of 
the soda tax policy 
Semi-structured interviews Policy triangle (context), 
Framing (how people think 
about the issue as part of the 
context) 
2 What was the process through 
which the soda tax became a 
policy option and part of the 
obesity strategy? 
To analyse the policy-making 
process surrounding the soda 
tax as part of the national 
strategy on obesity 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
 
Documentary analysis 
Policy triangle (process), 
Multiple streams (policy, 
politics, and problem) 
3 What were the positions and 
influence of key stakeholders 
toward the soda tax policy? 
 
To map and explore 
stakeholders’ positions and 
influence on the soda tax 
Semi-structured interviews 
 
Documentary analysis 
 
Network analysis, 
Multiple streams (politics), 
 
4 What were the role of actors in 
shaping the design and 
implementation of the soda tax 
policy? 
To examine how actors 
attempted to influence the 
design and implementation of 
the soda tax and the immediate 
results of the soda tax policy 
Documentary analysis 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
Network analysis, 
Framing theory, 
Multiple streams (politics) 
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IV. Data collection 
 
Elite interviews 
Elite interviews refer to interviews conducted with a selected group of actors who 
have particular power and influence on the research topic (Hochschild, 2009).  The 
process of designing the interview guides, identification and selection of 
participants, and how the interviews were conducted is described below. 
 
To perform the elite interviews, a topic guide for the semi-structured interviews was 
designed by the researcher.  A semi-structured interview is guided by a pre-defined 
list of questions or topics related to the aims and objectives (Minichiello, Aroni, 
Timewell, & Alexander, 1990).  Ritchie and Spencer’s (1994) framework was used 
to guide its design to avoid covering broader topics during the interview.  This 
framework includes the different areas policy analysis covers: contextual, 
diagnostic, evaluative, and strategic factors.  The topic guide included questions 
about stakeholders, knowledge of the policy problem, agenda setting, resulting 
policy content, their involvement in the whole process, and their views on the future 
of the current regulatory framework of the soda tax.  Annex 1 shows the topic guide.  
It was initially piloted with two interviewees and revised before it was used with 
the other participants and respondents. 
 
Identification of key participants and sampling  
A purposive sample of stakeholders was determined a priori as this sample strategy 
is useful when only a limited number of people can serve as the primary data source, 
such as in the elite interviews conducted for this research (Box-Steffensmeier, 
Brady, & Collier, 2008; Dexter, 2006).  The sample frame was decided following 
consideration of the literature review, personal knowledge of the specific Mexican 
policy context and applying a stakeholder mapping to identify the characteristics 
and variations of the selected participants in order to reduce bias in the researcher’s 
judgement (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006).  First, a list of potential participants was 
obtained to identify stakeholders across key disciplines and sectors involved in the 
soda tax policy by using the guide in Table 3.5.  After conducting the first set of 
interviews, a snowballing technique was applied to include more actors (Morse, 
1995). 
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Table 3.5 Groups of stakeholder considered for purposive elite interview 
sample selection 
Private sector stakeholders Public sector stakeholders Civil society 
stakeholders 
Corporations and businesses 
Business associations 
Professional bodies 
Individual business leaders 
Financial institutions 
Ministries and advisors 
Civil servants 
Elected representatives 
Political parties 
Commissions 
International bodies 
Media 
Universities 
Social movements & 
advocacy groups 
Trade unions 
National NGOs 
International NGOs 
Adapted from: Start, D. & Hovland, I. (2004). Tools for policy impact: a handbook for 
researchers: Overseas Development Institute London. 
 
 
Stakeholder mapping  
The stakeholders (actors) were mapped using a stakeholder grid that was used as 
part of a comprehensive stakeholder analysis based on the ODI guidelines (Start, 
2004).  Stakeholder analysis is a technique used in applied policy research, and it 
can provide new knowledge about policy-making (Varvazovsky & Burugha, 2000).  
Specifically, it can be used to map the position of the actors in relation to an issue as 
well as among each other.  This mapping is used to identify all actors according to 
their power-interest at the time (2013).  In this case, power measures the influence 
they have over the policy and the degree of their ability to block or change the policy. 
Interest is the degree to which they are likely to be affected by the policy change 
(Start, 2004).  As mentioned above, these criteria were set following pre-conceived 
assumptions as a previous participant in the process and based on a literature 
review. 
 
Stakeholder mapping was used to identify whether any part of the grid was blank to 
consider any gaps in the sample frame.  This allowed the sample frame to have a 
weighted design according to the stakeholder’s power-interest, thereby allowing 
the sample to be as inclusive as possible.  Figure 3.1 shows the list of stakeholders 
identified and allocated in the grid. 
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Figure 3.1 Stakeholders mapping by organisation 
 
Recruitment of participants 
Between September and December 2014, 43 individuals were invited to participate 
in this study and, of these, 33 were interviewed.  First, an invitation was sent by 
email to explain the purpose of the interviews and the research conducted as part of 
a thesis to obtain a PhD at LSHTM.  The stakeholders were also contacted by phone 
at least two more times after the e-mail was sent whenever there was a non-
response after a week of the first invitation, which was sent by e-mail.  
 
All except two consented to have the interview recorded.  Of the ten individuals who 
declined to participate; two (one a journalist and one an academic) were unable to 
attend the interview, and eight (one from the civil society, one academic, and six 
from the food and beverage industry (F&BI)) declined to participate with no given 
reason.  Table 3.6 shows the number of people recruited by type of organisation. 
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Table 3.6 Stakeholders invited to participate in this study  
Type of organisation 
Number of participants 
Interviewed 
Declined 
participation 
Unable to 
reschedule 
Invited 
Food & Beverage Industry and 
Industry Consortiums 5 6  11 
Academics 7 1 1 9 
Governments     
    Executive power 7*   7 
    Legislators 3   3 
Civil society 4 1  5 
International organisations 2   2 
Media 3  1 4 
Think tanks 2     2 
TOTAL 33  8 2 43 
*Two members of the federal government did not allow recording during the interview 
 
Conducting interviews 
All participants were provided with a copy of the participant information sheet on 
the day of the interview.  After being given time to read it and ask questions, they 
were asked to sign the informed consent sheet approved by the Ethics Committee of 
LSHTM on the 29  August 2014 (Reference number 8573) and by the Ethics and 
Research Committee of the National Institute of Public Health (in Spanish) on 29 
September 2014 (Reference number W-09) (Annex 2). 
 
The interviews lasted between 45 and 60 minutes and were conducted by the 
researcher at a location selected by the participants. The interview followed the 
semi-structured topic guide, which had been designed and piloted.  Data collection 
from the interviews was iterative, as the ideas raised and opinions generated 
provided questions for subsequent interviews. Care was taken to protect 
participants’ confidentiality.  Triangulation of data was employed to identify 
common and diverging narratives between informants in each sector, and within 
the responses of each informant regardless of the sector they represented (Flick, 
2004). 
 
Most interviews were recorded digitally and downloaded onto a personal computer.  
During the interview, handwritten notes were taken, and these were typed after the 
interviews.  The audio recordings were transcribed by the researcher and by an 
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assistant assigned to the National Institute of Public Health (INSP) project, as 
explained in the Ethics section. 
 
Data protection and security 
Interviews transcriptions were stored in a Dropbox password-secured folder. All 
interview files were anonymized using an alpha-numeric code.  The audio 
recordings were only accessible by the PhD candidate and a study assistant based in 
the INSP who helped transcribe 20 interviews.  The transcripts and hard copies of 
signed informed consent forms were stored securely in a locked drawer at the 
candidate’s LSHTM desk while in London and in the candidate’s home while in 
Mexico. Information storage satisfied security and ethics requirements during the 
study and followed the standard LSHTM ethics and good data management 
practices. 
 
Documentary analysis 
Documentary analysis was used as a complementary data collection method 
alongside the elite interviews, for the purpose of triangulation of information from 
different sources (Carter, Bryant-Lukosius, DiCenso, Blythe, & Neville, 2014; Flick, 
2004).  It is useful for policy analysis of the Mexican soda tax, as it considers 
organisation reports, policy documents, and other materials generated during 
policy design and implementation that are relevant to answering the research 
questions of this thesis. 
 
The time frame for documentary review was defined a priori as five years, from 
January 2011 to December 2015.  This includes the first attempts by legislators to 
include an obesity policy on the government’s agenda and the fiscal reform in 2013, 
when the soda tax became effective.  The two years following the fiscal reform are 
also included in the analysis to document the main reactions and positions following 
the policy change. 
 
Document selection 
To perform the documentary analysis, first, the documents were classified to define 
the inclusion and exclusion criteria for the sampling of documents to be selected.  
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There were three types of documents: primary documents, secondary documents, 
and auxiliary documents (Bailey, 1994; Mogalakwe, 2006).  
  
Primary documents are written by someone who experiences the event, and they 
include published and unpublished data.  For this thesis, primary data included 
published interviews, organisational web pages, minutes of meetings, conference 
transcripts, academic forums, articles and reports published on the topic by 
individuals or their organisations, as well as documents related to, referenced in, or 
provided during the interviews. 
 
Secondary documents are records about primary documents as well as other objects 
or accounts that are at least one step removed from the initial data sourced. They 
interpret, assign value to, and draw conclusions about the events reported in the 
primary data (Altheide & Schnieder, 2013).  For this thesis, secondary data included 
newspaper articles or other mass media publications referring to the soda tax that 
provide any record of primary documents. 
 
Auxiliary documents supplement a research project but are not the main focus of 
the investigation nor the primary source of data for understanding the topic.  Owing 
to time limitations and the scope of this research, no auxiliary data was included in 
this study. 
 
Document search  
After defining the type of documents to be included, documents were selected 
through a methodical search process.  The search began with a review of the 
websites of organisations identified in the stakeholder mapping, and the attempt to 
include all actors known to be directly or indirectly involved in the policy process.  
For example, people from CONMEXICO and ANPRAC did not consent to the 
interview, but they are examples of core actors involved in the process, and their 
website and public documents were included in the analysis.  All websites, which 
were searched systematically, are listed in Table 3.7. 
 
  
 77 
Table 3.7 Websites searched methodically by type and name of organisation  
Type of 
organisation 
Name of organisation 
International 
organisations 
PAHO (Pan-American Health Organization) 
Bloomberg Philanthropies (BP)  
World Obesity Federation (WOF)  
Interamerican Development Bank (IDB) 
World Public Health Nutrition Association (WPHNA)  
Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) 
Government Ministry of Health (MOH) (Secretaría de Salud- SSA) 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público 
- SHCP) 
Ministry of Education (MoE) (Secretaría de Educación Pública - SEP) 
Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) (Secretaria de Desarrollo 
Social- SEDESOL) 
Federal Commission to Protect Against Sanitary Risks (Comisión 
para la Protección Contra Riesgos Sanitarios - COFEPRIS,) 
National Water Commission (Comisión Nacional de Agua -
CONAGUA) 
SENATORS official website 
DEPUTIES official website 
Think tanks/ civil 
society 
organisations 
National Association of Diabetes (Asociación Mexicana de Diabetes -
AMD) 
Mexican Diabetes Federation, (Federación Mexicana de Diabetes - 
FMD) 
Mexican Foundation for Health (Fundación Mexicana para la Salud - 
FUNSALUD) 
Contrapeso  
Mídete Foundation (Fundación Mídet - FM)  
Consumers’ Power (El Poder del Consumidor - EPC)   
Alliance for Healthy Eating (Alianza por la Salud Alimentaria - ASA) 
Aspen Institute (AI)  
Mexican Institute for Competitively Instituto Mexicano para la 
Competitividad - IMCO)  
Polithink  
Mexican Association of Nutritionists (Asociación Mexicana de 
Nutriólogos - AMENAC) 
Industry National Asociation of Soda and Carbonate Water Producers 
(Asociación Nacional de Productores de Refresco y Agua 
Carbonatada - ANPRAC) 
Mexican Board of the Consumption Industry (Consejo Mexicano de 
la Inustria de Consumo A.C - CONMEXICO) 
Confederation of the Industry Chambers (Confederación de cámara 
de industriales - CONCAMIN) 
National Union of Sugar Cane Producers (Unión Nacional de 
Caneros- UNC) 
Coca-Cola’s  Economic Mexican Promoter (Fomento Económico 
Mexicano, Coca-Cola FEMSA) 
ARCA (Coca-Cola’s Mexican and Latin-American distributor) 
PepsiCo 
Pepsico Foundation (PF)  
Cocal-Cola Foundation (CCF)  
National Chamber of Sugary and Alcohol Industry (Camara Nacional 
de la Industria Azucarera y Alcoholera - CNIAA)  
Euromonitor 
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Table 3.8 summarizes the search terms used for each website. These terms were 
applied as independent searches (one search per term) and/or were combined. 
 
Table 3.8 Search terms used on each website in Spanish and English 
(depending on the site) 
Search 
term 1 
Search 
term 2 
Dates Actions Attributes Arguments 
Spanish 
Impuesto 
IEPS 
Gravamen 
Reforma 
fiscal 
Refresco 
Bebidas 
azucaradas 
Agua 
potable 
Agua 
embotellada 
2011-
2015 
Estrategia 
policita 
Legislación 
Reforma 
 
Efectivo 
Inefectivo 
Regresivo 
Elástico/inelástico 
Beneficios/implicaciones 
Empleo 
Salud 
Inequidad 
Gasto 
Obesidad 
Diabetes 
English 
Tax 
Levy 
Fiscal 
Reform 
 
Sodas 
Sweetened 
beverages 
Drinking 
water 
Bottled 
water 
2011-
2015 
Strategy 
Policy 
Legislation 
Reform 
Effective/ineffective 
Regressive 
Elastic/inelastic 
Benefits/implications 
Employment 
Health 
Inequality 
Expense 
Obesity 
Diabetes 
 
Some exceptions were made depending on the structure of each web site.  Examples 
include (a) when a webpage lacked a search function, (b) when searched key terms 
and links ended in a journalistic note or interview, (c) when the link to a specific 
document was followed and the document was missing, and (d) when the webpage 
considered was no longer available or did not mention the topic whatsoever 
although it was known a priori that the institution was involved in the policy 
process.  For this last scenario, where websites such as FUNSALUD or SSA had no 
public or internal documents available, secondary data were used by performing 
Google searches with the terms listed in Table 3.  Secondary sources were cross-
checked with accounts from the same institution’s interviewees (if performed) and 
with other documents that refer to the stakeholder's position, but which were not 
necessarily accessed through the defined search.  Figure 3.2 shows a flowchart of 
the process used to select the documents which were finally included. 
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Figure 3.2 Documents selection for analysis 
 
 
Additional material obtained from interviewees 
During the interviews, several actors referred to documents relevant  to the soda 
tax.  Such documents were either bills proposed by actors interviewed, reports 
edited by their organisations, presentations, or press releases.  The documents were 
read and discussed with supervisors to decide whether they should be included. 
 
Limitations of document selection 
One of the main limitations of the approach used to select documents is the date of 
the review (January and February 2016), as some of the information on the websites 
might have already been removed or modified. To overcome this limitation, 
whenever information gaps relevant to addressing the research question were 
identified, two approaches were considered.  First, interview transcripts were 
reviewed and if relevant, data was included, as the analytical framework used is the 
same.  Second, if the first approach was not useful owing to information gaps in 
documents or interview transcripts, additional secondary data was included when 
possible to draw conclusions.  The results section of this thesis mentions whenever 
any of these approaches was used, and it is discussed accordingly in the 
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corresponding section.  When relevant documents considered to be relevant for this 
investigation were not found through the standardized search, the processes 
mentioned above were also used.  If, by using any of those processes the source 
document was still not found, it was accepted as a ‘lost’ document.  The implications 
of not being available are discussed in the results and discussion chapters. This 
situation was considered as a finding of the policy process.  In total, 145 documents 
were found and included in the sample.  Table 3.9 lists the type of document and 
year of publication. 
 
Table 3.9 Number of documents analysed by type and by year of publication 
Type of document Period   
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Policy documents 0 2 2 4 1 9 
Corporative documents 2 4 4 4 1 15 
Press releases 2 3 3 3  11 
Posts on websites 2 12 19 18 36 87 
Organisations’ reports  1 3 2 5 11 
Financial reports (papers)  1 1 1 2 5 
Newspaper articles (secondary 
documents) 
   1 4 5 
Minutes/programs of meetings  1 1   2 
Total 6 24 33 33 49 145 
 
V. Data analysis 
 
All data including interview transcripts and selected documents were uploaded to 
and coded using NVivo software (versions 10 and 11, QRS International), which was 
used for categorizing and organising the data.   
 
A qualitative thematic analysis was conducted.  Interviews and documents were 
analysed at different points in time during the research process using the same 
analytical approach.  An abductive approach was selected to explore all aspects of 
the dataset and to interpret the data in two steps (Green & Thorogood, 2012b; Meyer 
& Lunnay, 2013). First, key themes were applied as a guide to address the overall 
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research aim.  These themes included the following topics: knowledge of policy, 
participation, influence, self-perceived power, main perceptions of ‘the problem’ 
and ‘the policy’, and implementation process of the soda tax.  As mentioned above, 
the use of theory also directed the interview guide, and therefore the analytical 
methods used, as both the interviews and the documents have similar theoretical 
approaches. 
 
To understand the types, characteristics, and organisational aspects of the 
documents and what they claim to represent, the themes and codes in each 
document were identified using the a priori defined themes, without forcing them 
to fit.  The initial coding was reviewed with the two PhD supervisors. 
 
Second, emerging codes and themes from documents were integrated into the 
analytical framework.  To account for reflexivity, the next step was to refer to the 
themes emerging from the first stem (from theory) and then to compare them and 
discuss the differences and loopholes identified in each theme during the meetings 
with supervisors.  The themes were reviewed and agreed to (a) review the balance 
between the two orientations, (b) reflect on the complexity of the case by exploring 
the associations and explanations of the policy, and (c) meet the epistemological 
foundation of the analysis. 
 
This methodology helped to identify the main aspects of the soda tax (context, 
content, and policy documents of the process), to map how the positions of actors 
evolved and to identify how they framed their arguments and positions over the 
years selected.  In addition, this methodology allowed for the triangulation of data 
from different sources (documents and accounts of interviews made in 2014) and 
for triangulation of theoretical perspectives (defined here as ‘approaching data with 
various theoretical pints in mind’) (Flick, 2004, p. 178).  
 
To undertake triangulation of data, a spreadsheet was built with arguments found 
in the analysis, and helped to compare and contrast arguments between 
interviewees’ transcripts.   This spreadsheet was later use to look into the a priori 
defined themes, and to identify emerging themes.  To triangulate across methods, 
once information of the interviews was analysed, documents were analysed using 
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the same approach.  Similar themes were identified, and new ones emerge.  Finally, 
arguments identified in different data sources were compared and contrasted.  
 
Applying triangulation helped to obtain richer enough evidence to show the 
complexities, problems, and strengths of the data analysis, and to provide a plausible 
interpretation of the data. 
 
VI. Ethics 
 
Ethics approval was obtained from the LSHTM Observational Research Ethics 
Committee on 31 July and 24 August 2013 under the 'title ‘Food politics in Mexico: 
A policy analysis of the 2014 soda tax’, reference number 8573.  The ethics 
submission included the semi-structured interview guide, informed consent form, 
and participant information sheet (Annex 3).  The Mexican National Institute of 
Public Health´s Ethics Committee approved the interview guideline in Spanish and 
the participant information sheet on 24 September 2014.  Both included 
information on the research topic and the food labelling policy. The latter topic had 
originally been considered for thesis inclusion but was later excluded from the 
thesis.  The Ethics Committees’ of both institutions required the project to include 
the ethical principles stated in the Declaration of Helsinki developed by the World 
Medical Association (confidentiality of data, anonymity, accepting to participate, 
right to withdraw from the study, and permission to record the interview). 
 
There were some concerns regarding whether to classify data obtained through 
Internet searches as public or private (Buchanan & Zimmer, 2015; Heilferty, 2011; 
Seale, 2005).  Although postings on websites or microblogs are technically in the 
public domain, the authors probably do not expect this information to be used as 
research data.  For this thesis, online narratives are considered ‘representation 
approaches’ rather than accounts of research subjects.  This is one of several ways 
to approach ethics when dealing with online publications (Heilferty, 2011; Seale, 
2005).  Moreover, a compilation of ethical perspectives and the dilemmas emerging 
in research have been published, and these are constantly under revision as new 
techniques and dilemmas emerge (Buchanan & Zimmer, 2015). Therefore, when 
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researching online documents, periodical reviews on ethical guidelines were 
reviewed and considered. 
 
VII. Reflexivity and personal experience 
 
It is important to acknowledge that as former advocate, I hold opinions on the 
benefits of soda tax.  Awareness of where I come from and the opinions I hold were 
accounted for during the data collection, analysis and write up.  As a researcher my 
values, education, and nationality, my network with the actors, and the foreign 
institution I represented during this research, have shaped this study. Recognising 
all factors associated to my background and experience adds to quality assurance as 
mentioned in table 3.10.  According to H. Becker it is unavoidable to take sides as a 
researcher, though by disclosing participation and using findings for providing 
further theoretical perspectives, instead of having a strong position strengthens 
research (Becker & Faulkner, 2008). 
 
As literature points out, policy analysis is unique in time and place and analyses are 
inherently subjective.  The quality of the analysis depends on the skills, time, 
resources and knowledge of the researcher about the context (insider) and biases 
of the analyst (Green & Thorogood, 2012a).  All these possible challenges of the 
policy analysis were recognised, and carefully considered during the research with 
guidance and support from the supervisors.  Advantages and disadvantages faced 
during the process were accounted for and reflected upon, and are discussed in the 
final chapter (Chapter 9, p. 203). 
 
 
VIII.  Quality assurance 
 
As this research used a multi-method approach, the issues of reliability and validity 
were considered.  Reliability refers to ‘whether the research process is consistent 
and carried out with careful attention to the rules and conventions of qualitative 
methodology’ (Tolley et al., 2016, p. 25).  Validity or credibility refer to ‘the 
confidence in the truth of the findings, including an accurate understanding of the 
context’ (Tolley et al., 2016). 
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To ensure research transparency and to acknowledge possible flaws during the 
research process, a list of techniques based on Guest, MacQueen and Namey’s list 
was used (2012, p. 101). This  aims to help qualitative researchers identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of their research when evaluating its validity and 
reliability (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2011).  The adaptation of this list for this 
thesis is shown in Table 3.10 with the suggested techniques and comments on how 
they were used for this research. 
 
Table 3.10 Techniques for enhancing validity and reliability, adapted for 
recommended techniques from (Guest et al., 2011) 
Technique Used Comments 
1. Use of multiple methods √ Use of interviews and documents 
2. Team-based instrument 
development 
√ Although not a team project, the 
interview guide and research question 
were reviewed with PhD supervisors 
3. Adjust the instrument √ Interview guides were piloted and 
adjusted after the first interview 
4. Monitor data as they are obtained √ Review and familiarization with the 
audio and taking notes during 
interviews were performed 
5. Transcribe data using protocol 
(verbatim) 
√ Transcripts were done verbatim by a 
trained person 
6. Check translation of quotes used 
and revise by bilingual supervisors 
√ One supervisor and a committee 
member reviewed the quotes 
7. Use of multiple coders × As this was a PhD, only one person 
coded the data 
8. Codebook and themes (external 
and peer review of coding and 
summaries) 
 
√ 
Codebook was reviewed with 
supervisors for interview analysis and 
documentary analysis 
9. Create an audit trial ×  
10. Triangulate data sources and 
identify negative cases 
√ Triangulation was made between 
interviews and documents  (data 
source and multiple methods) 
11. Negative case analysis ×  
12. Support themes and 
interpretations with quotes 
√ Results section and analysis contains 
‘en vivo’ quotes 
 
IX. Summary 
 
 85 
This chapter presented the study design and methodology used to answer the 
research questions.  The aim was to explain how the qualitative policy analysis of 
the soda tax was conducted; why these data collection methods were used; the 
analytical method chosen; and the main considerations including the theoretical 
background.  
 
This is a policy analysis of a case study using qualitative methods for data collection.  
Elite interviews and documentary analyses were selected as the most suitable data 
collection methods as both reflect the policy process through the accounts and 
written materials of the process, its content, and the participants during the policy 
change.  The interviews had a semi-structured design, and 33 participants, chosen 
purposively using a stakeholder mapping strategy, were interviewed. In addition, 
145 documents were selected following a systematic search strategy.  The analysis 
took an abductive approach using an iterative process.  The LSHTM ethics protocol 
was followed for data collection, and the NVivo data management software was used 
to organise the data for analysis. For quality assurance and security of data, other 
researchers (supervisors) were consulted, and they reviewed all materials and 
outputs during the process. 
  
 86 
Chapter 4.  Contextual factors relevant to obesity, sugary drinks 
consumption and policy actions in Mexico 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the context of Mexico at the time the soda tax was proposed.  
First, it describes the national trends in rates of obesity and trends in selected 
obesity risk factors including sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) consumption.  
Second, it presents the economic importance of SSB and the sugar cane industry in 
Mexico. It discusses the lack of access to safe drinking water the country is 
experiencing which has exacerbated the consumption of industrialised beverages. 
Finally, it presents an overview of the political context when the soda tax was 
discussed and the motivations behind the policy change.  
 
II. Overweight and obesity trends in the country 
 
In 2006 the National Nutrition and Health Survey (NNHS; Encuesta Nacional de 
Nutricion y Salud- ENSANUT 2006) showed that the prevalence of overweight and 
obesity in Mexican adults was 69.3% (Olaiz-Fernández G et al., 2006).  In 2012, the 
NNHS showed the combined prevalence of overweight and obesity in adults had 
increased to 71.2% (38.8% overweight and 32.4% obesity), representing 48.6 
million people (Gutiérrez et al., 2012).  The prevalence of overweight and obesity 
for children under 5 increased from 33.6% in 2006 to 34.4% in 2012 (19.8% 
overweight and 17.4% obesity) (Gutiérrez et al., 2012).  These results positioned 
Mexico as the country with the highest increase in adult obesity worldwide at the 
time (Popkin et al., 2012). In 2016, a new NNHS showed that the trends continued 
to increase in adults, as the combined prevalence of overweight and obesity reached 
72.5% (39.2% overweight and 33.3% obesity), while the rate for children between 
5 and 11 years slightly decreased to 33.7% (15.4% overweight and 18.3% obesity 
(INSP, 2016). 
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Other obesity risk factors rates in Mexico  
Results of the NNHS conducted in 2016 showed that 79 % and 75.6 % of children 
(10-15 years) spent more than two hours sedentary in front of a screen, while only 
17.2% of them engaged in physical activity at least 60 minutes every day of the week, 
as recommended (INSP, 2016). Furthermore, 14.4% of adults did not follow the 
WHO recommendation of spending at least 150 minutes per week exercising, while 
50.1% of adults reported to spend more than two hours per day in front of a screen 
(INSP, 2016).  
 
The same NNHS showed 61.9% of children between 5 and 11 years were consuming 
sweets and desserts more than three times per week, while 81.5% were consuming 
SSB three times or more per week.  Only 20% reported consuming vegetables on a 
daily basis. Additionally, 38% of adults reported consuming snacks, sweets and 
desserts more than three times per week and 85.5% consumed SSB more than three 
times per week, while only 42.3% reported consuming vegetables daily. 
 
III. Sugar-sweetened beverage consumption and water availability  
 
Several sources have confirmed that Mexico has become the country with the largest 
SSB and carbonated sweetened beverage (soda) consumption per capita in the 
world (Barquera, Hernández-Barrera, & Tolentino, 2008; Gutiérrez et al., 2012; 
Stern et al., 2012). Factors that have led to an increase of soda consumption include 
the large distribution chains that big soft drink companies have achieved in Mexico 
in the last decade (Taylor, 2016), and the lack of a safe, public drinking water supply 
in most urban cities and rural towns (CONAGUA, 2007).  To describe the whole 
phenomenon is beyond the scope of this research, but some of the main issues 
influencing how sweetened beverage consumption has increased are described in 
this chapter.  
 
Between 1999 and 2006, the percentage of energy consumed from all beverages was 
22.3% for adults and 20.1% for adolescents.  For adults, almost 15.2% came from 
beverages other than milk and juices (Barquera et al., 2008).  Additionally, the 
National Survey of Income and Expenses of Homes (Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y 
Gasto de Los Hogares - ENIGH) 2010 data showed that the trend of SSB consumption 
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in Mexico has increased in terms of both number of consumers and frequency of 
consumption per week (Colchero et al., 2012).  Between 1998 and 2006, the 
population who reported consuming SSB increased from 48% to 60%, reaching an 
average consumption of 191 litres per person per year.  A recent analysis showed 
that in 2012 beverages with added sugars represented 17.5% (325 kcal) and 19.0% 
(382 kcal) of the total daily energy intake per capita in children aged 1-19 years and 
adults aged >20 years, respectively.  Stern, Tolentino & Barquera (2012) found that 
the top three most consumed beverages by adults were plain water (74.6%), sugary 
drinks (42.0%), and sugary coffee/tea (37.6%). Finally, estimations of soda 
consumption in Mexico have also been based on sales reported in the Euromonitor 
International database from the Food Industry Development Centre Inc 
("Euromonitor ", 2011). The sales of soda are divided into on-trade and off-trade, 
which represents the main mechanisms of soda sales. Trends in the past five years 
are summarised in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1 Sugar-sweetened beverages off-trade sales in Mexico 2010-2015  
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The estimated average consumption for 2011 was 163 litres per capita per year, 
which was 30% higher than the estimated consumption for the US (118 L) 
(Colcehro, 2013; Colchero et al., 2012).  For the following three years sales stayed 
flat, and just after the soda tax took effect sales slightly decreased, as shown in 
Figure 4.1. 
 
The SSB industry and the retail market in Mexico 
With high consumption of soda, Mexico has been a profitable market for the 
beverage industry. Two companies have 85% of the market share for soda in 
Mexico: Coca-Cola (70%) and Pepsi (15%) (Besley & Rosen, 1999; Cahuana et al., 
2012; Cahuana, Sosa, Rubalcava, Panopoulou, & Rodriguez, 2013). A relatively old 
source from the National Association of Producers of Soda and Carbonated Water 
(Asociación Nacional de Productores de Refrescos y Aguas Carbonatadas- 
ANPRAC)(ANPRAC, 2008) estimated the annual consumption of soda was 160 litres 
per capita per year in 2008, representing a 6% increase since 2000.  Also, the 
ANPRAC report for 2008 (later removed from their site) estimated annual soda sales 
were around 16,916,000 litres and 95% of the soda portfolio was sugar-sweetened 
beverages, and only 5% were non-caloric sweeteners (ANPRAC, 2008). ANPRAC 
stopped presenting reports on their website after other sources of research revealed 
the implications of high soda consumption. Any detailed report after 2008 was 
removed from their site and stopped being available in any open information source.  
 
Production of soda by the company with the largest market share in Mexico, The 
Coca-Cola Company, is via two bottling companies: Coca-Cola FEMSA and Arca-
Continental. Coca-Cola FEMSA is the largest with sales of 2,685 million unit cases in 
2011. Each unit case equals 5.678 litres of soda, hence sales equalled 1,521,704 
litres of soda.  Their market share was 73.7% in carbonated sodas, 4.9% in water, 
16.3% in flavoured water and 5% in potable bottled water(Coca-Cola FEMSA, 2011). 
Coca-Cola FEMSA sales in Mexico represented 44% of their total sales in Latin 
America, with 23% of total sales in Colombia, 12% in Venezuela and 11% in Brazil 
(Coca-Cola FEMSA, 2011).  In 2012, sales increased to 2,649 million unit cases, and 
by 2013, their annual sales grew by 5.2%, with sales of 3,205 million units, or 
18,197,990 litres of soda (Coca-Cola FEMSA, 2012).  For 2014, when the soda tax 
was implemented, the sales for that year were 3,417 million unit cases, with an 
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annual growth of 6.6% (Coca-Cola FEMSA, 2014).  The overall estimated 
consumption per capita decreased mainly after the soda tax was implemented, 
though information on the type of beverages sold was not available in the latest 
annual report (Coca-Cola FEMSA, 2015a).  Table 4.1 illustrates Coca-Cola FEMSA’s 
sales for 2011 to 2015 per capita, grouped by type of beverages sold.  
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Table 4.1 Coca-Cola FEMSA estimated beverage sales per capita per year and by type of beverage produced 
 
2011   2012   2013   2014   2015   
 L/capita (%) L/capita (%) L/capita (%) L/capita (%) L/capita (%) 
Consumption of beverages  per capita£ 144 100 148 100 149 100 138 100 135 100 
Carbonated soda 105 73 108 72 108 72 101 72 NA NA 
Flavoured bottled water 7 5 7 5 8 6 8 5.8 NA NA 
Still water, presentations <5L 7 5 8 5 8 6 7 5.1 NA NA 
Sold in jug presentation (>5L) Still and 
flavoured water 
24 17 26 18 25 17 23 17 NA NA 
Sweetened beverages (approximately 66.5%)* 
95  97  98  91  89  
* Estimated from Coca-Cola FEMSA annual report information (Coca-Cola FEMSA, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a). 
£ population estimated in 2011: 116,147 000 and soda consumption (Colcehro, 2013) 
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The high consumption and availability of sodas and sugary drinks are influenced by 
other contextual factors of relevance in Mexico, as discussed below.  
 
Lack of drinking water availability in Mexico 
The problem of poor water quality and thus lack of access to safe drinking water for 
a large proportion of the Mexican population is considered one of the leading 
contributors to the high levels of soda consumption in Mexico. Even though Rivera’s 
model (presented in Figure 3.1) considers the problem of drinking water access, it 
fails to analyse the issue in depth as an important risk factor in the causal pathway 
of soda consumption.  This issue may be unique to the Mexican context, and possibly 
other developing countries, so it might not have been considered in countries where 
access to safe drinking water is guaranteed by the state.  
 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), a country is water-
stressed if the water withdrawn for any purpose is 25% or more of the total 
renewable water available (FAO, 2016). The latest available data about water use 
from the FAO shows that in 2011 water withdrawal for human use in Mexico 
(extracted from a lake or river) reached 80.3 million litres representing 673 litres 
per person per year and accounting for 17.21% of the total renewable water 
available per year (3,822 million litres per person/year) (FAO, 2014a).  This is a high 
proportion and close to a profile of a water-stressed country, and worse than in 
other Latin-American countries.  For example, Chile withdraws 35.4 million litres 
per year (2,147 litres per person/year), representing 4% of total renewable water, 
and Brazil withdraws 7,830 litres (383 litres per person/year), representing 0.86% 
of total renewable water (UN Water, 2016). Of the total water withdrawal for human 
use in Mexico, 77% is for agriculture, 9% for industrial use, and 14% for household 
use (municipal).  This last category includes free drinking water available to the 
population and it is estimated to be 11,440 million litres of water a year (FAO, 
2014a).  
 
In contrast, the use of water to produce soda in the country was estimated to be high.  
In 2011, the overall beverage production in Mexico by Coca-Cola FEMSA was 15,039 
million litres of beverages, of which only 5% (751,965,930 litres) was bottled water 
with no added sugar or sweeteners.  Of the total beverage production 51.6% 
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(7,761,826,000 litres) were sold in Mexico.  For every litre of beverage produced, 
Coca-Cola FEMSA uses 1.7 litres of water, or a total of approximately 25 million litres 
of water per year (Coca-Cola FEMSA, 2011). Water use for SSB production in Mexico 
and sold in Mexico equates to 0.18 % of the national water withdrawal for industry 
use per year.  In 2012 the total beverage production 56.4% (9,766,160,000 litres) 
were sold in Mexico.  Coca-Cola FEMSA used 1.6 litres of water for each bottled litre 
of beverage sold, equating 0.21% of the national water withdrawal for industry 
usage.  Additionally, any of the two estimated figures are beyond the FAO figures for 
water withdrawal for ‘municipality usage’.  This means that, in Mexico: (a) water 
concessions for industrial use are high compared to water use in other sectors, 
including the provision of free drinking water; (b) there is a large water use for the 
production of sugary drinks; and (c) people’s access to sugary drinks and industry’s  
access to water for industrial are more than the amount of clean and safe drinking 
water available for inhabitants (CONAGUA, 2007; FAO, 2014a).  Table 4.2 shows the 
total availability and use of water in Mexico for 2011, and compares it to the 
reported soda production in 2011 and 2012 by Coca-Cola FEMSA.  
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Table 4.2 Type of water extraction and usage in Mexico for 2011 and soda 
production by FEMSA in 2011 and 2012 
Type of extraction 
(2011) 
Millions of litres Estimated % of 
water withdrawal 
 
Water withdrawn for human usage& 
Agricultural sector 61,580,000,000 77%  
Municipality usage 11,440,000,000 14%  
Industry usage 7,280,000,000 9%  
Sub-total 80,300,000,000 100%  
Water withdrawn for non-human usage& 
Hydroelectric 136,100,000,000 82%  
Other 28,500,000,000 18%  
Sub-total 164,600,000,000 100%  
Total extraction (human + non-human)  
Total 244,900,000,000 100%  
Coca-Cola FEMSA total beverage production, usage of water 
and soda consumption in 2011 and 2012 
 2011 2012  
Beverage sold 
(litres)$ 
7,761,826,000 9,766,160,000  
Estimate % of water 
withdrawal for 
industrial usage 
0.18% 0.21%  
Total usage* 13, 195,104,200 15,625,856,000  
$ Other soda bottlers (e.g., PepsiCo, Big Cola and Grupo Arca) not considered in this estimate 
*Usage calculated with the amount reported by the company to use per litre of beverage 
produced (1.7/L in 2011 and 1.6/L in 2012) with data obtained from: Annual Report Coca-
Cola FEMSA 2011, (Coca-Cola FEMSA, 2011, p. 21), Annual Report Coca-Cola FEMSA 2012, 
Coca-Cola FEMSA, 2012(Coca-Cola FEMSA, 2012, p. 17) 
 &Data obtained from ‘Countries profile: Mexico’, FaoAquaStat, 2012 
(http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/MEX/index.stm) in the public 
domain 
 
Furthermore, lack of access to free, safe drinking water is accepted as a condition 
under which most of the Mexican population lives, and this has not changed much 
over time (FAO, 2014b).  Public trust in water quality is a problem.  As previously 
mentioned, the link between obesity and access to clean water may be unique to the 
Mexican context.  
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Table 4.2 on water extraction shows the relatively low availability of water used for 
domestic supply (which includes drinking water). The water balance in a growing 
number of cities and regions is sustained by overexploitation of renewable 
groundwater. Additionally, 70% of the water bodies have some degree of 
contamination (CONAGUA, 2014b; UN Water, 2016).  In 2016 the UN score for water 
quality in Mexico was only 60.5 out of 100 (UN Water, 2016). 
 
While the regulatory framework for water access has been constantly modified, 
quality of water has not been a major preoccupation for politicians (UN Water, 
2016).  At the same time bottled water in Mexico has become an important business. 
Bottled water is linked to the soda industry because the same big corporations that 
produce soda own most of the bottled water brands. Bottled water consumption in 
Mexico for 2016 was estimated to be more than 170 litres per person (The 
Economist, 2016). 
 
Another issue for water access is the regulatory framework surrounding it. The 
current concession of water wells in Mexico is regulated by CONAGUA, a 
governmental body of the Ministry of Agriculture.  Water concessions granted by 
the state to the private sector rely on a weak regulatory basis, which lacks specific 
principles (CONAGUA, 2007) (discussed in Chapter 8).  Soda producers have used 
this regulatory situation to frame the use, provision and disposal of water as a 
socially responsible action (SRA), throughout the soda tax discussion and 
implementation. Some of these dynamics and how actors link these regulations is 
discussed in Chapter 8, as it is also related to tax benefits for soda producers 
(CONAGUA, 2007). 
 
IV. The influence of trade agreements  
 
In the 1950s, Coca-Cola began intense marketing campaigns in Mexico (Nestle & 
Rosenberg, 2015).  As a result, from the 1970s onward sodas were established in 
Mexican daily life (Soares, 2016).  Mexico’s elected President in 2000, Vincente Fox, 
was the former President of Coca-Cola Mexico and Latin America (Soares, 2016).  
From the time Mexico started to struggle with its obesity prevalence, it was clear 
that the soft drink consumption played a significant role in the problem (Barquera 
 96 
et al., 2008).  At the time there was no governmental drive to change the food system 
and national food supplies, despite the overwhelming evidence and attempts by 
those in public health to initiate  changes (James, 2013). 
 
Mexico has been a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
since 1986 and a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995. As 
one of the most heavily involved Latin-American countries in trade agreements, 
Mexico has tariff reduction schemes with the European Union, which eliminated 
tariffs on all industrial and agricultural products (with a small list of exceptions).  In 
addition, Mexico has free trade agreements with Israel and Japan (WTO, 2016).  
According to the International Chamber of Commerce Open Market Index, Mexico is 
situated in 54th place among the 75 countries examined, which means the country 
has an average openness to trade (Fringer, 2013). 
 
Mexico applies tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) to agricultural products under the WTO 
Framework (WTO, 2016). Sugar is one of the products that is excluded from further 
liberalisation in Mexico (WTO, 2005).  From 2009 through 2012, international sugar 
prices were volatile due to various factors, including shifting demands, availability 
and climate issues affecting production and distribution.  Sugar price was a 
highlighted consideration by soda producers, and regulations are perceived as a 
barrier to market entry since they caused the companies to pay in excess of 
international market prices as mentioned in the 2012 Coca-Cola FEMSA report (US 
SEC, 2012, p. 9). 
 
One of Mexico’s most important free trade agreements is the agreement with the 
United States and Canada; the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  The 
effect such trade agreements cannot be neglected.  The effect of NAFTA on 
agricultural liberalisation in Mexico can be summarised as follows.  First, domestic 
producers started competing with foreign goods, but the overall agricultural trade 
flows grew.  Second, liberalisation improved resource allocation and agricultural 
activity (Salazar, 2010).  Third, the number of imported goods increased under 
NAFTA.  Farmers who produced these goods had to lower their costs so that they 
could compete with the imported goods.  Finally, investment in the Mexican 
agricultural sector increased significantly (Yunez-Naude & Barceinas, 2002).  Even 
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though the Mexican diet has changed over time, Clark, Hawkes, Murphy, Hasen-
Kuhn & Wallinga (2012) argue that four trends in the Mexican diet can be seen after 
the establishment of NAFTA.  First, the consumption of processed dairy foods, such 
as ice cream and frozen desserts, increased significantly.  Second, the consumption 
of snacks increased from 1.54 billion in 1999 to 1.7 billion in 2001.  In particular, the 
importing of US snacks increased, which caused more intense competition between 
imported snacks and domestic manufactured snacks (Blouin, Hawkes, Henson, 
Drager, & Dube, 2010).  Third, consumption of soft drinks tripled for adults, which 
dramatically increased their total sugar intake (Clark et al., 2012).  And fourth, the 
consumption of processed meats grew much faster than the total growth in the 
consumption of meat (Blouin et al., 2010; Clark et al., 2012). 
 
Sugar has been part of several discussions when it comes to taxing producers.  The 
sugar cane industry has been a relatively important industry for the Mexican 
economy; it represents 0.05 of GDP and sugar is the largest crop after corn (WTO, 
2005).  The sugar cane industry employs about 2 million people, and domestic 
consumption is around 4.5 million metric tonnes, with the largest demand being 
from the soft drink industry (Geo Mex, 2016).  In 2000, President Vicente Fox's 
government expropriated 27 sugar mills, about half of the annual industry 
production.  Prices had fallen as corn syrup imports grew, and some mill owners 
illegally discarded sugar on the domestic market.  The owners had borrowed heavily 
to pay growers, and by 2000 the industry owed the government $3 billion (Malkin, 
2004). 
 
Under government management, in 2002 prices of cane sugar were protected by 
imposing a 20% tax on imported corn syrup-sweetened soft drinks, and on high-
fructose corn syrup (HFCS) as an ingredient for foods (WTO, 2005). Only in 
December 2014, the United States and Mexico agreed to abandon tariffs on imports 
of Mexican sugar (Malkin, 2004).  The tariffs had caused a dispute between the 
United States and Mexico for breaching the NAFTA regulation and the 
counterarguments of being an anti-dumping duty (WTO, 2005).  The anti-dumping 
duty is a government protectionist tariff imposed whenever an imported product’s 
price is or might be cheaper than the same product produced domestically.  The 
United States agreed to enact measures that would limit the amount of sugar cane 
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they allowed into the country from Mexico, as US sugar cane producers complained 
about Mexican sugar being cheaper. The solution caused disappointment as quotas 
on Mexican imported sugar to the United States were not a condition of the NAFTA 
that was established in the early 1990s (Joespht, 2014).  
 
In 2007, the corn syrup tax was removed as mandate by the NAFTA, meaning 
completely free trade.  Therefore when the soda tax was approved in 2013 and 
passed in 2014, soda producers stopped using sugar cane and opted for HFCS to cut 
costs, as it was cheaper than sugar cane.  Tests of the products have shown that 
Mexican sodas have both sugar cane and HFCS in equal proportion (Goran, Ulijaszek, 
& Ventura, 2013).  Therefore, removing the corn syrup tax had an impact on sugar 
cane producers, as the former became a cheaper option for soda producers.  In 2014, 
the Camára Nacional de la Industra Azucarera y Alcoholera y la Union Nacional de 
Cañeros y Azucarera (CNIAA) was producing around 1,400,000 tonnes of sweetened 
beverages (Radio Forumla, 2013), and opposed the tax, as it would decrease the 
already low demand of sugar cane in the country.  Also, according to the United 
States Department of Agriculture’s Foraging Agricultural Service, after introduction 
of the soda tax of $1.00 peso/litre (US $0.076/litre), soft drink sales in Mexico 
dropped more than 5%, followed by a 4% drop in sales in the second quarter, and a 
2% decline in the second half of the year (USDA, 2015). 
 
V. The political context 
 
In 2013, Enrique Peña Nieto took office as President after 12 years of opposition 
rule. Mexico has a federal presidential constitution, with a democratic selection of 
the president every six years.  Peña Nieto had the largest media coverage of the three 
main candidates and was already mayor in Estado de Mexico, the most populous 
state in the whole country.  Additionally, he was the candidate of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), an old hegemonic party that had ruled the country for 
more than 70 years.  PRI had only been defeated two times, in the previous two 
presidential elections (2002-2006 and 2006-2012) (Crumpacker, 2013). 
 
A few months before he took office, a group of students sabotaged an electoral event 
at a private university in Mexico City and social media protests and demonstrations 
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against him followed. His party was perceived as highly corrupt (Crumpacker, 2013; 
Expansión, 2012; García & Treré, 2014) and one which championed old conservative 
and neo-liberal ideas. These events impacted the electoral process in a very short 
space of time (García & Treré, 2014).  Additionally, the lack of trust and the negative 
connotation given to the new presidency were relevant as gaining trust and support 
was a key aim of the entering team (García & Treré, 2014). Health issues are relevant 
when framed as a means to improve social capital (Baum, 1999; IMCO, 2015a), and 
the obesity situation in Mexico was seen as a good opportunity.  
 
National obesity policies: from Calderon to Pena Nieto’s presidency  
Although obesity rates increased alarmingly between 1988 and 1999, it was only 
after the 2006 Health and Nutrition Survey that obesity started to gain more 
attention than under-nutrition as a health issue.  Although obesity was recognised 
as a major public health problem by the Mexican government, by the food and 
beverage industry, and by the wider population (SSA, 2011), there were no 
important actions against obesity until the government of Felipe Calderon. During 
the second half of his administration (2009-2012), the government created a 
number of initiatives to tackle this problem. 
 
In 2008, Calderon’s government became concerned with national-level food policy 
actions. This included in the agenda some of the obesity recommendations made by 
the WHO in 2003 and 2008 (SSA, 2011; WHO, 2008; WHO/FAO, 2003), such as 
including food guidelines in schools to improve nutrition, reducing sodium 
consumption and improving consumer information on packaged foods, and 
increasing the time of physical activity programs at schools. Several governmental 
and non-governmental initiatives were started. Governmental initiatives included 
the publication of the Beverage Guidelines, and the National Agreement for Healthy 
Eating (Acuerdo Nacional Para la Salud Alimentaira - ANSA), a national agreement 
that included school food guidelines, physical activity programmes in schools, and 
the introduction of skimmed milk as part of the school breakfast program (SSA, 
2010).  Parallel to these intersectoral government actions, some non-governmental 
actions emerged.  One of the major food corporations implemented the self-
regulatory code entitled Código Pabi in 2009, the aim of which was to voluntarily 
restrict food marketing to children (CONAR, 2008).  In addition, food corporations, 
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led by the Mexican group ConMexico, launched a voluntary Front of Package 
Labelling Strategy (FOPLS) in 2011.  None of these regulatory and self-regulatory 
actions had any major impact on obesity due to poor execution.  For example, the 
voluntary labelling strategy was not promoted, and it was not presented in a simple, 
clear format; similarly, the ‘Código Pabi’ had several loopholes, such as failing to 
designate specific sanctions if violated (Theodore et al., 2016).  These loopholes 
included a lack of cohesive actions or regulatory measures since they were only 
voluntary actions and an ‘agreement’ to an inter-sectoral compromise, not a 
mandatory regulation for most of the actions.  In addition, most of the compromises 
outlined by all actors were in need of a designated budget and implementation 
guidelines.  They also lacked a rigorous impact and process evaluation (Avila, 2012, 
Freaner, 2012; Hernandez, 2012).  The timespan between development, 
implementation and change in administration weakened and limited this initial 
effort (Barquera et al., 2013; Charvel S, 2012). 
 
VI. Development of a soda tax in the new government’s agenda 
 
During the presidential election period in 2011-2012, an agreement called Pacto Por 
México was signed.  This was a formal agreement signed by three of the main parties 
running for office in México in 2012: Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática (PRD), and Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).  The 
agreement specified actions to be addressed regardless of who won.  One action was 
the promotion and improvement of a healthy environment in schools (Pacto for 
Mexico; SSA, 2012).  This was the first attempt to regulate and include in the formal 
policies a matter of health related to childhood obesity. 
 
The first step for designing policies and agenda setting for the new administration 
was to draft the National Development Plan (NDP) 2012-2018.  The NDP is the 
Federal Public Administration’s plan and budget for all the policies to be 
implemented during the time in office (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 2013).  The 
Ministry of Finance under the Economic Planning and Public Policy Analysis 
Department oversees the appointment of a team to draft a working document 
nurtured by proposals from other ministries.  The second step of the policy design 
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is for the ministries to develop their sectoral plans, which outline the strategies of 
each ministry. 
 
The soda tax policy was conceived from two separate parts of the government. It 
was first proposed as a legislative initiative by two senators, and then it was adopted 
by the federal government and outlined broadly in the NDP as part of several multi-
sectoral actions to tackle obesity.  Only the sectoral plans of the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF) and of the Ministry of Health (MoH) outlined the soda tax in more detail.  The 
MoF sectoral plan presented it as part of the Fiscal Reform; conversely, the MoH 
sectoral plan discussed it as part of the National Strategy to Control and Prevent 
Obesity, Overweight and Diabetes (Estrategia Nacional para el Control del 
Sobrepeso la Obesidad y la Diabets - ENPCSOD) (SSA, 2013b).  The latter consisted 
of three action plans, or pillars (as named and outlined in yellow in the figure), and 
the leadership of designing each pillar was assigned to different representatives 
under the MoH as shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2 Policy documents related to the soda tax 
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The ENPCSOD was presented with a monitoring and evaluation plan to be conducted 
during the execution of the policy throughout the presidency of Peña Nieto.  The 
plan, called the Mexican Observatory of Non-Communicable Diseases (Observatorio 
Mexicano de Enfermedades No Trasmisibles - OMENT), was a coalition organised by 
the federal government with a ‘technical-scientific’ structure combining 
participants from the private and public sector as well as civil society organisations.  
The aim was to gather expertise of different backgrounds to build first the indicators 
for the policy evaluation strategy, and then the actual evaluation strategy (SSA, 
2016, p. 14).  Chapter 7 will describe in detail the process and participation of 
different actors to develop the content of the policies related to the soda tax as well 
as how they set the agenda to implement the policies mentioned in the figure.  
 
VII. Summary 
 
This chapter presents facts about Mexico’s health and political situation before the 
soda tax was implemented.  It first highlights the high prevalence of obesity in 
Mexico and the high levels of soda consumption.  It presents the drinking water 
situation and its relationship with soda production and availability.  Water access 
and quality are compromised, while soda producers heavily use water not only to 
produce sugary drinks and sodas, but also to produce bottled water.  Additionally, 
international trade agreements and the sugar production and usage in Mexico 
reflect the  relevance of the sugar cane industry’s for the country’s economy, as well 
as why sugar cane and soda producers considered it a threat.  Finally, the last section 
gives an overview of the political context on previous obesity prevention policies in 
the country and highlights the opportunities offered by a change of government as 
drivers for the soda tax implementation.  As Kingdon’s stream theory points out, the 
politics, the problem and the policy coincided  in a window of opportunity:  The need 
for revenue (as the politics) and obesity as a public health problem triggered an 
opportunity for the soda tax policy to occur. 
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  Chapter 5. Key actors shaping the agenda, and an analysis of 
their networks 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This results chapter analyses and explores the interconnections between actors in 
relation to the soda tax development.  It looks at the links (networks) between actors 
in order to help explain actors’ influence and interests in the soda tax policy, and 
how these links shaped the policy process.  It presents and discusses findings from 
both the interviews and the documentary analysis. 
 
This chapter first presents why the role of actor networks in the policy process is 
considered to identify the roles of actors involved in the policy process.  Then, it 
examines the links between actors existing before, and those formed during, the 
soda tax debate and discusses how they evolved throughout the policy process.  The 
interrelationships of the actors identified during the soda tax are considered as 
explanatory factors in the formulation of ‘frames’ used to position the policy 
problem and its solutions, in the policy formulation and agenda; and in the outcomes 
of the policy, discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
The main theoretical components used to analyse policy networks are defined and 
discussed in the section Policy network approach in Chapter 3.  Using the Policy 
Network Approach, emerging from the originally from the Social Network Theory, 
as a lens through which to explore the relationships that occurred during the soda 
tax debate, raises important questions of transparency, accountability, and 
interdependence of the policy process, as evidenced in previous studies (Tantivess 
and Walt, 2008). 
 
II. Role of actor networks in policy process 
 
Policy making is shaped by actors seeking to use their resources in order to have 
their concerns included in the policy agenda.  A network is a form of coordination 
and governance with the participation of different state and non-state actors in 
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government processes (Castells, 1996; Rhodes, 1997; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; 
Thomposon, 2003).  Therefore, for this case study some governance principles 
(defined in Table 3.2) related to power and influence of actors and their networks 
are considered for the analysis and include: responsiveness, accountability, and 
participation.  These principles are part of the analytical framework to assess the 
governance of the health system (Siddiqi, 2009) (see Chapter 3 for definitions). 
 
Furthermore, to explore which actors are influential and how influence is structured 
in terms of networks, this analysis also focuses on the exchange of financial and 
technical resources (Lewis, 2005).  The interrelationships between state and non-
state actors can range from minimal interaction to strong collaboration. The 
Australian government has classified the interrelationships between actors on a 
continuum depending on time and trust between the parties.  This spectrum goes 
from networking, which involves the exchange of information, through coordination 
between actors, cooperation and finally collaboration, the closest link.  The latter 
degree of interrelation includes information exchange and resource sharing and 
facilitates participants' capacity to achieve mutual benefits (VicHealth, 2016). 
 
Parsons noted that a network or community ‘seeks to focus on the pattern of formal 
and informal contacts and relationships between actors which shaped the policy 
agenda and decision-making’ (2005, p. 185).  Participants are acting in a ‘social 
system in which other actors’ impact upon one another’s decisions’ (Parsons, 2005, 
p. 185).  Based on this argument, it is possible to identify the structures and 
dependencies among organisations and actors, for example, when a person is using 
double roles (Section V) throughout time, to identify the various relationships 
shaping the policy environment (Rhodes, 1998).  Parsons’ argument can also be 
used to help explain the frames used to position the issue and the solution on the 
agenda, examined in Chapter 6.  Identifying links existing before the soda tax helped 
in explaining the existence of a potential bias or potentially compromised frames of 
the policy problem and policy solution, as discussed through some examples below.  
Furthermore, it highlights potential conflicts of interests some actors might 
encounter while setting the soda tax policy agenda.  The concept of ‘conflict of 
interest’ as defined for this work is ‘a set of conditions in which professional 
judgement concerning a primary interest […] be unduly influenced by a secondary 
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interest […]’ (Thompson, 1993).  Section III describes the actors involved in the 
policy process, and Section IV explains and analyses the links identified in this 
analysis. 
 
III. Actors shaping the soda tax agenda 
 
As described in the ‘Methods’ section in Chapter 3, actors were identified based on 
a literature review and by considering all sectors suggested by Star and Hovland 
(2004) when analysing actors (Figure 3.5).  For this research, the actors involved in 
the soda tax are broadly categorised as follows: international organisations 
(agencies and international civil organisations), government organisations 
(including different sectors of the government), academics, national civil society 
organisations (CSOs) and think tanks (TTs) and private-sector organisations, 
including media actors, food and beverage industry (F&BI) and marketing firms for 
soft drinks.  The following section briefly describes who the actors were, how they 
were involved and what their main positions and influence were before and during 
the soda tax debate.  In this thesis, ‘influence’ or ‘power’ is defined as ‘the capability 
or ability to accomplish something’ (Schmeer, 1999).  Annex 4 provides a full 
mapping of the actors with a detailed description of the background of each actor 
related to the policy and the rationale used to consider them relevant for the soda 
tax policy analysis.  In this chapter, a brief description of who the actors are is 
presented before the full analysis. 
 
International organisations 
Six international organisations were identified as being involved in the soda tax 
policy process, as listed in Figure 5.1.  They were either agencies such as PAHO or 
international civil or consumer organisations that supported the policy process. 
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Figure 5.1 International organisations identified as being involved in the soda 
tax policy 
PAHO (Pan-American Health Organisation) 
Bloomberg Philanthropies (BP) 
World Obesity Federation (WOF) 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
World Public Health Nutrition (WPHNA) 
Centre for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) 
For details of the organisations and their relationships to the soda tax policy, see Annex 
4. 
 
Government 
A range of government actors were involved in developing the obesity policy in 
Mexico, including members from several ministries, specialized entities of the 
federal government and Senators and Deputies in legislative power.  Figure 5.2 
shows the government organisations identified as being involved in the soda tax 
policy. 
 
Figure 5.2 Government organisations identified as being involved in the soda 
tax policy 
Ministry of Health (MoH) (Secretaría de Salud- SSA) 
Ministry of Finance (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público - SHCP) 
Ministry of Economy (MoE) (Secretaría de Economía) 
Ministry of Public Education (Secretaría de Educación Pública - SEP)  
Ministry of Social Development (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social - SEDESOL) 
Federal Commission to Protect Against Sanitary Risks (Comisión Para la Protección 
Contra Riesgos Sanitarios - COFEPRIS) 
National Water Commission (Comisión Nacional de Agua - CONAGUA) 
Senators 
Deputies 
Instituto Nacional de la Infraestructura Física Educativa (National Institute of Education 
Physical Activity Infrastructure - INIFED) 
For details of the organisations and their relationship to the soda tax policy, see Annex 4. 
 
The role of some government organisations has changed over time.  For example, 
the Ministry of Public Education (SEP) was highly involved in the 2010 obesity 
policy ANSA but not in the 2012-2018 policy agenda.  The Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
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was supposed to be highly involved in implementing the ANSA, whereas in the 
incoming presidency in 2012, they were assigned to be core promoters of the federal 
government’s soda tax.  The Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL) was 
appointed in both administrations to implement actions to improve access to 
healthy foods.  Annex 4 describes some actions government organisations were 
taking for obesity prevention and the role they played in obesity and fiscal policies. 
 
Academic organisations 
According to a PAHO report, academic organisations have been actively engaged in 
the obesity agenda for the past 10 years in Mexico (PAHO, 2011).  In 2011, this 
report recognized the ‘relevant’ role academic institutions play in Mexico to position 
the obesity issue (see Annex 4) (PAHO, 2011).  They were also identified as 
influential actors in the soda tax agenda and as key ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (as 
described in Chapter 7).  Figure 5.3 shows the identified academic actors involved 
in the soda tax policy. 
 
Figure 5.3 Academic organisations identified as being involved in the soda tax 
policy 
Mexican Academy of Medicine (Academia Nacional de Medicina - ANMM) 
National Institute of Public Health (Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública - INSP) 
National Institute of Medical Science and Nutrition Salvador Zuvirán (Instituto Nacional de 
Ciencias Médicas y Nutrición Salvador Zubirán - INCMNSZ) 
Centre of Economic Research and Teaching (Centro de Investigación y Docencia 
Económicas CIDE) 
National Autonomous University of Nuevo León (Universidad Autónoma a de Nuevo León 
- UNAL) 
Mexico Autonomous Institute of Technology (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México - 
ITAM) 
For details of the organisations and their relationship to the soda tax policy, see Annex 4. 
 
Civil society organisations and think tanks 
Various CSOs were involved in influencing the soda tax agenda, as listed in Figure 
5.4.  Most of the coalitions and networks among CSOs were built during the process, 
such as ContraPESO, whereas some of them already existed, such as ASA (see Annex 
4 for details).  Adam and Kriesi (2007) referred to the former as issue networks and 
to the latter as a policy community (Chapter 3).  The position and power of some 
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organisations and think tanks shifted throughout the policy process, which is 
discussed in the following three chapters.   
 
Figure 5.4 CSOs and TTs identified as being involved in the soda tax policy 
National Association of Diabetes (Asociación Mexicana de Diabetes - AMD) 
Mexican Diabetes Federation, A.C. (Federación Mexicana de Diabetes A.C. - FMD) 
Mexican Foundation for Health (Fundación Mexicana para la Salud - FUNSALUD) 
ContraPESO 
Mídete Foundation (Fundación Mídete - FM) 
The Consumers Power (El Poder del Consumidor - EPC) 
Alliance for Healthy Eating (Alianza por la Salud Alimentaria - ASA) 
Aspen Institute (AI) 
Mexican Institute for Competiveness (Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad - IMCO) 
Polithink 
For details of the organisations and their relationship to the soda tax policy, see Annex 
4. 
 
Private sector organisations including the food and beverage industry  
Private sector organisations including F&BI representatives and media 
representatives were also key players in the policy debate (as discussed in Chapters 
7 and 8).  Figure 5.5 lists the main private sector organizations as being involved in 
the soda tax policy; these are described in detail in Annex 4.  The relationships and 
networks among the private sector actors ranged from corporate consortiums such 
as CONCAMIN that previously existed, to coalitions supporting their own non-
governmental organisations, called BINGOS (business interested non-governmental 
organisations) (Hastings, 2013, p. 140).  Finally, the industry created links with 
other organisations to create front groups (White & Bero, 2010), and engaged in 
constituency building with government actors and academics. 
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Figure 5.5 Private sector organisations identified as being involved in the 
soda tax policy 
National Association of Soda and Soda Water Producers (Asociacion Nacional de 
Productores de Refresco y Agua Carbonatada - ANPRAC) 
Mexican Consortium of Consumers Industry (Consejo Mexicano de la Industria de 
Consumo - CONMEXICO) 
Confederation of Industry Chambers (Confederacion de Camara de lndustriales 
CONCAMIN) 
Sugar Cane Producers' Union (Unión Nacional de Cañeros - UNC) 
Coca-Cola FEMSA (Fomento Empresarial Mexicano) 
ARCA Continental  
PepsiCo 
PepsiCo Foundation   
Coca-Cola Foundation 
National Chamber of the Sugar and Alcohol Industry (Cámara Nacional de las Industrias 
Azucarera y Alcoholera CNIAA) 
For details of the organisations and their relationship to the soda tax policy, see Annex 4. 
 
These five groups of actors interacted throughout the policy development.  Some of 
the relationships and links among them as well as those that developed during the 
soda tax debate are discussed below.  
 
IV. Networks and links among actors identified before and during policy 
process  
 
Different types of networks and links were found among actors and include: (1) 
individuals playing double roles in two or more organisations (Annex 4), (2) 
members of advisory panels from different sectors being involved in policy design 
or advocating for policy changes, (3) financial links between groups, and (4) 
partnerships being entered into for a particular purpose, such as advocacy activities 
or policy implementation or evaluation.  An overview of the actors’ links are shown 
in Figure 5.6.  The author developed this figure.  The distances between boxes are 
not representative of the closeness of relationships between actors.  The direction 
of the arrows show in which direction a relationship between actors was identified. 
Each colour represents the type of relationship identified and included: advocacy or 
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lobbying, supporting arguments, technical support, personal double roles, technical 
collaboration, advisory boards, financial support, or actors as part of the federal 
government. Additionally, annex 5 presents a table with examples of relationships 
identified based on a general categorization using types of networks (issue 
networks or community networks defined in chapter 3 p. 61) the resources 
interchanged and elements of governance that might be at stake. 
 
Constituency building with academics and the civil society 
Constituency building has been part of the ‘playbook’ of private sector businesses 
such as tobacco and alcohol companies (Brownell & Warner, 2009).  Establishing 
relationships with key leaders and policymakers is one way to influence policy 
(Brownell & Warner, 2009; Mialon, Swinburn, Wate, Tukana, & Sacks, 2016).  The 
analysis presented in this chapter shows how key actors from the main F&BI 
companies in the country were somehow related to the ENPCSOD.  Chapter 7 
describes in detail the formal participation of these actors in the soda tax policy 
design, and some existing relationships that are relevant to the structure and 
process of the soda tax policy are discussed below. 
 
Multiple roles of individual actors  
Multiple roles of individual actors, particularly the ‘revolving door’ concept of 
individuals changing job roles between public and private sectors, is a well-known 
practice among representatives of private sector organisations including the F&BI.  
Two think tanks and policy advocacy organisations, AI and IMCO, were among the 
organisations in Mexico whose directors or consultants held influential roles 
elsewhere.  Both organisations were invited to participate in the soda tax evaluation.  
For instance AI’s board included the former head of Coca-Cola Mexico, the Dean of 
the well-known private university ITAM (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de 
México) and the Vice-President of Walmart.  The consultants included Jaime 
Zabludovsky, the former head of CONMEXICO (The Aspen Institute).  IMCO had 
among its board members the Chief Executive of Grupo Bimbo, the largest packaged 
food producer in Mexico with 11.4% of the market share (Euromonitor, 2016), and 
Jaime Zabludovsky, the former head of CONMEXICO, Director of CONACYT, and head 
of the CEE (Consejo Coordinador Empresarial [Business Coordinating Council]) 
(IMCO, 2016).  
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Financial links between the food and beverage industry, academia and 
government agencies 
Financial links were found among organisations involved in the soda tax.  Some of 
these relationships included government organisations as a third party, as shown in 
Annex 5.  One example, is a funding program to improve water and sanitation in 
poor communities, part funded by PepsiCo and part by international development 
agencies, as stated in a PepsiCo company report. This can be seen as a collaboration 
(exchange of information, resource sharing) or the formation of an issue network: 
 
Funded with a loan of $450 million dollars from the Inter-American 
Development Bank, which eventually benefited 600,000 people with 
access to drinking water, and about 390 thousand people with access 
to sewerage and sanitation in rural areas in 31 states.  Funding 
estimated at $1 million will come from AquaFund, a program funded 
by the IDB, PepsiCo Foundation, Swiss Cooperation, and the Austrian 
government.  (PepsiCo, 2011) 
 
PepsiCo Foundation and Coca-Cola Foundation are clear examples of F&BI funding 
their own non-profit organisations, as ‘front organisations’ that aim to change public 
perceptions about the companies or the F&BI in general through corporate social 
responsibility actions.  These actions improve their reputation, as a representative 
of the media phrased it: 
 
It is trendy (for these corporations) to clean their actions, and to 
promote their good will with consumers […] by including actions such 
as sponsoring documentaries or social responsibility actions (MIM).  
 
Some links and partnerships between F&BI and CSO were not disclosed to the public 
during the soda tax debate.  CSO’s did not make public any conflicts of interests, for 
example at COFEPRIS workshops for the PND as described in Chapter 7.  These 
included links between the FMD and Coca-Cola, BID and PepsiCo, Coca-Cola and 
CONACYT, Coca-Cola and the AMD and the INNSZ and F&BI (Annex 4 and Annex 5).  
For this research, some CSOs known to be in partnership with the F&BI refused to 
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be interviewed; these included Mexicanos Activos and Mexico se Mueve, as 
mentioned in Chapter 3 who were two “front organisations” or BINGOS focusing 
investments and policy emphasis on physical activity measures. 
 
Funding research and establishing front groups 
As noted in Chapter 3, one of the strategies used by the F&BI is to sponsor or fund 
research (Marks & Thompson, 2011; Newton et al., 2016).  This was also found in 
the case of the soda tax.  Some academic institutions, both private and public, were 
found to have been funded by the F&BI (Annex 5).  First, the Coca-Cola Foundation 
sponsored research through CONACYT, the governmental agency that supports 
research in the country.  In 2015 they launched a prize for any scientific project that 
will improve ‘science and technology’ and contributed to capacity building in the 
country (CONACYT, 2015).  CONACYT also partnered with the Institute of Beverages 
for Health and Wellbeing (Instituto de Bebidas para la Salud y el Bienestar), a 
research group fully funded by Coca-Cola (Annex 4).  This partnership was in the 
public domain as it was made clear in the announcement of the award: 
 
CONACYT in coordination with the Coca-Cola Foundation sponsored 
the First Prize in Biomedicine Research ‘Dr. Rubén Lisker’ to Dr. […] 
for his project ‘[…] the Elimination of Leukemic Cells’ (Coca-Cola 
Mexico, 2015b). 
 
In 2015, the Coca-Cola Company partnered with the Mexican Diabetes Association, 
whose branch in Monterrey on 8 July 2015 hosted a scientific event called ‘Physical 
activity for people living with diabetes’.  The event was hosted by the Mexican 
branch of an organisation called ‘Exercise is Medicine (Movimiento es Salud) which 
is funded by Coca-Cola.  According to Exercise’s annual report, ‘Coca-Cola also 
provided logistical support for the event’ (Nestle & Rosenberg, 2015, p. 816). 
 
Additionally, several networks and coalitions were created during the public 
discussion about the soda tax, before it was approved in the Fiscal Reform.  The F&BI 
did not publicly disclose that they partnered with health organisations and the 
Mexican Federation of Diabetes (FMD, 2016; Ramirez, 2014), nor did they publicly 
announce their support for certain BINGOS (Business Interests non-government 
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organisation).  For example, one group called Sweeten your Life (Endulza tu Vida) 
was sponsored by the sugar industry (CNIAA) (Ramirez, 2014); it tried to legitimise 
itself by including registered nutritionists in its leading team to give 
recommendations about sugar consumption (Hablemos de azúcar, 2016).  
Furthermore, the F&BI participated in sponsoring organisations such as Mexico is 
Moving (Mexico se Mueve), Active Mexicans (Mexicanos Activos A.C.) and The 
Centre for Consumer Freedom (Centro para la Libertad del Consumo) (CLC, 2013; 
Mexicanos Activos, 2016).  The first two were organisations who were set up to 
promote physical activity, and the third one was a front group advocating for the 
right to free choice. 
 
Additionally, after the soda tax was implemented the academic institution UNAL’s 
role as an agency of the obesity policy was compromised.  This university was 
appointed to design the indicators for evaluating the obesity policy, and during this 
period received money from the National Association of Soda and Soda Water 
Producers (Asociacion Nacional de Productores de Refresco y Agua Carbonatada -
ANPRAC) to publish a report on the impact of the soda tax just one year after the tax 
implementation.  This is discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 8.  Also, the F&BI 
sponsored academic work on the impact the soda tax had on obesity after one year 
of implementation.  It was published by a group of economists at ITAM, and it framed 
the levy’s effect as minimal: 
 
The study that CONMEXICO and ANPRAC contracted with ITAM 
concluded under strict academic independence that the soda tax in 
2014 (the first year of the levy) did not significantly reduce caloric 
consumption […] it only  caused a reduction of 6 of the 3,200 daily 
calories consumed by an average Mexican. (Ramirez, 2016) 
 
The report mentioned that the sponsors had no influence, regardless of the obvious 
bias the narratives used against the soda tax: 
 
Kantar World Panel México.  The current paper sprang from a 
collaboration with CONMEXICO in which they helped us get the data 
from KWP.  CONMEXICO did not have any veto power nor influence 
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over the results.  Any remaining errors are ours only. (Aguilar, 
Gutierrez, & Seira, 2015) 
 
Other financial support given by F&BI to actors involved in the policy process is 
described in Chapter 6 while analysing the process of framing the impact of the soda 
tax.  Some of them include: the link between CONMEXICO and ITAM, ANPRAC and 
UNAL; and Nestlé and FUNSALUD, as explained in the previous section (refer to 
acronyms index). 
 
Food and beverage industry constituency building with government 
Three types of formal links were identified between the F&BI and the government. 
First, multiple roles of individuals across government and industry. Second, 
memberships of advisory boards; and third, partnerships with government agencies 
for implementing, monitoring or evaluating policies related to food and water 
provision. 
 
‘The revolving door’ 
Dr. Mercedes Juan was the Executive President of the CSO FUNSALUD until 
December 2012 and was appointed the Secretary of Health in 2013.  The strategy 
against obesity, ENPCSOD, came into effect under her leadership.  She did not have 
a strong position on the soda tax when it was first proposed by the Senate and the 
MoF, as discussed in detail in Chapter 7.  However, in 2014 she maintained that it 
was an effective measure in reducing soda consumption.  After the first discussions 
on the impact of the soda tax became public in 2015 and important discussions on 
conflicts of interest in the Ministry of Health (MoH) were raised by civil society, she 
was replaced by Dr. José Narro, the former head of National Autonomous University 
of Mexico (Universidad Autónoma de México - UNAM). 
 
Additionally, a few members of the FUNSALUD board have been part of the federal 
government, and the organisation’s general advisors include e.g. Jaime 
Zabludowsky, ex-General Director of CONMEXICO and a key dealer in the NAFTA 
treaty who also served as an advisor in other think tanks’ evaluation programs, as 
with Aspen and IMCO (as explained in Annex 4) (Funsalud, 2016).  Major 
transnational corporations and political leaders argued that it was time for all those 
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concerned with the development to move forward, away from a ‘confrontation’ with 
each other and toward a ‘cooperation’ and ‘dialogue’ to tackle the urgent issues of 
the day (CONCAMIN, 2015). 
 
Funding and technical support  
The F&BI provided both financial support and technical support to the government.  
The F&BI partnered with government with various government organisations, 
mainly for the implementation of parallel policy actions such as the provision of 
drinking water in schools (e.g. CONAGUA and INIFED, p. 181 & p. 246), or technical 
support, for example, for the establishment and evaluation of the obesity policy of 
OMENT (as described in Chapter 7 section IV, p 162).   The types of support are part 
of strategies provided by the industry were either as public-private partnerships 
(PPP) or corporate social responsibility (CSR) actions.  PPP are agreements between 
the private sector and the government to meet government or social needs, and 
rewarding the private sector based on possible outputs  (Sharma & Bindal, 2014)..  
CSR has been defined as ‘the ethical principle that an organization should be 
responsible for how its behaviour might affect society and the environment’ (Jobber 
& Ellis-Chadwick, 2012, p.134).   
 
Other relevant example found to be relevant to the policy process was the 
partnership between, CONAGUA, the World Bank and Coca-Cola FEMSA to provide 
water to selected poor Mexican communities:   
 
In 2012 the World Bank gave a loan of 250 million dollars to the 
National Water for the program called PROMAGUA […] Also, Coca-Cola 
obtained seven government concessions to provide water with them 
to the poorest communities, and they would not have to pay any more 
the water service charges to the government. (Agua Org, 2016) 
 
A number of educational programs and partnerships to promote science and 
technology were also funded by companies such as PepsiCo.  In 2015 the PepsiCo 
Foundation signed an agreement to support the International Youth Foundation 
(IYF) with a training program called ‘Key to the Future’ aimed to prepare young 
students from the 39 campuses of the National College of Professional Technical 
 116 
Education (Colegio Nacional de Educación Professional Técnica - CONALEP) in the 
State of Mexico for integration into the labour market (CONALEP, 2016). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 8, corporations frame actions as a Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) while governments frame some of these actions as public-
private partnerships (PPP).  Although actions framed as CSR and those framed as 
PPP may effectively have the same results, there are contradictions as the public 
may perceive CSR as separate from government. The government and F&BI links 
and collaborations should be a matter of public concern, as results show 
policymaking is embedded in a conflicted environment where the F&BI has a role of 
influence and power over policymaking.  This is shown in Figure 5.2, where the 
green and blue arrows representing links between the MoH and the F&BI actors 
identified, outnumber the links the MoH has with independent academic institutions 
or international agencies, supporters of the soda tax and other health policies.  As 
discussed in Chapter 6, this close relationship endangers the primary aim of the soda 
tax, namely, of protecting health.  The identified links highlight the normalisation of 
connections among actors that go beyond common interests and instead have 
competing fundamental aims and goals toward health and other objectives, thereby 
jeopardising any attempt toward public health solutions for obesity, as other case 
studies have found (Collin, 2018.). 
 
International agencies’ support to civil society organisations and academics 
International organisations have been recognized in the literature as actors 
influencing public health agendas at the country or regional level (Lee & Goodman, 
2002, p. 97; Tantivess & Walt, 2008).  At least three of them, PAHO as an agency, and 
BP and WOF as civil society organisations, have been active during the discussion of 
the soda tax, and they have repeatedly disclosed their position on the soda tax 
during the policy discussion (Annex 4) (BP; PAHO, 2015).  Other organisations such 
as WPHNA and CSIP have provided support by issuing a number of press releases 
as part of the network of certain national civil societies (see Chapter 8).   
 
Three main ways of involvement of international agencies were identified included: 
taking part of  advisory committees, such as the case of PAHO with the Senate 
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(Annex 4 and Annex 5); provision of financial support for research; and advocacy 
groups and support in framing the debate (Annex 4, Annex 5 and Chapter 8). 
 
Funding research and advocacy strategies 
In Mexico, BP provided technical and financial support for ‘an obesity prevention program’ 
(BP, 2016). In 2012, BP financed a  $10 million three-year program that was indepented of 
the soda industry.  They money was used to supported a think tank, an academic institution 
and a civil scoieyt (Donaldson, 2015), calling them ‘partners’.   The funding sources were 
stated on the agencies’ websites, where they mentioned that: 
 
For the first time, the financial power of Mexico’s soda industry faced 
a serious challenge. (BP) 
 
BP influenced the wider policy debate by providing resources for academics to 
publish evidence supporting the soda tax (Colchero et al., 2015).  BP’s support to 
national CSOs was one of the main strategic links which supported the soda tax 
implementation by shifting the power of actors involved in the obesity ‘network’.  
The influence of financial support for civil society groups advocating for the tax was 
a key factor in this case study that allowed these pro-sugar tax groups to gain 
support of other civil society organisations (Nestle & Rosenberg, 2015), well-known 
international scholars and some well-known journalists (Chapter 8) (Donaldson, 
2015). 
 
BP paid for media campaigns designed and promoted by the ‘partner’ civil society 
groups and with support of academics, so that they could gain wider credibility for 
their arguments supporting the soda tax. For example, Dr. Lustig, a well-known 
international expert in obesity, was invited to talk to the media paid for by BP.  In 
May 2013, he participated in a forum called ‘The Sugar Pandemic: Policy vs. Politics’ 
and spoke about the harm caused by sugar and soda consumption to people and how 
the F&BI uses its influence to block effective public health policy.  The overall paid-
for efforts resulted in nearly 800 media stories on obesity (Donaldson, 2014).  This 
meant that for the first time, the coalition of actors supporting the soda tax was well 
funded and had wide support of strategic groups and public-interest lobbying firms, 
as a member of the TT mentioned: 
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Mexico’s left party, the PRD, did support the tax.  And the industry had 
never before faced an opposition with Bloomberg money.  ‘That 
levelled the playing field’ said Ricky Arango, who heads Polithink, a 
public-interest lobbying firm Bloomberg hired to persuade legislators. 
(Nestle & Rosenberg, 2015) 
 
Academics were subsequently able to make their positions clearly heard in 
newspapers and blogs.  A BP report explained how the success of the soda tax was 
achieved through their strategy which centred on two activities in particular: paid 
and earned media campaigns and formal lobbying, both of which leveraged scientific 
evidence and a rigorous understanding of the political context (Donaldson, 2014). 
 
International organisations’ support for the soda tax policy was also related to other 
aims, including: positioning themselves for the future, building relationships to 
further influence national polices; and supporting corporate social responsibility 
and PPP.  The first is illustrated by the framing the BP page used to promote its own 
founder, Michael Bloomberg.  He was portrayed as a person who helps his country 
and other countries to safeguard public health (BP, 2016) indicating that BP’s action 
might also serve personal purposes of its founder.  The second aims to improve the 
representation of groups with the same interests who are a minority at the policy 
discussion table; this includes support such as resources, tools and expertise given 
by BP and PAHO to national CSOs as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Donaldson, 2015; PAHO, 
2015).  The third relates to binding international organisations like BID with the 
private sector and with policymakers during policy implementation or during the 
policy design (e.g.  PAHO with MoH).  
 
Academic collaborations to build evidence 
Two main collaborations were identified as key aspects in the policy process for the 
soda tax.  The first was the collaboration between the ANM and the INSP.  
Researchers from several prestigious institutions published a book titled ‘Obesidad 
en México: Recomendaciones para una política de Estado’ (Obesity in Mexico: 
Recommendations for a State Policy) on 30 January 2013.  The book content covers 
various topics related to obesity, including recommendations for a policy plan to 
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address the obesity epidemic, the aetiology of obesity and the main causes of this 
problem.  The content was used repeatedly in forums and discussions on the soda 
tax and other policies.  It presented Mexico’s situation in relation to obesity and 
provided some suggestions on the regulations needed to improve public polices for 
obesity and diabetes (Rivera-Dommarco, Hernández-Ávila, Aguilar-Salinas, Vadillo-
Ortega, & Murayama-Rendón, 2013; Rivera, 2013). 
 
The second was the collaboration between the INSP and the think tank IMCO to 
publish a report that mapped policies selected in the strategy and compared them 
to the benchmark indicators produced by the Cancer Research Institute.  This 
resulted in the publication ‘Kilos de mas, pesos de menos: Los costos de la obesidad’ 
(More kilos, less pesos: The costs of obesity) in 2015 (IMCO, 2015a).  This study 
estimated the social costs of obesity, including expenditures on medical treatment 
and productivity losses due to premature mortality and work absenteeism.  It also 
reviewed the public policies that had been adopted to address this problem and 
compared their design with international benchmarks to provide some 
recommendations (IMCO, 2015a). 
 
These academic collaborations are part of the coalition-building process for framing 
the problem and its potential solutions (Chapter 6 page 122).  These initiatives are 
promoted by academic ‘policy entrepreneurs’ and shape public narratives.  Chapter 
6 discusses framing and how it impacts the policy process in further detail.  The main 
issue in the second collaboration discloses a potential compromised position from 
IMCO, as it has F&BI members on its board and had worked with industry who 
opposed the tax; while the INSP was one of the allies in promoting the soda tax. 
 
Advocacy groups’ and civil society organisations links to government officials 
A number of civil society organisations had links with government officials.  The 
most relevant relationship seen for the soda tax was the relationship between a key 
Senator and civil society organisations (Fundacion Midete, ContraPESO and 
Polithink), who together designed the soda tax legislative proposal in 2012, as 
explained in detail in Chapter 7 (page 147).  Data did not show a direct link between 
the federal government and civil society groups pushing for the soda tax before the 
soda tax came into effect.  However, they were linked through a third party (as 
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described in the policy formulation in Chapter 7 (page 150)).  At the time of the soda 
tax discussions, PAHO led a multi-disciplinary group that included members of the 
MoH, civil society and academia (PAHO, 2015, p. 42). 
 
V. Networks and links representation 
 
Figure 5.6 is an organisational network1 representation summarising the 
relationships described in this chapter, Annex 4 and Annex 5.  It identifies different 
degrees and forms of relationships among actors.  Policy actors’ networks and type 
of relationships are indicated by coloured lines and arrows that show the 
relationships among them.  The colour of the box represents the type of 
organisation.  Civil society groups are represented in green; academics in yellow; 
government agencies in blue; and F&BI and consortiums or boards of actors in red.  
This graphic representation is at the organisation level; it differs from other types 
of network analysis used in public health, such as social networks (social support 
for a particular population), disease transmission networks or information 
transmission networks (information to communities and consumers in health 
promotion) (Luke & Harris, 2007).  
 
                                                        
 
1 The organisational network is a ‘paradigm to consider connections among different components, implications 
of interactions and the transdisciplinary thinking and engagement of those who have a stake in the outcome 
to govern the course of change’ (Leischow SJ, Milstenin B, 2006 p. 403). 
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Figure 5.6 Links identified among actors before, during and after the soda tax 
 
 
Key: Refer to the ‘organisations’ section in the Glossary for acronyms.  Note: some relationships are illustrated along chapter 5, 6, 7 or 8.  
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IV. Summary 
 
Complex relationships among various groups and actors in the soda tax 
policymaking process were identified.  These included relationships between 
companies and the government, civil society groups and international 
organisations, academics and industry, think tanks and industry consortiums, F&BI 
and ministries, academics and activists and civil society and legislators.  Some were 
advisory relationships, and some were financial relationships, collaborations, 
consultations or even situations of nepotism in high-level positions (Expansión, 
2013; Vanguardia, 2013). 
 
Network analysis is a useful path to identify the opportunities and constraints 
during the process, although it is a complex and very delicate research as it might 
touch upon various sensibilities, of actors involved in the analysis.  However, the 
public domain of such relationships has been shown to empower public health 
interest processes, as shown in theories on agenda setting and other case studies 
(Kraak, Swinburn, Lawrence, & Harrison, 2014; Rasheed et al., 2017; Tantivess & 
Walt, 2008). 
 
The main findings of this chapter on actor mapping suggest that some relationships 
and links contributed to and influenced the agenda setting.  In several theories of 
policy analysis, groups and networks represent a key element of policymaking 
(Marsh & Smith, 2000; Silke & Kriesi, 2007; Tantivess & Walt, 2008).  The policy 
process depends on how the relations among interested parties develop.  Each actor 
accepts as a reality, through their own lens, the social climate which will best suit 
their interest for their own success.  Public arguments provided by actors about a 
positive or negative position regarding the soda tax may merely be a publicly 
acceptable justification for their own political interests.  However, publicly 
unrecognised interests, private relationships, sources of support and double roles 
can offer a better understanding of the policy actions. 
 
Mapping the actors involved in the policy (Section II and Annex 4), and analysing 
the type of networks helps to reveal a further understanding of their views and 
whether they are potentially compromised.  It also raises key questions about 
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conflict of interests, accountability issues (who is accountable to whom and through 
what mechanisms), representation in the formal policy process, power imbalance 
around the policy debate and responsibility shifts in who is leading certain actions 
and how.  Answers to some of these wider questions go beyond the scope of this 
thesis; however, it provides an opportunity to examine particular contextual issues 
that drove the soda tax in a certain direction and enabled it to happen while at the 
same time considering the issues that restricted the development. 
 
Chapter 6 explore actors’ views and perceptions used to frame the policy problem 
and its potential solutions, and how evidence was used to aid these narratives.  
Chapters 7 and 8 exemplify how the process occurred in these particular settings 
(narratives, structures and environment). 
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Chapter 6. Framing the soda tax policy 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the interpretations, perceptions and opinions of actors 
involved in the soda tax by using framing theory.  Policy positions and narratives 
used by different actors (called frames- see page 64) analysed in this chapter help 
to understand the policy formulation, agenda setting and actions undertaken by 
different actors throughout the policy process.  Comparing and contrasting the 
frames used by different actors (or package of ideas- Gitlin 1980) about the policy 
problem and its solutions also helped to identified policy controversies (Hawkins & 
Holden 2013a), and the policy dynamics (John, 2013b) surrounding the soda policy 
tax debates.  
 
This chapter first presents how actors framed the policy problem, followed by how 
the solutions to that problem were perceived.  Then the frames and arguments used 
to position the evidence and other socio-political factors are presented to 
understand how the policy debate occurred and how such frames supported or 
hindered the soda tax and its outcomes. 
 
Frames highlight certain aspects of a situation while obscuring others to define 
problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments and suggest remedies (Entman, 
1993).  For example, actors framed the problem as either a health (obesity) or a 
financial (lack of government income) problem, that could be solved by a soda tax.  
As explained in Chapter 3, framing theory offers a set of concepts which can be 
employed to understand how individuals, groups and societies perceive and 
communicate about social phenomena (Koon et al., 2016).  A frame is a lens through 
which to interpret a situation within a given set of assumptions (Koon et al., 2016).  
For example, in the context of this study, the way in which someone frames the 
‘causes of obesity’ suggest a particular set of values and assumptions which 
characterise the policy context) in a particular way.  It also opens up and closes off 
particular policy solutions, which are compatible or incompatible with however the 
issue was framed. 
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II. Framing the policy problem 
 
Obesity and soda consumption were the predominant frames for the policy problem 
emerging from the data. The ‘obesity problem’ was framed by most interviewees 
either as a result of an addiction to food or as a lack of conscious eating, and the 
arguments focused on it being a personal, behavioural issue rather than a public 
problem. ‘Soda consumption’ was framed as a problem that was ‘difficult’ to solve 
(Section III).  Other actors focused more on the multi-causality of obesity in contrast 
to singling out products like soda.  This debate was used both negatively and 
positively toward the soda tax as a solution.    
 
The other main framing was the issue of government finances. Only a few actors 
mentioned revenue generation as the objective of the policy, as a member of the MoF 
pointed out: 
 
It [the soda tax] implementation had to do with the fact that the 
President liked it, because it is a very good way to increase revenue.  
(CSM) 
 
It was only after the Fiscal Reform, which also contained other taxes such as those 
on pet food and gasoline, that the framing of the soda tax as a solution to the 
government’s lack of funds was commonly observed in documents, media and 
publications (Cozo & Cozo, 2006). These different frames found around the 
‘problem’ or ‘policy problem’ are explained further in the next sections. 
 
Framing the determinants of obesity 
The determinants of obesity were commonly framed as a personal choice or as  
individual behaviours influenced by certain environmental factors both among the 
actors interviewed or in reports published by their organisations (ANPRAC, 2016; 
Chapa-Cantú, Flores-Curiel, & Zúñiga-Valero, 2015).  For example, a report prepared 
in 2015 by the UNAL, which was sponsored by the soda industry, emphasises 
personal lifestyle factors: 
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Obesity is a multifactorial problem involving feeding habits, lifestyle, 
genes and physical exercise, among others. […] Lack of exercise and 
the availability of food in abundance are considered the two main 
causes of obesity.  However, there are other factors that contribute to 
obesity, such as reduced sleep times, changes in room temperature 
(through the use of air conditioners), reduced cigarette consumption, 
increased use of medications (antidepressants), among many other 
things. (Chapa-Cantú, 2015, pp. 26) 
 
In contrast, the ANM’s academic group, which was a strong supporter of the soda 
tax, highlighted the role of excessive consumption of foods with high energy density, 
high consumption of caloric beverages, low consumption of fruits and vegetables 
and low physical activity as key determinants of obesity.   In their book the ANM 
refers to research showing that 21% of the rural areas studied in Mexico did not 
have fruits available for sale on a regular basis, and 13% did not have vegetables 
available (Rivera Dommarco, Perichart, & Moreno, 2012, p. 7).  The book also 
emphasized the high availability of foods that were high in fats and sugars and SSB 
available in the same areas (Rivera-Dommarco et al., 2013, p. 2).  These examples 
highlight the framing used to demonstrate that availability of foods plays an 
important role in the population’s diet.  This frame is consistent with the frames 
used by public health researchers (Ghosh-Dastidar et al., 2014) and those used by 
the civil society when calling upon the government to act by improving access to 
water and healthy food in their manifesto (Alianza por la Salud Alimentaria, 2012b). 
 
Framing soda consumption as a problem 
It was a common belief among interviewed actors that soda consumption was a 
problem, regardless of their background, as indicated by the quotes in Figure 6.1.  
Most actors interviewed perceived soft drinks as a commodity affecting health. 
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Figure 6.1 Perception and frames to describe the ‘soda consumption’ problem 
in Mexico 
Actor Quote 
Civil society  In Mexico, it [soda consumption] is a big problem, there are many 
factors to explain why, but one of them is soda consumption, [it is] 
higher than in any other country. 
Legislator Mexico is the number one soda consumer per capita per year, with 
167 litres per person per year 
Academic Well, soda consumption in Mexico is high and it is very harmful, we 
are a society of high consumption 
Ministry of 
Health  
The problem is not having one sweetened beverage, the problem is 
the amount and frequency of consumption 
 
Frames about the determinants of soda consumption were around personal choices, 
access to water, addiction to these beverages and the social construction of soda 
being a reward and a desirable thing to purchase.  For example, an academic 
mentioned: 
 
When the only reward we can afford is soda, well we have problems 
[…].  Food and sodas are the safest way to please ourselves when 
resources are limited.  (ACA)  
 
Moreover, the cultural meaning soda has for Mexicans was a common frame in 
interviewees’ accounts.  Nevertheless, the roots of this behaviour are not well 
understood or described in the accounts.  The next section describes findings 
around this frame. 
 
The cultural meaning of drinking soda 
In addition to issues of soda availability and personal choice, most interviewees 
regardless of background, believed that soda has a deep cultural meaning and that 
drinking soda has an emotional value for Mexicans.  In small indigenous towns, 
advertising for soda even merges with state signs and religious rituals, and soda has 
replaced locally produced drinks or water as the primary source of hydration, as one 
interviewee mentioned: 
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When you go to small indigenous communities, you can see soda 
producers advertising everywhere, the sign with the name of the 
community has the logo of Coca-Cola on it [...].  Marketing has 
overtaken them [traditional foods], junk food and soda ads are 
everywhere […], people want to drink what everybody else in the city 
drinks, that is, soda and sugary drinks. (CSM) 
 
Some interviewees believed that Mexicans value soda more than other food 
commodities.  People drink soda for all meals including breakfast, and it is 
considered an act of kindness to offer visitors a glass of soda.  As a government 
official pointed out: 
 
In some areas, people value Coca-Cola more than food; they buy 2.5 
litres and some chips, instead of any other thing.  They would rather 
buy that than beans. (LEG) 
 
Although this argument could be seen as a stigmatized framing of the behaviour 
among low income populations, it exemplifies how a set of values is assigned to 
sodas.  This finding also concurs with previous research on this topic, which 
indicates that people drink soda regardless of whether it is recognised as a drink 
which is bad for the health of adults and children (Theodore et al., 2011).  In some 
circumstances such as smoking, decisions about a type of behaviour are guided only 
by the perceived short-term benefits, without taking into account the damage to 
health that this decision can cause in the long term (Lujic, Reuter, & Netter, 2005).  
This is also seen in the meaning of drinking soda, which has gone beyond 
rationalising its consumption as an unhealthy drink.  Drinking soda has an 
emotional value, and this can be compared with the arguments that have been made 
about the cultural and emotional value attached by some to smoking cigarettes 
(Ashton & Golding, 1989; Dallman, 2010).  Beliefs about soda being a symbol of 
belonging, of status and of satisfaction emerged in the interviews.  As an academic 
mentioned: 
 
[The reasoning is if] I don’t have any other means to have joy in my 
own home, I use food or [sugary] beverages to fulfil this lack of 
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satisfaction […].  [Soda is] much safer than alcohol […], and it is safer 
than tobacco […].  This behaviour is likely to be a result of an addiction. 
(ACA) 
 
Furthermore, the shift from consuming traditional drinks to consuming 
industrialized sugary drinks and sodas has been framed as a personal preference, as 
a way ‘to belong to this world’ (CSO interviewee) and as a result of exposure to soda 
producers’ marketing strategies (CSO interviewee).  In some cases, it has also been 
framed as a result of soda producers’ expansion into areas where they have 
government concessions to use and exploit water springs regardless of local 
communities’ opposition, as in the case of Chiapas State (Merbert, 2015, p. 175).  The 
presence of the company in poor communities was framed as an opportunity for 
local people to gain employment and improve the economy of the state (Coca-Cola 
Foundation, 2014b), and not as a factor that shifted the availability of drinks and 
affected choices.  Some academics mentioned that local presence of the brand, local 
marketing and local involvement in SRA is a way to use a frame for strategic 
marketing (Merbert, 2015, p. 175).   
 
The ‘happiness’ frame: filling the void 
Food and beverage producers producing soda are aware of the cultural meaning 
these beverages have in Mexico.  Therefore, their marketing strategies are related 
to the emotional side of people rather than pointing out its nutritional values.  Some 
examples include the Coca-Cola Foundation’s ‘Skipping to Happiness Program 2016’ 
(Coca-Cola FEMSA, 2015a) in Mexico, and the ‘A Little Happiness Every Day’ and 
‘Open Happiness’ worldwide campaigns (Taylor, 2016).  Emphasizing feelings and 
happiness to position their product was the frame picked by the F&BI to reach a 
population that was increasingly aware of the obesity problem.  Some of the 
strategies were used nationally by the F&BI to influence the policy debate, as 
described in Chapter 8.  
  
III. Framing the solution of the policy problem  
 
How to tackle obesity has been an ongoing debate worldwide for more than two 
decades (Cecchini & Sassi, 2012; WHO, 1990, 2003, 2007a, 2013b).  Different 
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approaches to tackle obesity have been debated, such as improving diets, improving 
access and availability of foods and improved public spaces for increasing activity, 
as explained in Chapter 2.  The solution for the ‘obesity problem’ was framed as 
being either a personal matter or a collective one.  However, the solution for the 
‘soda consumption’ problem was additionally framed as being a ‘difficult’ or ‘unfair’ 
one, since it intervened only in respect of one product.  This debate mirrors public 
health literature where polls and suggestions include dietary interventions (Sassi et 
al., 2012), nutrition education (Beeken & Wardle, 2013), interference of media in 
health habits (Boyce, 2007) and change in prices of single products (Powell & 
Chaloupka, 2009) as the solutions.  Each of these frames is explained below. 
 
Regardless of the solution being a personal or political matter, the solution to the 
obesity problem was framed as being ‘difficult’ (Rivera-Dommarco et al., 2013, p. 
11).  The ‘difficulty’ frame was identified as a barrier to public actions, and actors 
regardless of their backgrounds repeatedly mentioned it.  For example, the ANM 
mentioned: 
 
It is very difficult for people to modify their eating patterns, especially 
with respect to products such as sugar, where there is a tendency of 
humans to like it.  This is especially true in Mexico where we spoil our 
children.  From a very young age, they consume sugary drinks, and 
they no longer like simple water. (ACA) 
 
The perception of the problem being ‘difficult’ to solve is related to other 
assumptions about the problem, namely, the multi-causality of the disease, as 
discussed in Section II.  This ‘multi-causality’ framing has been one of the driving 
arguments to oppose the soda tax as a solution.  These findings concur with research 
dating from 2000 and before (Nestle & Jacobson, 2000) in which solutions kept 
focusing on changing the behaviour of individuals, an approach that, as the authors 
describe it, ‘has proven woefully inadequate, as indicated by the rising rates of both 
conditions’ (Nestle & Jacobson, 2000).  The argumentation follows that it is better 
than doing nothing about it because it is ‘difficult’ or to start making some changes 
to the environment (Stuckler & Nestle, 2012), as discussed in the following section. 
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Individual versus collective solutions 
Arguments about changing personal choices and lifestyles as a solution 
(CONMEXICO, 2013; EPC, 2011b; Radio Forumla, 2013) contrast with views on 
obesity as a structural problem concerning the State and in need of policies for 
changing the environment and for using legal interventions (Charvel S, 2012; 
Encarnación, 2015; EPC, 2011b).  Actors interviewed, such as advertisers, activists 
and think tank members, framed solutions as a matter for the individual, 
particularly for those suffering from obesity or diabetes.  As a member of the media 
pointed out: 
 
Each individual is responsible for their own behaviour and attitudes, 
and therefore, I think that the people have to take some actions and 
consume a healthier diet. (MIM) 
 
Framing the obesity solution as being the responsibility of individuals is mainly an 
argument given by actors whose main interests are to promote food and drinks for 
commercial gain.  They tend to influence debates when regulations are up for 
consideration, when such regulations might damage their primary interests 
(Hawkins & Holden, 2013b), as in the case of alcohol (Hawkins & McCambridge, 
2014) or tobacco (Cairney et al., 2012) regulations.  As described in Chapter 2, 
Mexico is a major consumer of snacks and sodas, and therefore any intervention 
strongly affecting demand is perceived as a threat to the soda industry (US SEC, 
2013).  Therefore, resistance to the policy was expected from the F&BI, and framing 
the problem as a personal matter was a means to resist policy change, as has been 
described in the literature (Brownell & Warner, 2009; Nestle & Jacobson, 2000). 
 
In contrast, actors familiar with the evidence on obesity as a health problem framed 
the solution as a matter of public concern.  For example, the ANM’s academic 
publication considered the problem to be a matter of protecting human rights.  It 
stated that public policies for ‘improving health’ were a part of attending to human 
rights and ‘are much needed in the country’ (Rivera-Dommarco et al., 2013, p. 10); 
they were supported by CSO organisations when promoting their ‘Manifiesto por la 
Salud Alimentaria’ (Alianza por la Salud Alimentaria, 2012b). 
 
 132 
Attributing obesity to a single product: soda 
A discrepancy in the frames around the causes of obesity was mainly the contrast 
between singling out one commodity versus the overall energy consumption of food.  
For example, while academics and civil society groups insisted on pointing out the 
negative effects of soda and sugary drinks on health, others dismissed it.  An actor 
from the industry mentioned ‘demonizing one thing [soda] is not good for anything’.  
He was supported by a civil society member who said ‘everything you eat or drink 
excessively will affect negatively your health. […] soda, water, anything’.  
 
Opposing arguments against an intervention in a single product (soda) emerged in 
the data.  For industry and media actors, the soda tax was overvalued as a solution 
to the obesity problem.  The CONCAMIN industry consortium press release 
mentioned: 
 
Besides not having a real impact on reducing obesity, it [the soda tax] 
has negative effects to society: taxes on foods and beverages result in 
increased revenue but do not improve the habits and behaviour of 
consumers. (CONCAMIN, 2015) 
 
This frame was largely contested by academics and civil society members.  They 
repeatedly highlighted the relevance of soda and sugary drinks as being part of the 
problem, and they emphasized that doing something about it was the key to solving 
the obesity problem.  This was expressed by civil society groups (see Chapter 8) and 
highlighted in the academics’ ANM report: 
 
Soda is not healthy, and its consumption is very well accepted and 
rooted in Mexican society.  However, its consumption is linked to an 
increased risk of overweight, obesity, diabetes and CVD. This is why, 
amongst other recommendations to reduce its intake, a soda tax is 
recommended. (Juan Rivera et al., 2012, p. 3) 
 
Consequently, these arguments opened an opportunity to frame the soda tax as a 
solution to overcome the obesity and diabetes problems, as discussed in literature 
(Dorfman, Wallack, & Woodruff, 2005; Smith et al., 2016).  The cornerstone 
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arguments used to push for the soda tax were considered to be (a) the current 
epidemiology data on obesity, (b) data on sugary drinks’ consumption and its 
relation to obesity; and (c) the public health advocacy arguments about the need for 
solutions.  As a member of a think tank mentioned: 
 
We had the perfect excuse: we are the country which consumes the 
most soda in the world, we have the data [on the obesity epidemic], 
[we had] the moment of [a fiscal reform coming], and […] we have the 
IEPS [special taxes on products and services] applied to products 
having negative externalities. (TTM) 
 
Therefore, having recognised obesity as a problem and having a political solution to 
it, the next step was to frame it as a collective effort.  An important frame adding 
strength to the solution was how the new government promoted itself as an 
inclusive government, where all actors should participate.  The following section 
discusses the positive and negative beliefs and frames about this approach. 
 
Multi-stakeholder approach 
One of the main frames about polices to tackle obesity was to have a multi-
stakeholder approach.  In this thesis, a multi-stakeholder approach is defined as ‘a 
governance structure that seeks to bring stakeholders [actors] together to 
participate in the dialogue, decision-making and implementation of solutions to 
common problems or goals’ (Council of Europe, 2016; Fuchs, Kalfagianni, & Havinga, 
2011).  However, no clear views were expressed, neither by informants nor in the 
documents, to suggest how such recommendations are to be implemented or 
operationalised (Pratt, Charvel Orozco, Hernandez-Avila, Reis, & Sarmiento, 2014; 
Rivera-Dommarco et al., 2013; SSA, 2011). 
 
The multi-stakeholder approach to tackle the obesity epidemic was framed both as 
a positive and negative approach.  Viewed positively, actors mentioned that the 
multi-stakeholder arrangement provides a space to influence and improve 
collaboration of non-state actors with policy-makers, regardless of the power 
imbalances among them. For example, a legal document explaining how to 
operationalise the policy of obesity mentions: 
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[Considering] that the Health Sector Program 2013-2018 has as one of 
its objectives to consolidate actions for disease prevention and health 
promotion [in order] to promote healthy attitudes and behaviours, it 
is necessary to promote participation of the public, social and private 
sectors to have an impact on the social determinants of health. (DOF, 
2014, p. 1) 
 
In contrast, academic members framed multi-stakeholder arrangements as 
potentially negative, if they were not established under clear principles and rules to 
outweigh the competing interests of actors.  As one academic mentioned: 
 
The political weight that the industry has in policy decisions is high.  
The Ministry of Health leading the process allowed the [F&BI] 
influence to be high […].  I believe that when the industry is part of the 
process, it loses credibility.  Obviously I believe that communication 
with the industry is necessary, and their opinion has to be heard, but it 
is very different [when instead, you only] hear their opinion and then 
a group of experts make the decisions. (ACA) 
 
Multi-stakeholder arrangements were also framed as arrangements that ‘have been 
shown to serve the private sector interests’ (CSO), as they tend to have the most 
power and close relationships with policy makers amongst all non-state actors 
(Farnsworth & Holden, 2006; Fuchs et al., 2011; Ken, 2014).  As noted by an 
interviewee from an international organisation: 
 
It seems like a joke having more representatives of the industry at the 
discussions than you have experts on nutrition and from the civil 
society groups at these workshops [workshops to set nutritional 
criteria for the ENCSOP]. They are deciding the rules. (IAM) 
 
Furthermore, while multi-stakeholder arrangements were highlighted as a platform 
that may or may not have potentially positive outcomes, the role of non-state actors 
or independent entities under such arrangements were also portrayed differently 
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depending on the informant.  Civil society members saw themselves as suddenly 
having a powerful position in food policy-making (Nestle & Rosenberg, 2015).  But 
they also framed the F&BI’s discursive power throughout the process (EPC, 2015), 
as has been the case in the policy sphere worldwide through the years (Clapp & 
Fuchs, 2009, pp. 93-95). 
 
It is important to consider the power of the F&BI, and how the outcome of the policy, 
as a fiscal measure, was what the F&BI wanted least.   However, as covered in 
Chapter 8, remediation actions were taken to avoid the full impact of the soda tax, 
and therefore the F&BI showed that they were able to maintain a powerful position 
throughout the policy process.  For instance, they had a place in the monitoring 
strategy (OMENT), as described in Chapter 7, and they initiated several PPPs that 
benefited their own interests, as noted in Chapter 8.  Also, framing the F&BI’s power 
was an important factor in the soda tax debate since it helped to engage the 
opposition to build a network, and also encouraged the government to avoid being 
perceived as complying with the F&BI demands. 
 
The government’s framing of the multi-stakeholder approach was highlighted in 
official state documents.  It did not consider potential sources of conflict but 
assumed a natural, positive and inclusive arrangement; an imbalance of power 
among the participants was not considered.  This is relevant to understanding the 
process described in Chapter 7.   
 
In addition to the multi-stakeholder approach frame, the use of evidence for policy 
design and implementation is a common argument used among actors.  The next 
section provides details about how actors framed evidence to either support or 
oppose the fiscal measure. 
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IV. Framing the evidence for the soda tax 
 
The use of evidence to support a problem or issue to get on the agenda was a 
recurring frame among interviewees and in documents.  It is important to mention 
the difference between the frame used to refer to the availability of evidence for a 
particular problem and the frame of how the evidence was used, regardless of any 
limits or flaws (in the views of some, as explained ahead).  The results show that 
some actors recognised the unprecedented emergence of evidence between 2009-
2013 related to SSB consumption and obesity as the cornerstone for fostering 
political change, as described in Chapter 4. 
 
The use of evidence for public health policy is itself a broad topic that is widely 
discussed among academics and goes beyond the scope of this research.  However, 
it is important to highlight how ‘evidence’ is framed either to support or to contest 
this policy, as it played a prominent part in the media to position the topic in the 
policy agenda.  As described in this section, for this case study, evidence was (a) 
recognised as being widely available, (b) perceived as being necessary for a policy 
change, and (c) framed differently by different actors to shape public opinion or seek 
support for their arguments (in this case, for or against the soda tax). 
 
Availability of evidence 
According to the MoF they used the available evidence to design the Fiscal Reform, 
and think tank members noted that there was a lot of information on the benefits of 
taxing sodas, which was provided to the policy makers.  Academics also mentioned 
they wanted evidence, and it was provided to them.  As an academic mentioned: 
 
What we needed is to base our decision on the best available evidence 
[…] we [academics supporting the tax] have very solid and 
internationally recognized experts. (ACA) 
 
A think tank member confirmed that ‘in the arguments used, there is a lot, I mean a 
lot of evidence’ (TTM).  However, according to other civil society informants, the 
actors who were involved in promoting the soda tax and continued to push for other 
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topics ‘needed to have fresher arguments’ (CSM) or to frame the evidence 
differently.  As an academic recognised, evidence is not always used: 
 
The evidence is not necessarily part of the political battle, [but 
sometimes] it feeds arguments, which favour or criticise specific 
positions on certain topic. (ACA) 
 
Furthermore, it was important to understand who the actors providing the evidence 
were.  As mentioned in a BP report, academics and international agencies provided 
evidence to make the case (Donaldson, 2015).  However, evidence was also 
generated and provided to politicians by the F&BI, as explained by an interviewee: 
 
We [the food and beverage industry] provided information and 
scientific evidence about the situation of the Mexican population, but 
we did not influence the policy decision. (F&BIM) 
 
Some interviewees referred to international and academic studies conducted and 
supported by independent scientific groups, whereas others (including an F&BI 
representative) highlighted their own evidence.  This becomes a matter of concern 
when there is deliberate misinformation to undermine or question the qualifications 
of some actors producing the evidence, as well as concerns about the source of 
funding when producing evidence for policy-making (Black, 2001). 
 
Use of evidence to challenge soda tax 
The following section analyses how evidence was used to challenge the soda tax.  An 
examination of how facts contradict each other depending on how they were framed 
is also presented.  This discussion focuses on how arguments based on certain 
sources were publicly used to gain credibility and to challenge the soda tax.  The 
frames deployed around the evidence helped to sustain certain actions taken by the 
actors involved in the policy formulation and the implementation of the tax 
(Chapters 7 and 8). 
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Economic implications of the soda tax and a threat to jobs  
Frames around the economic implications of the soda tax were used to negatively 
frame the policy measure.  The F&BI constantly issued press releases and engaged 
the press to express these thoughts (CONMEXICO, 2013).  These frames were also 
used by newspapers and journalists.  For example, Sergio Sarmiento, a well-known 
journalist, presented arguments against the soda tax in his ‘Jaque Mate’ editorial 
published in several newspapers, such as ‘The levy hit some producers and their 
workers as well as formal traders, but allowed a 51.7% increase in government 
income from excise tax’ (Sarmiento, 2013).  The main frames used to discourage the 
soda tax were the implications for jobs, soda producers and the poor. 
 
One of the main arguments against the soda tax was the implications it might have 
on employment.  As a specialist from the Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León 
(UNAL) pointed out in a press conference, the soda tax allegedly  created problems 
such as decreases in employment and production (Chapa-Cantú et al., 2015).  A 
press release in 2016 by the ANPRAC agreed with this claim and estimated that the 
gross production ‘fell by six thousand 500 million pesos, 0.04 percent of GDP and 
generated 10,000 job losses’ (ANPRAC).  Although this frame was sustained 
throughout the policy process, data analysed from soda producer’s annual reports 
showed that soda producers did not lose any employees. As shown in Figure 6.2, the 
three main soda producers in the country not only maintained but increased the 
number of employees (Arca Continental, 2014b; Coca-Cola Femsa, 2015b; Cultiba, 
2015). 
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Figure 6.2 Mexican employees per year of three main soda bottlers 
 
 
Arguments about implications for jobs and growth of the company were not 
consistent with the frames used by industry actors.  However, they disclose a 
contradictory argument used by the Universidad de Nuevo Leon and ANPRAC, as 
explained in Chapter 5.  They also disclose the close relationship of this university 
to the F&BI and the powerful position of soda industries in the economic and 
political agenda of the country. 
Implications for Mexico’s economy and soda production  
In addition to the ‘impact on jobs’, the F&BI also used the ‘negative impact on [soda] 
production chains’ to oppose the soda tax (Valverde, 2016, p. 1).  This frame was 
supported in a report funded by the F&BI, revealing the sector’s preoccupation with 
the implications of the soda tax for their business and, in turn, the impact on the 
economy: 
 
Changes to the soda industry in Mexico are important, as it has 
implications for the national economy and for other sectors.  The 
change affects the poor most, so we say that they are regressive taxes. 
(Aguilar et al., 2015, p. 18) 
 
This frame was contested by academics who reported that the growth rate of soft 
drinks for 2007-2014 was 1.9 % [and] that predictions for the next four years (2015-
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2018) showed that the industry would grow at a compound annual rate of 1% (Batis, 
Rivera, Popkin, & Taillie, 2016).  In addition, some actors who supported the soda 
producer’s interests, such as UNAL, framed soda producers as a cornerstone of the 
Mexican economy: 
 
Soda producers in Mexico represent 12.25% of the food, beverage and 
tobacco producers and 2.39% of the entire manufacturing industry, 
producing 124 million dollars per year, equivalent to 4.1% of Mexico’s 
GDP. (Chapa-Cantú et al., 2015, p. 5) 
 
Mergers and acquisitions with small businesses were one of the possible 
explanations for maintaining and increasing growth (and jobs).  Regardless of 
framing the soda tax as having a negative impact on manufacturers, reports showed 
that production of sugary drinks was actually decreasing, and such forecasts 
considered that no further tax changes would directly affect the soft drinks market, 
as the growth of products marked as light is estimated to reach 6.3% in 2 years 
(Batis et al., 2016). 
 
The negative effects soda tax has on jobs and on the county’s economy were 
promoted strongly in press releases and industry documents.  Interestingly, during 
a similar situation at the time of the Fiscal Reform in 2010 which also had 
implications for the industry, these frames were not used.  This was stressed to 
investors in a 2012 corporate document: 
 
In Mexico, a general tax reform became effective on 1 January of 2010, 
under which, as applicable to us, there was a temporary increase in the 
income tax rate from 28% to 30% from 2010 through 2012.  Pursuant 
to an amendment made at the end of 2012, the 30% income tax rate 
will continue to apply through 2013.  In addition, the value-added tax 
[‘VAT’] rate in Mexico increased in 2010 from 15% to 16%. (US SEC, 
2012)  
 
The different approach taken by the F&BI in a similar situation indicates that 
framing the soda tax as a ‘health tax’ was the main concern of the fiscal measure.  
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The soda tax clearly had implications for the internal processes of soda producers, 
but it did not necessarily affect them negatively overall.  However, the framing of 
their products as being penalized for not being healthy was the overarching concern 
affecting their business. 
 
Soda tax’s negative impact on the poor 
The impact of the soda tax on poor populations was one of the main arguments used 
to oppose the soda tax in industry-sponsored reports and in some actors' websites 
at the end of 2015: 
 
On average, families with low income spend 2.7% of their budget on 
buying non-alcoholic beverages, while people with higher income 
spend 1.1%. (Cantú, Curiel, & Valero, 2015, p. 21) 
 
Furthermore, the CONCAMIN report called the soda tax regressive (CONCAMIN, 
2015), and the ANPRAC noted that the soda tax affected 63.7% of low-income 
households and that the poorest households paid 37.5% of the total tax (ANPRAC).  
This was countered by promoters of the soda tax with evidence, presented by 
scholars at several academic events, that obesity is regressive, as the poorest sectors 
of the country were the most affected by obesity (Colchero, Popkin, Rivera, & Ng, 
2016). 
 
Soda as ‘necessary good’ 
In economic terms, soda was framed as a ‘necessary good’ or ‘normal good’ (Aguilar 
et al., 2015, p. 3).  A ‘necessary good’ is one whose demand increases as income 
increases but not in the same proportion as income (Bussiness dictionary, 216).  
This was used to frame the soda tax negatively by highlighting the fact that it affects 
the poor more than it does other groups.  The observed decrease in money spent on 
soda was simply attributed to a moderate change in income increase.  A think tank 
member supported this view on the decrease in soda consumption: 
 
There have been changes because people have reduced soda 
consumption, but if they are changing expenses on cleaning products, 
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toothpaste, soap, [this expenditure] is alarming because the impact on 
the poor people is outrageous. (TTM) 
 
In responding to these concerns, the Fiscal Reform framed the soda tax as taking 
account of the possible effects on the poor, mainly by avoiding the generalisation of 
value added tax (VAT) to food and medicine and only restricting it to soda and 
snacks (Initiatia de Ley de Ingresos de la Federación para el Ejercicio Fiscal de, 
2014).  The framing used in the government document justifies the measure as a 
direct answer to the F&BI’s concerns, and it confirms that the initial intention was 
to tax all food (as was also expressed by an interviewee, as noted in Chapter 7).   In 
addition to framing the soda tax as having negative social and economic 
implications, frames used to discourage the adoption of the soda tax included the 
lack of effectiveness of the measure, as explained below. 
 
Soda tax as an ineffective or negative policy measure 
The effectiveness of the soda tax was highly discussed in the media after the 
publication of three reports by ITAM, UNAL and INSP (Aguilar et al., 2015; Chapa-
Cantú et al., 2015; Colchero et al., 2016).  Contradictory arguments were found in 
these reports in terms of three factors.  The first was the source of funding for the 
analysis.  The second was the unit used to measure the effect and the databases used. 
The third was how the information was framed, and whether it led to a negative or 
positive perception of the effect or non-effect of the soda tax. 
 
ITAM’s report was funded by ANPRAC and CONMEXICO.  None of the economists 
who analysed the information were involved in the policy debate before this report 
was published, and therefore, the topic was novel to their practice.  As a result, no 
particular alienation to a particular position is assumed.  It used ‘caloric intake’ as 
an outcome measure, as reported in a publication by another university specialized 
in public policy: 
 
The report of CONMEXICO and ANPRAC with ITAM concludes that the 
tax did not reduce caloric intake in a significant way.  It only reduced 6 
kcal of the 3,200 calories consumed daily by Mexicans. (Ramirez, 
2016)  
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For CONMEXICO, this report was enough proof to demonstrate ‘that demand of 
taxed beverage and foods is inelastic’ (Ramirez, 2016).  This argument was taken to 
the media and was discussed in other publications, the report also mentioned that 
the estimated decrease in sugary drinks was between 6.5% and 7%.  The report 
admitted that the soda tax had incentivized consumers to reduce consumption, 
though it framed this as ‘moderately reduced consumption’ (Aguilar et al., 2015).  It 
was further noted: 
 
These decreases in purchased litres of sugary drinks may not change 
the total calorie consumption if consumers substitute other foods or 
drinks. (Aguilar et al., 2015, p. 17) 
 
Additionally, this report stratifies results according to the body mass index (BMI) of 
heads of families, and it also uses it as an outcome measurement.  This is a 
misleading measure, as BMI changes after population-level interventions are not 
perceived immediately but in the mid-to-long term (Barrientos, 2013). The main 
conclusion is to include policy measures other than just the soda tax: 
 
If the state wants to contribute, they can do other things, such as 
campaigns that make exercise attractive and healthy diets […], have 
water fountains, places to exercise […], sell seeds in Diconsa, have 
home gardens […], favour dietary sodas […], talk to food producers to 
reduce the amount of sugar. (Zaid, 2013, p. 1) 
 
UNAL’s report noted that sales decreased by 3%-4%.  However, it mentioned an 
increase in soda production from 1200 to 1400 million litres monthly (+16%), in 
bottled water from 400 to 500 million litres (+25%), and in juice from 30 million to 
75 million litres (+150%) (UNAL, 2015) and gave a negative connotation: 
 
Reduction in consumption was estimated at 3%.  Therefore, the tax did 
not substantially change the median caloric intake of Mexicans (if so, it 
reduced calorie consumption by 0.215) but importantly, it increased 
the fiscal revenue. (Chapa-Cantú et al., 2015) 
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Finally, the INSP report mentioned that sales of taxed beverages decreased by 6% (-
12 ml/capita/day) and the rate of decrease in sales was up to 12% in December 
2014 (up to 17% in LSE houses).  It also mentioned a 4% decrease in untaxed 
beverages (36 mL/capita/day) higher than the counterfactual (mainly by bottled 
water) (Colchero et al., 2016, p. 1).  This report was funded by Bloomberg 
Philanthropies with the outcome variable with respect to sodas purchased; it used 
Euromonitor International data and was prepared by supporters of the soda tax. 
 
This same report mentioned that economic models of addiction and related 
behavioural models imply that the long-term impact of a price change will be much 
larger than the short-term effect (Colchero et al., 2015), and it gave a positive 
connotation of the soda tax results.  Figure 6.3 shows the evidence presented in the 
above reports after the tax was implemented.  These frames were used to gain 
support with legislators for and against the soda tax during Congress’ voting 
sessions on the fiscal policies for 2015-2016. 
 
Figure 6.3 Framing soda tax impact according to report’s institutional support  
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V. Framing motivations for the soda tax 
 
Based on the socio-political conditions in Mexico, explained in Chapter 4, beliefs 
about the underlying driving forces behind the soda tax policy were framed in two 
ways. Some interviewees viewed the soda tax as a government initiative to secure 
government spending, while others saw it as a ‘window of opportunity’ where 
several factors merged, including pressure from civil society.  
 
Securing funds for public spending  
As the leader of a new administration, Enrique Peña Nieto sought to increase 
government funds by increasing public revenue.  This was not framed as a popular 
alternative, as one member of a think tank mentioned: 
 
Naturally, new governments implement reforms, and the first thing 
they do is to increase taxes.  Increasing taxes as soon as you take office 
is not as unpopular as if you increase taxes during an election, so this 
was a good moment to do so. (CSM) 
 
According to the civil society members interviewed, while running for president, 
Peña Nieto had intentions of taxing all foods, drinks and medicines, but that was very 
difficult because it would generate strong social opposition (CSM interviewee 
account).  According to a think tank member, and to some members of the media, 
Peña Nieto would exacerbate the general disapproval he faced among the liberals 
sympathisers supporting the defeated candidate of Partido de la Revolución 
Democrática (PRD) (Crumpacker, 2013).  The soda tax came with potential political 
costs, therefore, it had to be carefully framed to the public as a positive measure to 
overcome the negative externalities it might imply.  As some informants noted, it 
was a good time to raise taxes as a new administration was taking office.  For 
example, an international interviewee pointed out:  
 
Last year, we had something we did not have in 2006, a new 
administration that fortunately recognized obesity is a problem and 
taxing soda was a possibility […]. It [the soda tax] gained support from 
the President’s party. (IAM) 
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Increasing the price on soda was a good opportunity to generate revenue and was 
framed it as a positive measure.  However, one MoH did not frame the soda tax as a 
public health strategy, as might be expected from a health authority. Instead, he 
showed little involvement in the fiscal measure and stated that ‘you have to ask 
'Hacienda’ [the Ministry of Finance]’, explaining that the main aim of the soda tax 
was to collect money.  An academic agreed with this point and highlighted the lack 
of support from the MoH for this policy as a statement to their position:  
 
[The] Ministry of Health didn't support the tax actively at the 
beginning.  Their position was: It is the Ministry of Finance’s topic, not 
ours.  This is weird because, obviously, it was a health tax. (ACA) 
 
Soda tax as the result as a combination of factors 
The sodas tax was also framed as a result of a combination of several factors creating 
a policy ‘window of opportunity’. This included many policies proposed by the 
legislators, the support of CSO, and strong technical support (MoH account).  These 
beliefs reflect some of the theoretical proposal of Kingdon’s multiple streams theory 
on agenda setting (Kingdon, 1995; Silke & Kriesi, 2007, p. 129).  The account of a 
civil society member supports this finding:  
 
Well, it has much to do with the moment we were going through; a new 
government was taking office.  Usually when [a new] governments 
arrives, the first thing they do is reform and generally increase taxes 
because politically it has not such an impact as if they do it when 
leaving, or when you have an election involved.  [It also had to do with] 
now being a [right] time and situation allowing it [the soda tax] to 
happen, because it was something they had tried in other countries 
[too]. (CSM) 
 
Regardless of the motivation of the soda tax, the respondents unanimously agreed 
the government transition and the advocacy groups’ actions were relevant factors 
for the soda tax getting on the agenda.  These findings reflect the theory of agenda 
setting developed by Kingdon, where policy (the soda tax), politics (government 
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transition), and the problem (obesity/soda consumption) merge to create a policy 
window (Kingdon, 1995).  
 
VI. Summary  
 
This chapter explains how actors framed and perceived the cultural and political 
factors in Mexico at the time the soda tax was discussed as a policy alternative as 
well as immediately after it was implemented.  It describes how actors framed the 
obesity and soda consumption problem and how it was not necessarily considered 
a problem to be addressed only by the government.   
 
For this policy, the framing of the problem was strongly influenced by how the 
evidence surrounding the risk factors of either obesity or the soda tax were 
presented by different actors including academics, civil society and F&BI 
representatives.  Additionally, the recognition of a ‘problem’ of ‘high’ consumption 
of sugary drinks was framed as culturally significant for Mexicans, as stressed in 
previous publications (Théodore, Bonvecchio Arenas, Blanco García, & Carreto 
Rivera, 2011; Theodore et al., 2011), and which was strongly influenced by the 
excessive marketing and expanded distribution of sodas.  In addition, this 
perception is related to normative beliefs about the quality of water used for soda 
production, sodas as a reward and soda consumption as an addiction.   
 
In addition, the positive framing the process as a multi-stakeholder approach to 
obesity does not consider the potential conflicting problems arising from such an 
arrangement (Helmig, Spraul, & Ingenhoff, 2016).  The tax was not only framed as a 
positive factor for health and health programs, but also as a positive solution to 
increase income to execute such programs.  Its potential effect on the poor and the 
country's economy were the main arguments used to frame it as a negative policy 
option, similar to the cases of tobacco and alcohol policy issues, to gain support 
against the soda tax (Hawkins & McCambridge, 2014; McCambridge, Hawkins, & 
Holden, 2013; Mialon et al., 2015; Scholes, Johnson, & Whittington, 2002).  Finally, 
after the soda tax was implemented, some academics who were proponents of the 
tax produced evidence to highlight its positive effects, whereas opponents produced 
evidence of its ‘small’ effect.  
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Chapter 7. Policy development and the roles of state and non-state 
actors 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This chapter describes and analyses the process of the policy design and agenda 
setting of the soda tax.  It reflects upon findings from the interviews and policy 
documents supporting and outlining the soda tax; and explores the role of the state 
and non-state actors in the formal policy process.  
 
First, the soda tax as a legislative initiative presented in December 2012 is analysed. 
Then, the Mexican National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo [PND]), 
which commenced in 2013 as the outline of the President’s policy plan, is examined.  
Finally, the Ministry of Health’s (MoH’s) National Strategy to Control and Prevent 
Obesity, Overweight and Diabetes (ENPCSOD) and the Mexican Observatory of Non-
Communicable Diseases (Observatorio Mexicano de Enfermedades No 
Transmisibles - OMENT) design processes are presented. 
 
The above analyses follow the process shown in the lower part of the timeline in 
Figure 7.1.  For the purpose of this thesis, the process is divided into formal policy 
development led by government officials; and informal policy development.  Formal 
policy development refers to the process followed by state actors to formulate the 
policy content. Non-state actors may or may not be invited to participate in this 
process (Buse, 2008), which Kraak et al called ‘contractual relationships’ with state-
actors (2012).  Informal policy development refers to parallel actions that are not 
officially related to the formal process but that include the actions of non-state 
actors to influence the agenda setting and, in general, the policy process (Buse, 
2008).  This chapter analyses formal policy development and ‘contractual’ 
participation.  Chapter 8 analyses informal policy development or systemic public 
agenda (Cobb & Elder, 1972) and how it shaped the policy. 
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Figure 7.1 Policy design implementation pathway and participation of non-state actors 
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II. Soda tax as a legislative initiative 
The soda tax first became a legislative initiative in 2012.  Senator Marcela Torres 
from National Action Plan (Partido Acción Nacional- PAN), the largest party 
opposing the President’s party Democratic Revolution Party (Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática- PRD), submitted it to a vote.  A member of an international 
agency said in an interview that ‘the initiative was a result of [this] Senator working 
with the civil society and academics’.  According to Kingdon’s analytical framework, 
non-state influences or non-state policy entrepreneurs use agenda-setting 
opportunities (policy windows), such as the collaboration with the Senator, to 
include issues of interest on the policy agenda (Howlett et al., 2009, p. 103). 
 
When this legislative initiative was submitted to a vote, other initiatives were also 
emerging in both legislative chambers. However, none of them included a fiscal 
measure.  Thus, awareness of obesity as a public health issue was a clear concern in 
policy discussions within the legislative, and dialogue about the obesity problem 
was leading to a search for potential political solutions (Thomas, 2001).  One 
legislator stated the following: 
 
We [deputies of our party] made calls for actions, declarations, 
resolutions where we mentioned obesity as an important public health 
problem. (LEG) 
 
Support of non-state actors in formulating soda tax initiative 
Accounts consistently show that civil society and academia were part of the process 
of policy formulation of the soda tax initiative.  Some civil society groups 
acknowledged that they participated in this process, mainly through three different 
strategies.  First, they ‘persuaded’ the legislators to support the legislative initiative.  
Second, they brought together various actors, such as legislators and academics, and 
reached out to other civil society organisations, as described by a member of an 
international organisation: 
 
The INSP, the group El Poder del Consumidor (a civil society 
organisation) and an advocacy group called Polithink that worked to 
set ideas with the Congress were working together since the beginning 
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of the year [2012]. Each group has different projects and works with 
different organisations. (IAM) 
 
Third, they helped encourage the inclusion of evidence and academics’ 
recommendations in the legislative initiative by working with several academic 
institutions and ‘provided a lot of evidence and international experience’ (IAM).  
Academics and international organisations were invited to formally advise the 
Senator Marcela Torres, and some months later (Figure 7.1) the Senate invited the 
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) Mexican office to collaborate. One 
international organisation representative noted the following: 
 
We received the invitation from the Senate to help in this initiative [the 
soda tax] and facilitate information available in the organisation, but 
[we] also were in frequent conversations with the MoH to share 
everything we were working on and the experience the Congress was 
having with this initiative. (IAM) 
 
Subsequently, PAHO created a team of advisers that included several organisations, 
including the INSP, a MoH representative, other UN agencies such as FAO and 
UNICEF, Polithink and BP, to devise a strategy.  In this regard, one interviewee said 
the following: 
 
At least once a month, we were gathering to share what everyone was 
doing and defining strategies that could help consolidate the law 
initiative that the Congress would present to achieve approval of the 
majority. (IAM) 
 
Legislators’ positions in supporting and opposing the initiative 
Other than Senator Marcela Torres’s allies (other senators, Polithink, Fundación 
Mídete, Contra Peso ANSA), not many actors form the Senate participated in the 
formulation of the soda tax initiative.  Other legislators and food and beverage 
industry (F&BI) representatives reacted to the proposal only later.  First, several 
legislators from the proponent’s party and the opposing party expressed divided 
opinions: 
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The coordinator of the chamber didn’t want me to present it 
[legislative initiative], so I needed to impose by being accompanied 
with 24 other senators, 12 of my party and 12 of other parties […]. 
(LEG) 
 
A civil society member confirmed that the Senate chamber president, ‘who is totally 
pro-industry’, had decided to reduce the initially proposed soda tax of 20% and to 
not pass the legislative initiative.  These accounts indicate the strong opposition 
inside the Senate chamber at that time.  Additionally, and even though no formal 
accounts are available to verify lobbying efforts at legislative offices, one legislator 
mentioned that F&BI representatives visited all Senators who signed the legislative 
initiative.  She also noted:  
 
A Senator of my party represents the soda industry, and she radically 
opposed my legislative initiative. We even had personal problems 
inside our own party […]. (TTM) 
 
One interviewee described the F&BI lobbying as follows: 
 
Immediately after presenting the initiative, I had visits from the soda 
industry people, with studies supported by them telling me that soda 
was a clean liquid, that it is a safe source of drinking water, that it is 
part of the poorest Mexicans’ diet and that jobs would be threatened, 
as well as the whole economy in Mexico, that we would have problems 
with sugar cane producers, and all the little family stores would be 
affected because 80% of what they sell is soda. I argued against each of 
the arguments they gave me. (LEG) 
 
Many legislators from other parties who opposed the soda tax remained silent.  A 
think tank member noted that when the discussion started, the PRI legislators were 
silent on this aspect, and ‘they did not pronounce themselves in favour or against 
the tax,’ and it was mainly ‘because the Fiscal Reform was coming’ (TTM). 
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The widespread silence among the legislators of the new presidential party, 
Institutional Revolution Party (Partido de la Revolución Institucional- PRI), may 
have been due to a desire to ‘close’ the policy window opened by the PNA Senator’s 
soda tax proposal.  And before taking a stand for or against a policy proposed by the 
opposing party, legislators were waiting until the federal government first set out 
its agenda. 
 
Although multiple obesity-prevention legislative proposals, including the soda tax, 
were presented to vote in 2012, none of them were passed in the Congress (both 
Senate and Deputies chambers), where the majority represented the elected 
President’s party.  Instead, all obesity issues were withheld until the new federal 
administration took office. This strategy would give the federal government a 
positive image as being proactive in dealing with obesity, as politicians choose 
polices that ‘best promote their electoral appeal and gives more room for 
manoeuvre’ (Majone, 1989, p. 76). 
 
As mentioned in Kingdon’s framework, policymaking refers to a condition of 
ambiguity and ‘a state of having many ways of thinking about the same 
circumstances’ (Feldman, 1991, p. 5), as illustrated in this case.  Ambiguity creates 
stress and confusion (Zahariadis, 2014, p. 26).  For instance, whether taxing soda 
was a health, political, financial or moral decision was kept ambiguous, given the 
context of the country. The interviewees considered the Senate an institution with 
internally conflicting missions (Marks & Thompson, 2011). Additionally, they also 
revealed how the F&BI engaged in persistent lobbying as a corporate political 
activity (Mialon et al., 2015, p. 519). 
 
III. Formulation of National Development Plan 
 
As soon as Enrique Peña Nieto took office, his team started to formulate the NDP, as 
described in Chapter 4.  This plan’s design had a multi-sectorial and multi-
stakeholder approach. It included an internet-based public consultation, five 
national forums, seven special forums, forums in all 32 states and 122 workshops 
organised by each of the ministries of the executive power (Plan Nacional de 
Desarrollo, 2013).  In this regard, a MoH member said the following: 
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The NDP was written by following two pathways, one through the 
public consultation directly with us, and the other was the internal 
proposal each ministry had.  Each ministry’s proposals should have 
undergone their own public consultation process. Our public 
consultation was either by meeting with us in our offices or by 
answering some close-ended questions on our website that anyone 
could do. (MoFM) 
 
These accounts suggest that the approach taken was a collaborative one in which 
non-state actors were engaged (Kraak et al., 2012; VicHealth, 2016).  Such 
collaboration is meant to be inclusive for ‘enhancing the capacity of the participants 
for mutual benefit, and are meant to gain a common purpose’ (VicHealth, 2016, p. 
4).  The federal government had opened the dialogue with non-state actors (Howlett 
et al., 2009, p. 111). 
 
Public health advocates during the National Development Plan 
The civil society groups who supported the soda tax were pressuring to put obesity 
topics on the agenda even before the new President took office and since then, they 
had economic and technical support from international organisations (as described 
in Chapter 5).  Therefore, when referring to the National Development Plan, 
interviews reflected a sense of empowerment from civil society members or ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’.  As one civil society representative mentioned: 
 
Civil society organisations, like us, […] acted on the new 
administration’s agenda […]. They [the decision-makers’ had no idea 
how to work, and that gave us the opportunity to include what we 
wanted. (CSM) 
 
Civil society organisations representatives acknowledged their participation in the 
process, and most of their recommendations were considered.  A civil society 
member noted the following: 
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Thanks to our participation [us and other CSO] during the meetings for 
the NDP, it finally included a strategy to control obesity, overweight, 
and diabetes. (CSM) 
 
However, other interviewees noted that they were not invited for a workshop 
organized by COFERPIS): 
 
When the National Plan meetings were organised, we denounced that 
we [the civil society] were not invited [particularly] to the meeting 
organised by COFEPRIS. (CSM) 
 
The final content of National Development Plan 
Despite the participation of non-state actors in formulating the NDP, the final 
document did not include specific policies (including the soda tax) to tackle obesity.  
Instead, in its final version, one of the NDP’s aims was ‘to put in place actions to 
prevent and control overweight, obesity, and diabetes’ (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 
2013, p. 117).  According to the statements of Ministry of Finance (MoF) actors, the 
soda tax was not explicitly written into the NDP because it should be part of each 
ministry’s documents. No record of discussing the inclusion of the soda tax in the 
NDP was found in public webpages of governmental agencies at the time of this 
research. Access to the National Institute of Transparency and Access to Information 
did not reveal such records either (Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la 
Información y Protección de Datos Personales [INAI]).  Although the soda tax was 
not mentioned in the NDP, by highlighting obesity as a national problem, the MoF 
opened a window of opportunity for further work on the obesity agenda. 
 
IV. The soda tax as part of wider fiscal reforms 
 
It remains unclear how the soda tax became a part of the Fiscal Reform (Reforma 
Fiscal - RF) under the section of excise taxes (Impuesto Especial a Productos y 
Servicios - IEPS )  (DOF, 20 November 2013).  Contradictory accounts were found.  
First, two MoF members claimed to have worked hand-in-hand with the MoH: 
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We work with people from the Ministry of Health in all analyses, so we 
combined the creation of this tool [the soda tax] that would contribute 
to improving health but also to take advantage of the fiscal changes, 
and that’s how we decided to include it. (MoFM) 
 
Others claimed to have taken a participatory approach to include CSO comments on 
civil Fiscal Reform, which also included a snack tax: 
 
We listened to everybody […]. We received people from the academy, 
from the civil society, from the industry. (MoFM)  
 
Furthermore, a civil society member described how they were surprised to see the 
soda and snack taxes as part of the Fiscal Reform (DOF, 20 November 2013): 
 
Our surprise was that when the executive power presented the Fiscal 
Reform, they had taken our proposal […].  They never told us openly 
they would include the soda and snack taxes. (CSO) 
 
This final finding is consistent with another civil society actor’s claim that after Peña 
Nieto took office, the government tried to design everything quickly without much 
consultation in order to avoid problems.  MoH representatives mentioned that the 
soda tax was mainly prepared by the MoF.  However, in contrast, a legislator claimed 
that the soda tax was adopted from the original legislative initiative 
(LXII/1PPO70/38519, 2012) submitted by the PAN in 2012: 
 
One year after I presented the legislative proposal, the Minister of 
Finance came to see me and told me they were interested in my 
legislative initiative, including the soda tax and other fiscal measures, 
so they needed me to remove the legislative initiative for the President 
to propose it from the federal government. (LEG) 
 
The previous claims reveal a discrepancy, as the MoF member’s claim contradicts 
the claims of the MoH member, a legislator and a civil society member.  The 
interviewees offered different accounts of how the soda tax was included in the 
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policy documents and incorporated into the federal policy agenda.  Additionally, 
from interviewees’ accounts, it was not clear how the final decision of taxing sodas 
at the rate of 1 MXP per litre was made, as the original legislative initiative suggested 
a 20% price increase. The Senator mentioned that she did not agree with this 
reduction: 
 
I supported the MoF with the new federal soda tax proposal, but I did 
not agree how they presented it. I initially presented it as 20% per litre, 
and they [MoF] decreased it to 1.00 MXP per litre […]. (LEG) 
 
The interviewees speculated about the change being influenced by lobbying by the 
F&BI. One academic mentioned the following: 
 
I have no doubt the industry played a very important in modifying or 
reducing the tax proposed with a persuasive role, especially the sugar 
cane industry, but it was also [a result of] corruption and influence on 
legislators […]. (ACA) 
 
Only the legislator who proposed the soda tax explained its transition from being a 
legislative proposal to becoming part of the Fiscal Reform; by contrast, the MoF did 
not describe any links with the Senator.  The MoF’s lack of transparency about 
adopting the Senator’s legislative proposal indicates the relevance of the soda tax as 
being an idea conceived by executive power and the relevance given to it.  Lehmann 
and Gilson (2013) noted that this is a type of ‘power over others’ (VeneKlasen & 
Miller, 2002) ‘involving taking it from someone else, and using it to dominate and 
prevent others from gaining from it’ (Lehmann & Gilson, 2013, p. 360). 
 
V. The design of the MoH’s National Strategy for Prevention and 
Control of Overweight, Obesity and Diabetes  
 
While the soda tax was outlined in the RF, in parallel, it was also outlined in the 
ENPCSOD (Figure 7.1) and presented two months later.  The MoH outlined this 
strategy, which, as explained in Chapter 1, includes several measures or ‘pillars’ to 
tackle obesity.  One of them is the regulatory pillar that included the soda tax. The 
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government promoted ENPCSOD as a policy which included academic 
recommendations and the participation of non-state actors: 
 
We called everyone who wanted to participate, at least from here […] 
[the undersecretary of Health Promotion]. A list of very different 
people was involved in designing it [the National Strategy to Prevent 
Obesity]. (MoHM) 
 
In contrast, one civil society member and another from an international agency 
stated that neither of them were allowed to participate even when they offered to 
review the proposal for comments: 
 
No, we did not [participate in the National Strategy to Prevent Obesity 
and Overweight] […]. [We] did not have the opportunity to review it 
before publishing it, [even though] we offered to work with them [on 
the draft], and they didn’t accept it. (IAM)  
 
Some actors were surprised that INSP academics were not invited to participate in 
the policy design, as they have ‘international recognition’ and were part of the 
academics generating evidence for changes in obesity polices.  In contrast, a Senator 
from the President’s party mentioned that the ENPCSOD was based on INSP reports.  
Nevertheless, he does not mention their active participation in the strategy: 
 
Everything [for the ENPCSOD] was done through the under-secretary 
of Health; he based all the ideas on the INSP’s work on Mexico’s 
situation with obesity and overweight. Those [findings] guided us on 
what we have to do to reduce obesity and overweight. (LEG) 
 
When talking about participation in the specific workshops of each pillar or 
component of the strategy with a representative of the MoH, he concluded the 
following: 
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I don’t know the whole process […]. Each regulatory pillar had its own 
coordinator.  The regulatory pillar was organised by COFEPRIS, but the 
other two, well, we coordinated them. (MoHM) 
 
However, this same MOH actor also claimed that the ENPCSOD and its content was 
their idea, and that other actors were trying to claim responsibility: 
 
I designed the strategy … well, the conceptual framework I designed it 
[…], but suddenly everyone claimed to be the expert on the topic of 
diabetes and obesity, and a lot of ‘parents’ of the strategy came 
publicly. Mm… like always. (MoHM) 
 
This MOH actor’s comments sends contradictory messages about participation and 
knowledge on the strategy.  It reflects both the willingness to have some recognition 
and ‘power over’ (VeneKlasen & Miller, 2002) and credit for the policy.  However, 
the interviewee account reflects no clear knowledge of the whole process.  This 
might be a result of delegating the task to other policymakers to lead each pillar of 
the strategy.  Even so, it is expected that the person claiming to be the author of the 
strategy should know and clearly understand each detail of the process.  This 
account also contradicts the MoH’s claims when replying about the soda tax: 
 
You need to ask [about the soda tax] to ‘Hacienda’ [the Ministry of 
Finance]. (MoHM) 
 
The contradictory messages about the inclusion of the soda tax as part of the 
regulatory pillar of the ENPCSOD supports the claim that the soda tax came as a fast 
executive order and that it was included in both the Fiscal Reform and the ENPCSOD 
without much discussion among government officials or the civil society, as some 
members of think tanks have claimed.  However, members of the CSO claimed that 
the F&BI was involved in the ENPCSOD design, particularly in sessions discussing 
the food labelling and food marketing pillars of the strategy. 
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Legitimisation of the F&BI during the design of ENPCSOD 
F&BI representatives were invited to participate during the design of ENPCSOD.  A 
representative of the MoH confirmed their participation and justified it as 
‘necessary’ as it is a ‘legitimate’ industry.  Legitimisation of their involvement in 
policy processes is one of many corporate industry tactics used to influence the 
political agenda (Mialon et al., 2015).  However, government officials differ in their 
opinions of which industries should be involved: 
 
You cannot avoid the participation of the food industry […]. It is like 
saying [the food and beverage] industry is the worst […]. This is 
different from the tobacco industry: It has been demonstrated that a 
cigarette is harmful, while not at all foods and beverages produced by 
the same company are harmful; a lot of them sell water. (MoHM) 
 
MoH members clarified the F&BI’s participation during the process and noted that 
the MOH played a leadership role in managing this participation. 
 
[...] We did not negotiate with them [regarding the regulatory 
measures on the strategy]; we coordinated with them. Then [only we] 
will apply the law because we are the Mexican State and we have our 
responsibilities. (MoHM) 
 
In this quote, the MOH actor did not mention any potential conflicts due to the F&BI’s 
formal participation in the policy process. This is in contrast to other reports of F&BI 
participation (Mialon, Swinburn, Allender, et al., 2016; Nestle, 2013; Swinburn et al., 
2015).  This was consistent with another finding which compared the perception of 
the F&BI’s role in policymaking with the role of the tobacco and alcohol industry’s 
role in the 1980s and 1990s (Brownell & Warner, 2009; Warner, 2012).  The 
normative beliefs on these accounts about the role of the F&BI expose a social 
construct which accepts their participation in policy design without questioning the 
possible risk of such participation to the policy.  The concept of conflict of interest, 
defined in this study as ‘a set of conditions in which professional judgement 
concerning a primary interest […] be unduly influenced by a secondary interest […]’ 
(Thompson, 1993), is not considered.  If this paradigm prevails among decision-
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makers, companies’ active role in policy design is not considered as conflicting.  The 
F&BI whose products will be penalized by a soda tax, cannot ‘judge and be judged’, 
as an interviewed legislator phrased it.  When it comes to regulatory measures, 
commercial interests and fiduciary commitments will always outweigh public 
health interests for private companies (Brody, 2011). This appears to have been 
completely underestimated and overlooked by the political informants in this study. 
 
The argument that ‘they [companies] sell water’ (MoHR) appears to legitimize food 
companies’ position in the context of public health.  The informant did not relate the 
topic to the public right to free drinking water (provided by the state) or reflected 
on the dual role that soda companies might have in other policies concurrent with 
the soda tax, thereby influencing public health in other ways.  The inclusion of the 
F&BI and their formal role in policymaking seems to be justified by the idea that 
selling bottled water to consumers is an alternative healthier choice. 
 
Contrasting claims about the origin of the ENPCSOD presented earlier, and the lack 
of clarity about participation, indicate that the process lacked transparency, 
although this process was labelled as having a participatory approach. No public 
records are available regarding the official participants who attended the 
workshops to design the ENPCSOD; therefore, the actors’ accounts are the main 
source of information about this process. Accordingly, the lack of transparency and 
consistency points to a potentially biased participation at this stage of the policy and 
highlights the active role of the F&BI in the policy design. 
 
Academics’ participation 
The precise role played by academics in the ENPCSOD is not clear.  Academics and 
international agency members declared that they were not formally invited to 
participate.  One researcher mentioned that they were only consulted to comment 
on some of the indicators to be used in the ENPCSOD’s evaluation plan (OMENT); 
however, they were not part of the evaluating group: 
 
In the past administrations [from the PAN party], they did include us 
as experts in nutrition. This time, we were not included.  It depends on 
each administration.  We [people at the organisation] do not see 
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experts [in the administration] in this area; instead, we see it has 
members who are well known in the area of policy, but I don't see in 
this group [OMENT] a real expert, and that could be a weakness of the 
evaluating body. (ACA) 
 
MoH representatives stated that civil society organisations and academics did 
participate in the process.  However, a review of the participants showed that CSO 
members that were involved in promoting the agenda for obesity (ContraPESO, 
Polithink, Fundación Mídete, ANSA and EPC)  revealed they were not included in the 
advisory group, but only one: ContraPESO (OMENT, 2014).  Chapter 5 discusses the 
remaining invited organisations that had links to the F&BI.  Parallel to the 
confirmation of the OMENT by the government, an independent group of 
researchers, led by the INSP, evaluated the impact of the soda tax.  An international 
academic mentioned that she and other academics were invited to join this group: 
 
I [an international academic] was invited by the INSP and by the 
University of Carolina to do an evaluation on the soda tax; I already 
went to one meeting. (ACA) 
 
International participation in policy formulation 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, Bloomberg Philanthropies (BP) was part of the coalition 
who started advocating for an obesity policy in Mexico (Nestle, 2015). They were 
not invited by the MoH to participate in any part of the ENPCSOD design, or by the 
MoF to any workshops conducted during the policy design, as mentioned by an 
international organisation representative: 
 
We wanted to support the work the government is doing to address 
this problem of overweight and obesity, but it seems that we do not 
interest them. (IAR) 
 
However, they provided their help and support to non-state organisations who were 
advocating for policy changes: 
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I think international interest can help or hurt depending [on the 
circumstances].  As I said, the groups we supported were already 
working on this issue […], but obviously with funding, organisations 
can do more of what they were doing before [to advocate for policy 
changes]. (IAR) 
 
While findings suggest participation of civil society in the formal policy development 
was strong when the soda tax was part of a legislative initiative, it was the opposite 
when it turned into a federal policy initiative.  Academics and international 
organisations were not invited to contribute in the formal policy design process, 
especially by the MoH and MoF. While, F&BI participation was strong during the 
MoH consultation process.  The possibility of conflicts of interest owing to the 
inclusion of the F&BI in the policy design was not considered a problem. Instead, 
state actors seemed to consider F&BI actors’ participation as a positive part of the 
design process. 
 
VI. The Mexican Observatory on Non-Communicable Diseases 
(OMENT) 
 
When the ENPCSOD (obesity strategy) was launched in September 2013, the MoH 
announced that it would create a national observatory to monitor and evaluate the 
obesity strategy called ‘Mexican Observatory of Non-Communicable Diseases’ 
(Observatorio Mexicano de Enferemedades No Transmisibles OMENT), which 
included the soda tax.  In October 2014, the MoH organised the OMENT.  When 
interviews were conducted for this thesis (October 2014), one of the main topics 
covered was the interviewees’ knowledge of who would be part of the OMENT and 
how it would be structured, as none of this information was publicly available at the 
time.  According to the MoH, the multi sectoral platform was planned to include 
members of civil society and of F&BI, as stated in the official federal diary (Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DOF]) (DOF, 2014, p. 1). 
 
Establishing indicators for the OMENT  
A representative from the MoH mentioned that they would be working with two 
institutions, the Aspen Institute (Instituto Aspen -IA) in Mexico and the Mexican 
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Institute for Competitiveness (Instituto Mexicano de la Competitividad - IMCO) to 
develop 82 indicators that would cover a range of issues including not health and 
environmental goals: 
 
The indicators will measure the environment, for example, how the 
municipalities are performing in providing potable water fountains at 
schools and parks and how much the strategy is impacting 
productivity in Mexico. (MoHR) 
 
The number of indicators mentioned by the actor at the time of the interview was 
inconsistent with the number of indicators (52) mentioned in the first report 
published by IMCO in August 2015, when OMENT was publicly presented (IMCO, 
2015b; SSA, 2015).  Additionally, the report’s indicators and main outcomes for the 
regulatory pillar of the ENPSCOD were marked as ‘pending’ because they would be 
mid-term measures rather than results (IMCO, 2015b).  Public records of the multi-
sectorial approach of the design and development of the monitoring strategy 
OMENT were not available at the time of data collection.  Only a few documents 
regarding the indicators to be used and the methodology for choosing them were 
available publicly (IMCO, 2015c; SSA, 2015).   
 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, some organisations were commissioned to contribute in 
developing the indicators for the OMENT evaluation strategy (e.g. IMCO), but had 
members on their own committee boards with potential conflicts of interest, such 
as the head of CONMEXICO (the F&BI industry association described in Annex 4).  
These findings suggest a potential conflict of interest in building the indicators. 
Furthermore, the participation of non-state actors, including both the F&BI and 
academia, add weight to the claim about potential conflicting interests during the 
soda tax policy design process. 
 
Establishing the advisory board of the OMENT 
In September 2014, almost one year after the soda tax was announced in the Fiscal 
Reform, the Secretary of Health Mercedes Juan presented the OMENT (SSA, 2015).  
As published in the DOF, its ‘technical-scientific’ structure (DOF, 2014) included civil 
 165 
society organisations, consortiums/confederations and associations of industry 
members, think tanks and academic organisations (Table 7.1).  
 
ContraPESO (a coalition of associations explained in Annex 4) was the only pro-soda 
tax civil society group who the Ministry of Health called to participate as an advisor 
on the OMENT.  By contrast, numerous actors who were against the soda tax, such 
as CONCAMIN, CANACINTRA and CONMEXICO, whose members included soda 
companies, and the National Association of Soda Producers (ANPRAC), were invited. 
Think tanks which did not have a public position for or against the soda tax, such as 
IMCO, Fundación Este País, Aspen Institute and Fundación Carlos Slim, were 
included, although the INPS and EPC were not invited. Furthermore, the Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de Nuevo León, which was invited, later issued an independent 
report sponsored by ANPRAC about the negative implications of the soda tax.  
 
Table  7.1 Advisory board for the government’s  obesity policies monitoring 
strategies and  their links  (OMENT, 2014) 
Actor Name Links with 
F&BI 
Links with other 
government 
organisation 
Academics Academia Mexicana de Pediatría YES NA 
 Academia Nacional de Medicina NO YES 
 Instituto Politécnico Nacional  NO NA 
 Sociedad Mexicana de la Salud Publica YES NA 
 UNAL YES NA 
Industry  CANACINTRA  YES 
 CONCAMIN  YES 
 ConMexico  YES 
Civil  ContraPESO NO YES 
Society Fundación Carlos Slim YES YES  
 Fundación Este País   
 Funsalud YES YES 
 IMCO YES YES 
 Mexicanos Activos YES NA 
 Sociedad Mexicana de Cardiología NO NA 
 Aspen Institute México YES NA 
NA= Not avilable 
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OMENT included two organisations who opposed the soda tax during the debate and 
who had previously received funds from soda and tobacco companies, namely, the 
FMD and Fundación Slim, respectively (Burch, Wander, & Collin, 2010; FMD, 2016).  
Furthermore, academic organisations who did not issue public statements about 
their positions on the soda tax were involved, such as Mexican Association of 
Universities and Higher Education Institutions (Asociación Mexicana de 
Universidades e Instituciones de Educación Superior - ANUES), Mexican Society of 
Public Health (Sociedad Mexicana de Salud Pública A.C. - SMSP) and FUNSALUD.  The 
latter is the institution where the Secretary of Health used to work before taking 
office (Funsalud, 2016). 
 
The advisory board comprising non-state actors from all sectors represented the 
obesity policy process as an ‘inclusive policy’, which was one of the central 
arguments of the federal government’s NDP (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 2013). 
According to this argument, the monitoring and evaluation body included all types 
of actors, regardless of their previous position on the policies included in the obesity 
plan (soda tax as well as food labelling and regulations regarding marketing food to 
children).  Some actors included were linked to the soda industry, indicating a 
potential conflict of interest in participating in the process of evaluating the effect of 
the soda tax on reducing obesity.  These relationships and networks stressed in 
Chapter 5 and illustrated here, showed that no attention or relevance was given to 
the clear conflict of interest this arrangement means for policy success.  
  
VII. Summary 
 
This chapter describes and analyses the development of the soda tax policy and how 
it was set out in different policy documents.  It highlights the efforts of state actors 
to acknowledge the participation of non-state actors in the formal policy process; 
and to ensure that non-state actors have a legitimate and accountable 
representation in policymaking.  It concurs with the principals of good governance 
outlined in Chapters 3 and 5.  Mixed and contradictory information about the formal 
participation of the F&BI, civil society and academics was seen in the NDP, FR, 
ENPCSOD and OMENT policy formulation.  Civil society members’ suggested that the 
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claims of an inclusive process were inaccurate.  Some explained how they helped in 
the design of the soda tax legislative proposal, and they provided evidence to the 
MoF.  However, they claimed that there was a distant relationship between civil 
society and the MoH, in contrast to the close relationship and participation of the 
F&BI.  The study shows there was close engagement between the F&BI with some 
policymakers.  Companies directly lobbied congressmen, while the F&BI 
participation in the obesity policy’s design was active and seen by the MoH 
representatives as a legitimate and valuable contribution. 
 
When the MoH was designing the ENPCSOD, although some academic actors were 
invited to participate, none of them had previously been involved in promoting an 
obesity policy (including actors from the National Academy of Medicine and 
academics from the Institute Nacional de Salud Pública).  The non-state actors 
invited to the workshops on the food labelling regulation and food marketing 
strategy were mainly from the F&BI, while a mix of actors played a role in the 
OMENT.  The results show a perceived power imbalance from civil society during 
the policy design, as F&BI representatives were able to influence decision-making 
disproportionately in ways that were in opposition to, or not aligned with, civil 
society organisation’s and academics’ views on suitable outcomes of the policy 
development process (Buse et al., 2017, p. 34).  
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Chapter 8. Actions shaping the implementation of the soda tax  
 
I. Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the informal policy development.  It analyses actions shaping 
the development of the soda tax that do not necessarily fall under the category of 
formal policy development, analysed in Chapter 7.  It reflects upon findings from the 
documentary analysis and the interviews. 
 
Alongside the formal government policy development processes described in 
Chapter 7, the agenda and policy outcomes were also influenced by strategies and 
actions taken outside the formal process by non-state actors.  These strategies 
aimed either to influence policy outcomes, or to mitigate the policy measures once 
implemented.  The approaches used included calls for action, launching counter-
marketing campaigns, support for social movements, entering into fiscal 
agreements with the government, strengthening public-private partnerships, and 
influencing water governance. This chapter examines the influence of these actions 
on the soda tax discussion and implementation. 
 
Figure 7.1 (page 146) presents the timeline of the soda tax policy development and 
implementation, and the main actions and strategies applied by non-state actors.  
Some of these actions denote non-state actors’ concerns about the policy 
development process.  For example, the sugary drinks companies were concerned 
about the implications the levy would have on their business, and as such introduced 
activities to mitigate the new regulation.  Other actors engaged in activities to give 
continuity to their role as health advocates.  In this chapter, actions are accounted 
for, and analysed as a changing dynamic shaping the socio-political context 
surrounding the soda tax and related policies, such as the provision of water.  
Competing interests within the health policy agenda are reflected in the data.  
Finally, as an example of such externalities, the findings related to Mexican water 
governance are presented, as one rhetoric put forward for using soda tax revenues 
for water provision. 
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II. Calls for action, and how they shaped the policy agenda  
 
In this thesis, a call for action is defined as a strategy used by actors in the policy 
process to increase support for their own position.  It includes calls for the 
government to regulate, public demonstrations (against/for the cause), and calls for 
diversifying investments.  Different types of calls for action were triggered during 
the years the soda tax was contemplated as a policy measure, as well as during and 
after its implementation.  Table 8.1 provides an overview of the various calls for 
action in chronological order.  
 
Table 8.1 Calls for action implemented by different actors through 2011-2015 
Type Actor Call for action Addressed to Year 
Civil Society El Poder del 
Consumidor  
Call to implement 
policies to tackle 
obesity, including a soda 
tax  
Government September 
2011 
Government 
(executive 
power) 
Federal 
government 
Promote a National Pact 
with specific actions 
against obesity 
All parties 
running for 
government 
positions 
December 
2012 
Civil Society Alianza por la 
Salud 
Alimentaria, 
ContraPESO 
El poder de 
consumidor, 
Fundación 
Mídete  
Call for actions on 
obesity policies 
(drinking fountains in 
schools, follow and 
monitor food guidelines, 
clear food labelling, 
regulate food marketing 
to children, promote 
breastfeeding and 
implement a soda tax) 
Federal 
government 
and legislators 
January-
July 2012 
Government 
and academia 
Senators, 
Deputies and 
academics 
from Latin 
America 
Invitation to support, 
promote and implement 
policy actions in Latin 
America to reduce 
obesity 
Civil society, 
government, 
academics 
November 
2012 
Academia 
and 
International 
Organisation
s 
PAHO, WPHNA 
WOF, BP, CSPI 
Call for the federal 
government to regulate 
marketing, taxing SSB 
labelling 
Federal 
government  
January 
2013 
Food and 
Beverage 
Industry 
CNIAA, 
CONMEXICO, 
ANPRAC 
Public call to oppose the 
soda tax 
 August and 
October 
2013 
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The first time a national organisation published a call for action aimed at the 
government to implement a soda tax was in September 2012.  El Poder del 
Consumidor (EPC) published a press release with the title ‘We Ask for a Soda Tax’ 
(EPC, 2011a, p. 1).  Although the press release did not mention the word ‘tax’ except 
in the title, it highlighted the high consumption of a soda in Mexico and the lack of 
access to potable water, as both being primary causes of obesity. EPC promoted this 
call to action with support from BP (as described in Chapter 5).  This press release 
was the trigger point for further political discussion on the topic.  The document 
concluded with the following statement:  
 
We observe that neither the federal government nor the local 
governments have implemented any comprehensive policy against 
obesity, as it has been recommended by international organisations. 
(EPC, 2011a) 
 
Also in October 2012, academics organised a forum with speakers from different 
backgrounds to promote health policies addressing obesity.  The forum was held at 
ITAM and the opening session was called ‘Fiscal policies as a tool to reduce 
consumption of SSB’ (Política fiscal como herramienta para disminuir el consumo de 
bebidas azucaradas) by Dr Frank Chaloupka (Chaloupka, 2012).  The forum 
Food and 
Beverage 
Industry 
Coca-Cola 
FEMSA/ 
PepsiCo 
brokers 
Call to promote other 
programs and actions  
Investors/inter
nal 
  
2012-2015 
Invest/innovate 
portfolio  
 2013 
Diversify market to the 
(e.g. Philippines) 
 2013 
 
Adapt to the market 
conditions 
  
2014 
Academia 
and 
International 
Organisation
s 
INSP, ITAM, 
PAHO, 
Universidad 
Sao Paulo, 
INTA, ANM 
 
Call to reflect on 
solutions to overcome 
the obesity problem in 
Mexico and Latin 
America 
 
Academic 
colleagues, 
governmental 
actors and 
international 
organisations 
October- 
November 
2016 
 
*Acronyms explained in the Glossary section 1 
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presented the views of different actors on the soda tax and served to orchestrate 
future actions to increase the debate on health taxes.  Later that year, the National 
Institute of Public Health, University of Sao Paulo and INTA, Santiago, Chile 
organised a conference on obesity policies in Mexico.  It included members of the 
Congress, academics, members of consumers’ organisations from Mexico, Brazil, 
Peru, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and members of the Pan-American Health Organization 
(Rivera, 2012).  The final output was a signed letter to commit to promoting, 
advocating and implementing policies for obesity, including fiscal measures (WN, 
2013).  
 
After this meeting, from October to December 2012 calls for action came from 
academia and civil society groups.  In December 2012, ten days after Peña Nieto’s 
government took office an initiative was presented in the Senate proposing a 20% 
tax. Congress voted against it at the time.  The chain of events preceding the 
presentation of the initiative, suggest a series of actions by non-state actors to 
support the initiative.  Stakeholder accounts suggest the proposal was expected to 
fail in Congress at that time, but it was necessary to present it to increase pressure 
among policy makers, as mentioned by a think tank member who acted as a policy 
entrepreneur: 
 
We knew that the senator’s proposal was not going to pass, but we 
decided to support her to start a public dialog, an advocacy strategy for 
2013. (TTM)  
 
Immediately after the soda tax was rejected in Congress, in January 2013, a public 
academic event was organised.  The ANM presented the book they had edited with 
the INSP (link described in Chapter 5) (Rivera-Dommarco et al., 2013).  The media 
called it the ‘white paper’ for addressing obesity, as it included a brief chapter about 
the position and recommendations for policy change by the academy.  The main 
arguments reflected their views about how marketing and prices of unhealthy foods 
were the core areas of intervention, and how ‘hard policies’ would protect 
‘fundamental rights’:  
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Regulation should be used as an instrument to ensure a good 
performance of the State to guarantee fundamental rights, to intervene 
on markets and minimize their externalities on the risk of causing 
obesity. (Rivera-Dommarco et al., 2013, p. 6) 
 
During the first half of 2013, a number of calls for action favouring the soda tax were 
published and implemented by the civil society as mentioned in a report published 
by BP in 2015: 
 
[Civil societies] purchased full-page newspaper advertisements in key 
national dairies like la Jornada, Milenio, Reforma, El Universal.  For 
example, a broad-based coalition (Alianza por la Salud) called for a 2 
peso per litre tax and underscored that both national and international 
experts propose soda taxes as an effective measure to address obesity. 
(Donaldson, 2015, p. 13) 
   
During the public debate organisations such as WPHNA, IOTF, and PAHO supported 
groups such as ContraPESO, and Alianza por la Salud Alimentaria (Alianza por la 
Salud Alimentaria, 2012a; Donaldson, 2014) by co-signing their positions published 
in the media.  While the civil society used the media for their purposes, the response 
was not always favourable:  
 
Some of the broadcasting and media were [our] allies in the 
discussions in the newspapers […]. Reforma was our ally; they 
published some of the initiatives and explained the debate accurately 
for the soda tax […].  There were several digital media that allowed us 
to publish texts.  However, there were others [media organisations] 
that were against [us].  Also, some journalists wrote columns in 
newspapers and opinions about the negative effect of sodas, as 
mentioned by Catón, a very well-known writer, in his column.  (TTM)  
 
The same year the Fiscal Reform was announced, soda companies called for 
portfolio diversification and expansion to other countries, as a preventive action.  
Investment in the region was expected: 
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We expect to see more value added innovation specifically geared 
toward the Latin American market as manufacturers compete for the 
money people are willing to devote to soft drinks. (Euromonitor, 2012)  
 
And, while the Congress voting on the Fiscal Reform, between August and October 
2013, and before it took effect in January 2014, the food and beverage industry 
through CONMEXICO called for opposition to the soda tax in their press releases:  
 
CONMEXICO expresses its energetic opposition to special taxes to food 
and non-alcoholic beverages as a Public Health measure, as well as a 
discriminatory treatment to any food.  (CONMEXICO, 2013) 
 
As regards government actors, the Ministry of Health first talked about the soda tax 
a few months before its official discussion.  The first statement by the Secretary of 
Health, Mercedes Juan, was made in March 2013 who said:  
 
The important thing is to educate people so they’re aware of the health 
effects because you can’t force anyone not to drink soda.  (SSA, 2013a, 
p. 2) 
 
Her statement avoided the original question of the interviewer about the approval 
of soda tax raised by the press, but highlighted education as an important approach 
for behavioural change.  By pointing to the unsuitability of coercive action on soda 
consumption, Juan stood for the ‘right to choose,’ similar to the industry discourse 
(CLC, 2013).  This implies a similar narrative of the government and the private 
sector.  Thereafter, and before the soda tax was formally proposed by the executive, 
no additional public statements were made by the MoH.  During interviews 
conducted for this study, the MoH actors avoided the topic, as exemplified by this 
quote:  
 
Look, ask [the Minister] of Finance […].  The first one who decided on 
the tax was the legislative party, so you would have to ask them.  
(MoHR)  
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In September 2014, almost one year after the soda tax was announced in the Fiscal 
Reform, the Secretary of Health, Mercedes Juan, publicly supported the soda tax, 
particularity during the presentation of the OMENT (OMENT, 2014), and later in 
2015 through public statements about the positive effects of the soda tax in 2015 
(SSA, 2015).   
 
Calls for actions not only helped to build up positions among policymakers, but these 
findings suggest they were also means to increase public support for these positions.  
To support these actions, actors also used marketing strategies as discussed below.  
 
III.  Use of marketing strategies to oppose or support the tax  
 
Marketing strategies have been used to influence public opinion, public choice 
(when selecting what to drink) and actors support for a specific position towards 
the soda tax.  Marketing principles include the four Ps: promotion, product, price, 
and place (Rayner, 2007; M. Wood, 2016).  Both the soda industry and civil society 
groups who were advocating for the soda tax tried to use at least one of these four 
principles.  The soda industry promoted and improved the place of their beverages 
by distributing refrigerators to small business (388,000 coolers were distributed in 
2012), resulting in 73% of Mexicans having refrigerated products (Coca-Cola 
FEMSA, 2012, p. 6).  Further industry strategies included improving the availability 
of their products, making them convenient to get, by innovating ways to distribute 
and market their products: 
 
[We intend] to go beyond retail into other encouraging high-traffic 
venues such as universities and offices - engaging directly with 
consumers.  For example, we conducted a promising pilot offering both 
beverages and snacks at some ‘at work’ locations in Mexico. (Coca-Cola 
FEMSA, 2012, p. 7) 
 
Although Mexico implemented a regulation to restrict sweetened beverages in 
schools in 2010, it was not well monitored (Barquera et al., 2013).  As a result, 
despite the regulation, companies aimed to expand the availability of sugary drinks 
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at workplace and schools.  Additionally, two of the main soda companies launched 
several massive campaigns to strengthen consumers’ trusts and loyalty to their 
brands during 2012-2013.  Both were linked to happiness:  
 
We launched successful campaigns to endorse connecting consumers 
with the brand, as the tour of FIFA World Cup, ‘Share a Coke’ and ‘Make 
someone happy,’ among others […] strengthened yet more loyalty to 
our brand.  (Coca-Cola FEMSA, 2014) 
 
Coca-Cola also engaged in indirect promotion through funding academic institutions 
to conduct research on happiness.  In 2013, the Coca-Cola Happiness Institute 
presented its new website inviting people to explore and learn from more than 400 
studies selected from nearly 8,000 on Happiness and Health (Coca-Cola FEMSA, 
2013).  Also, PepsiCo funded a training program for students in the State of Mexico 
in coordination with the governments’ National College of Professional Technical 
Education (CONALEP) in the State of Mexico preparing participants to integrate into 
the labour market (PepsiCo, 2012). 
 
In 2014 another marketing principle, using audience segmentation, focusing 
particularly on women, was highlighted by PepsiCo: 
 
PepsiCo serves consumers of every income group and ethnicity, on 
every continent, and in intensely competitive markets.  We also know 
that women make the majority of food and beverage buying decisions.  
Understanding how to meet the needs of such a diverse cross-section 
of global consumers requires a diverse and talented workforce. 
(PepsiCo, 2014) 
 
These strategies were clearly attempts to draw attention away from the negative 
connotation of sweetened beverage consumption that was gaining strength through 
the dissemination of international recommendations about reducing soda 
consumption, promoted by Mexican civil society and academics (Donaldson, 2014; 
PAHO, 2015).   
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During the same period, civil society groups launched a social marketing campaign 
to position ‘drinking soda’ as a negative behaviour.  Although it was only promoted 
in Mexico City, it was highly acclaimed and had an important reach all over the 
country:  
 
Our program partners created subway advertising campaigns in 
Mexico City depicting the negative effects of obesity.  The Director of 
the Latin American Office of the Food and Agricultural Organization of 
the United Nations praised the ads and called for their replication 
across Latin America. (Donaldson, 2014, p. 4) 
 
However, the social marketing campaign failed to be included in one of the major TV 
networks: 
 
Televisa, TV Azteca and Milenio TV, for over a month, have denied 
accepting our ad that exposes the benefits [the soda tax] can bring to 
the people [if its] proceeds is used for the introduction of water 
fountains in public spaces, while they accept intense advertising of soft 
drinks and sugary drinks. ("Acusan a Televisa, TV Azteca y Milenio TV 
de negarse a difundir spot contra las refresqueras," 2013) 
 
These accounts suggest that the main broadcasters in Mexico appeared to be 
compromised, but data obtained during this research did not find a direct link to any 
key actors who were against the soda tax, such as the F&BI or the sugar cane 
producers.   
 
Soda companies and sugar producers not only improved marketing to increase 
brand loyalty, but they also sponsored campaigns to portray the negative 
implications of the tax.  For example, sugar cane producers launched a campaign 
entitled ‘Hablemos de Azúcar’ (‘Let’s Talk About Sugar’), stating that sugar is ‘a little 
happiness every day’ (Hablemos de azúcar, 2016), while the director of ‘Centro para 
la Libertad del Consumo’ (The Centre for Consumer Freedom), a front group, made 
a video saying, ‘[The soda tax] messes with our free choice and consumption’ (CLC, 
2013).  Additionally, this group sponsored advertising with the questions: ‘Can you 
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bottle obesity with taxes? Yes or no on the tax on chubby people?’ (Donaldson, 2014) 
(CLC, 2013).  Furthermore, according to the same report, the industry engaged local 
store owners by distributing posters and other incentives to display the poster 
saying ‘This store and its clients say NO to another soda tax’, indicating actors’ 
loyalty to the brand and promoting a negative position for the soda tax (Donaldson, 
2014, p. 5).  
 
A media battle started in June 2013 between civil society organisations and the 
companies and groups opposing the soda tax.  Regardless of the outcome of the soda 
tax, this public exposure of the different counter-arguments might have had a 
positive effect on public opinion regarding the tax, as reported in a poll conducted 
at the end of the year (PAHO, 2015).   
 
IV.  Public demonstrations and human rights arguments   
 
Another strategy used by non-state actors to mobilise public support and to 
promote the tax included public demonstrations (EPC, 2012; Nestle & Rosenberg, 
2015).  The civil society used the ‘right to health’ as their central argument to call 
for demonstrations, in contrast to the food industry and industry consortiums 
arguments for the ‘right to choice’ and free markets.  On their website, the civil 
society Alianza por la Salud Alimentaria cites the Universal Human Rights of 1948 
and the International Pact of Economic Social and Cultural Rights of 1966:  
 
It is a human right to have on a regular basis, permanent and free, 
either direct or by buying it, access to an adequate diet. (Alianza por la 
Salud Alimentaria, 2012c) 
 
The basic human right to an adequate diet is promoted in combination with other 
rights, such as the right to free drinking water, a right to health and children’s rights.  
The ANSA’s site discusses the high intake, availability and promotion of sodas and 
high-caloric foods and how they interfere with the rights mentioned. 
 
Meanwhile, corporate documents showed that companies engaged in social 
programs addressing minority groups, sometimes in collaboration with public 
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institutions and international agencies (Coca-Cola FEMSA, 2014, 2015a).  Also, free 
choice and free consumption were promoted. For example, in October 2013 
González de Tagle, a corporate lawyer heading the industry front group ‘Centre for 
free consumption’ (Centro para la Libertad del Consumo), mentioned in one public 
video ‘soda tax is a measure that is ineffective, under such an argument, tacos should 
be taxed, it messes with our free choice and consumption’ (CLC, 2013).  At the time 
this document analysis was performed (2016), the group had no longer a website. 
 
V. Increase in corporate social responsibility activities related to 
health and food 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) includes in its multiple definitions words such 
as ‘commitment’, ‘concern about’, and ‘ethical actions.’  According to Van Marrewijk 
(2003) the definition of social responsibility is often biased toward specific (often 
corporate) interests and thus prevents the development and implementation of the 
concept;  however, such biases are not supported by empirical evidence (Van 
Marrewijk, 2003).  Dahlsrud (2008) suggests that ‘any attempt to develop an 
unbiased definition is challenging because there is no methodology to verify 
whether it is indeed unbiased or not’ (p. 2)  The most common approach to 
corporate social responsibility is ‘[a] concept whereby companies are integrating 
social and environmental concerns in their business operations and their 
interactions with their stakeholders on voluntary actions’ (Dahlsrud, 2008, p. 3).  
Another common definition is ‘the commitment of business to contribute to 
sustainable actions, economic development, working with employees, families the 
local community and society to improve their quality of life’ (Dahlsrud, 2008). 
 
Soda companies promote themselves as socially responsible.  Their annual reports 
emphasise words such as: ‘commitment’, ‘helping and volunteering’, ‘being 
generous or inclusive’ and ‘having values and being philanthropic’ (Coca-Cola 
FEMSA, 2013, 2014). They include actions such as improving access to water and 
sanitation, empowering women, providing education (including schools such as 
PepsiCo University, or by supporting public schools), offering cultural programs, 
improving lifestyles with physical activity programs, developing environmental 
programs and using sustainable technologies (PepsiCo, 2012, 2014).  These actions 
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are framed as reflecting core company values with the aim to build trust and 
engagement with consumers and investors.  Table. 8.2 shows some of the social 
responsibility actions described in the soda companies’ annual reports (Coca-Cola 
FEMSA, 2013, 2014). 
 
Table 8.2 Social responsibility actions framed in corporate documents 
Company Quote as on document Year 
ARCA 
Continental 
Social responsibility and sustainability are essential parts of 
ARCA Continental’s values and organizational culture, and 
key elements in our business [… ].  These two concepts are 
included in all the company’s strategic decisions. 
2012 
Coca-Cola 
FEMSA 
At Coca-Cola FEMSA we are dedicated to reducing and 
relieving the environmental impact of our actions, basically 
on water, energy, residual and recycling areas, by investing 
more than 2.3 million dollars [in these areas] in 2014 [...]. 
2013 
 
Coca-Cola 
FEMSA 
In our community, we are committed to fostering active and 
healthy lifestyles, including good nutrition, hydration, and 
physical-activity habits, investing more than 3.5 million 
dollars.  Because of these actions, during 2014, more than 
737,000 people have benefitted from our Healthy Lifestyle 
and Community Development programs. 
2013 
 
PepsiCo The Mission of PepsiCo Foundation is to: promote 
sustainable development in the most needed regions where 
we operate through strategic partnerships that integrate the 
areas of education, health, and environment, providing the 
means to create self-sustaining communities by improving 
their quality of life. 
2013 
 
Soda companies were creating strategies to overcome the impact of the soda tax on 
consumers’ behaviour while still improving profits, regardless of an increased sales 
price. The social responsibility actions are framed as an overarching value of the 
company to increase empathy with worried consumers.  These findings concur with 
tactics used by the tobacco industry (Brownell & Warner, 2009) and by the F&BI in 
other countries (Hawkins & Holden, 2013b; Mialon, Swinburn, Allender, et al., 
2016).  
 
VI. Fiscal concessions for the private sector 
 
The federal government wanted to address obesity and health concerns (ENCSOD, 
2012), but keeping the F&BI involved in their activities.  This was justified on 
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grounds that the F&BI was a ‘legitimate industry in Mexico’, whose role in the policy 
process was perceived as important, as described by a MoH representative in 
Chapter 7 (page 157).  The government launched a comprehensive obesity strategy, 
the ENCSOD, and not only included F&BI representatives in the decision-making, but 
fiscal incentives were provided to the F&BI simultaneously to the proposed 
introduction of the soda tax.  In December 2013, the government posted an 
addendum to the Fiscal Reform, which included economic benefits for sweetened 
beverage producers:  
 
A fiscal stimulus is granted to importers of juices, nectars, fruit 
concentrates or vegetable and beverage products in which milk is a 
component that is combined with vegetables, dairy cultures, or 
Lactobacilli, sweeteners or other ingredients such as drinking yoghurt, 
fermented milk product or liquefied and non-carbonated water or 
whose presentation is made in containers under ten litres. The fiscal 
stimulus equals 100% of the value added tax (VAT) payable on the 
import or sale of the above products.  (DOF, 2013b) 
 
The amendment to the Fiscal Reform also included fiscal incentives such as fixed 
deductions to companies engaged in certain philanthropic activities related to 
health and environmental remediation: 
 
A tax incentive will be given to taxpayers for donations of commodities 
for human subsistence such as products for healing or feeding […] 
equal to 5% of the cost of sales that would had been made and are 
actually donated. (DOF, 2013a) 
 
In addition, the federal government signed an agreement with CONCAMIN (see 
Chapter 5) in which the government committed to avoid further tax increases on 
any of their products or services.  The latest amendments published in the Fiscal 
Reform would be the only changes made at least until the end of Enrique Peña 
Nieto’s government, as this part of the document mentions:  
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Exceptions to make modifications to taxes.  In the period beginning 
today [24 Feb 2014] until 30 November 2018, the Federal Executive 
will only propose amendments in response to substantial 
macroeconomic events to which it is imperative to make adjustments 
to the tax framework.  If none of these occur, the Federal Government 
will not propose any changes to the tax framework to Congress.  
(SEGOB, 2014) 
 
Evidence presented here suggests close relationships between the government and 
F&BI during and after the soda tax implementation, but the interaction between 
actors was not always publicly disclosed. 
 
VII. Public-private partnerships 
 
As mentioned in chapter 5, public-private partnerships (PPP) between the 
government and the F&BI were another important strategy used to overcome the 
soda tax.  These arrangements were found to be beneficiary for both government 
and industry, as some corporate actions or corporate social responsibility actions 
(as companies frame them) were  also part of the social policy of the country.  
Chapter 5 mentioned the partnership of  Pepsico and CONAGUA, existing even 
before the soda tax debate,  but at the time of the policy change, a collaboration 
between a charity funded by Coca-Cola and the government was launched to 
improve physical activity in schools: 
 
Coca-Cola FEMSA and Fundación Movimiento es Salud A.C. (Movement 
is Health Foundation) in partnership with the National Committee for 
Developing Physical Activity in Basic Education (Consejo Nacional 
para el Desarrollo de la Educación Física y el Deporte en la Educación 
Básica - CONDEBA) will support an education project in physical 
activity, nutrition and health in order to sensitize more people about 
their health and the importance of living an active and healthy life.  
(Coca-Cola Foundation, 2014c)  
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Information about the Fundación Movimiento es Salud A.C was not updated on the 
website, and the links on the webpage were not working.  According to one 
interviewee, the foundation was not independent but was either a front group or a 
civil society organisation embedded in the company. 
 
The PepsiCo Foundation, which was established in 2011 under the administration 
of Felipe Calderon (PepsiCo, 2011) with the BID when they authorized a loan of 600 
billion MXP (31.5  billion USD) for the program Agua Saneamiento e Higiene en la 
Educación Básica.  It still remains active and has consolidated over the years, as their 
webpage mentioned:  
 
PepsiCo and the PepsiCo Foundation are deeply committed to respect 
for human rights and have publicly announced this alliance with the 
IDB to meet the global objective of providing access to safe water for 
three million people in developing countries through 2015(PepsiCo, 
2011).   
 
A number of PPPs were involved in the installation of water fountains in schools.  
The government committed to providing schools and parks with drinking water and 
the legislature proposed an addendum to the soda tax a few months after the soda 
tax was approved to establish an escrow to use the revenues for water provision 
(AguaOrg, 2015a; Senado de la República, 2015).  In 2014, Coca-Cola Mexico 
collaborated with Healthy Schools (Escuelas Saludables A.C.), a civil BID society 
association founded the same year with the purpose of providing drinking water to 
public schools.  The organisation’s webpage mentioned:  
 
Through its national program of Hydrate Centres, and together with 
[us], Coca-Cola installed drinking fountains in 999 public schools 
extending water provision to 279 thousand students and teachers 
from 198 municipalities. (Coca-Cola Foundation, 2014a)  
 
In another example, the institute in charge of school infrastructure in the State of 
Durango, the Institute of Physical Activity Infrastructure (Instituto de la 
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Infraestructura Física Educativa del Estado de Durango - INIFED), was part of a 
regional partnership: 
 
[…] Saturday February 22, 2014 in Durango the first cooperation 
agreement between Coca-Cola Hydrate Centres, Escuelas Saludables 
A.C. (Sustainable Schools, A.C) and INIFEED was signed, as well as in 
Nayarit two days before.  (Arca Continental, 2014a)  
 
In 2014, Coca-Cola FEMSA initiated a program called Water for Our Future, 
partnering with the Latin American Water Funds Partnership, and other Coca-Cola 
bottlers.  Its aim was to conserve more than 6,000 hectares of watersheds, 
replenishing 6.9 million cubic meters of water to nature through an investment of 
US$7.4 million in at least five countries in the region.  (Coca-Cola FEMSA, 2014). 
 
The latest PPP established between Coca-Cola and the government found in 
literature for this research was established in 2016.  In October 2016 the President, 
together with the Secretary of Health, the Secretary of Economy, and the head of 
CONACYT opened the Centre for Innovation and Development Coca-Cola (Centro 
para la Innovación y Desarrollo Coca-Cola - CIDCC), with the purpose of ‘investing 
in the generation of sustainable values through research’ (Coca-Cola FEMSA, 2016, 
p. 1).  Its aim is to work throughout Latin America, and be involved in water 
governance.  During the opening event the President publicly stated that he was a 
loyal costumer of the brand and that he had one Coca-Cola every day, and that this 
effort responds to his call to partner with the private sector to support research and 
employment in the country.  As outlined in Chapter 7, the private sector’s active role 
as a partner of the MoH exposes a conflicted environment for public programs for 
obesity prevention.  The CIDCC opening event was heavily criticized by the press 
and CSOs, but no changes to the structure of the partnership were made.   
 
As described in the literature, PPP benefits include improving the visibility of social 
actions (Kraak et al., 2012, WHO, 2007a), in the case of the CIDCC, to water.  This 
conflicts with vested commercial interest of corporations, which commercial 
fiduciary duties to their shareholder are above any social responsibility actions 
(Joyner & Payne, 2002).  The research shows that the conflict of interest these cases 
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imply are not a matter of concern for the Mexican government when partnering with 
the soda industry. 
 
VIII. Civil society demands for accountability of the soda tax revenues  
 
Civil society groups continued to hold the government accountable and to push for 
an increase to the soda tax rate.  They requested the government to disclose whether 
revenues were being used to provide water access, and lobbied legislators to 
continue the push for regulations to tackle obesity.  A push for an increase by 20% 
on the soda tax was on their agenda, as stated in one of their reports:  
 
[The government needs to] increase the tax from 10% to 20%, i.e. from 
1 to 2 pesos per litre in order to achieve a substantial reduction in their 
consumption.  (Calvillo, Espinosa, & Macari, 2015) 
 
They also fought for the use of soda tax revenues for water provision: 
 
Allocate an adequate amount of the resources obtained through the 
application of the tax to sugary drinks in actions of prevention and 
control of obesity and diabetes, including the installation of drinking 
wells.  (Calvillo et al., 2015) 
 
These claims were supported by the Mexican Association of Cardiologists in a press 
release published in September 2015 calling on the government to improve 
availability of free drinking water in public spaces, especially schools, stadiums, 
parks, and in all cultural venue (cinemas, theatres, auditoriums, forums, tents, etc.) 
(Sociedad Mexican de Cirujia Cardiaca, 2015).  In addition, CSOs with no commercial 
interests accused the government of having a conflict of interest as regards their 
obesity policy (Calvillo et al., 2015).  While the academia recommended the 
government to consider changes on the policy following transparency principles:  
 
We recommend these actions [should be applied] within a culture of 
open government, seeking as a primary objective the health of 
Mexicans.  For this, it will be essential for all processes to analyse the 
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sources of potential conflict of interest of the actors involved and to act 
with transparency.  (ACA) 
 
Finally, some civil society groups continued to support policies to tackle obesity (FM, 
EPC, ANSA).  They supported legislation proposed by several senators to increase 
the tax (Radio fórmula, 2016), though it did not receive enough votes to pass in the 
Senate.  They also supported a senator’s proposal of an Obesity Law, aimed at 
providing statutory and cohesive measures to the ENPCSO (Senado de la República, 
2014).  Several civil society organisations represented by ANSA, and the ContraPESO 
coalition began to work on a proposal for a General Law on the Prevention and 
Control of Overweight and Obesity, with the support of renowned academics from 
ITAM and CIDE (Fundación Mídete, 2015).  Its purpose was to introduce a 
comprehensive legal framework based on scientific evidence and international 
experts’ recommendations, emphasising ‘the protection of the constitutional rights 
to health, food health, information, consumers, and above all, the best interests of 
children’ (Fundación Midete, 2015).   
 
Civil society groups supporting the soda tax continued to push for increased 
regulation after the initial legislation was approved.  While they have been unable 
to cause further regulatory change in the country, they have raised public awareness 
and used litigation to improve the outcomes of the obesity agenda.   As an activist 
mentioned in respect of their continued attempts to influence obesity policy: 
 
The latest battle to impose a soda tax of 10% to SSB was won by the 
alliance of legislators, civil servants, health professional bodies, 
citizens and supportive media orchestrated by El Poder del Consumers 
public interest organisation […].  Protests and campaigns by public 
health advocates and activists are effective and can inspire similar 
actions in many other countries.  (TTM)  
 
IX. The influence of non-state actors on water provision  
 
Chapter 1 discussed water available for human consumption and its use for 
producing soda in Mexico.  The following section will describe how the government 
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and private sector portrayed their actions (laws or activities) around national water 
governance. 
 
Water provision and the use of soda tax revenues 
A few months after the soda tax was implemented, a legislative addendum was 
approved to allocate revenue from the soda tax to ‘invest in providing access to 
water to all primary schools’ (Senado de la República, 2015):  
 
[The decree] amending the General Law of Physical Educational 
Infrastructure makes the sufficient supply of potable water for human 
consumption mandatory in all educational levels, pre-school, primary, 
and high school, by adding drinking fountains.  (AguaOrg, 2015a) 
 
The Centre for Studies of Public Finance estimated a three-year investment of just 
over 9 billion pesos (Senado de la República, 2014).  The funding approved to 
comply with the decree was 1,360 million pesos in 2014, which is only 14% of the 
estimated cost and as such insufficient to fund the current demand for drinking 
water.  Until 2015, no clear information of the application of this decree had been 
published.  In May 2015, IMCO reported only 14% of the schools had working water 
fountains. Moreover, that year a lower chamber congressman presented a new 
initiative to earmark the tax:  
 
The six-year goal was to include 40,000 drinking fountains in public 
schools, but according to the Ministry of Education’s reports, only 
6.68% of that goal was completed, and so far only 2,675 water 
fountains have been installed (1,175 in 2014, and 1 5000 in 2015).  
(IMCO, 2015a)  
 
In December 2015, after a  petition asking for water fountains in schools the Ministry 
of Education stated that for 2016, 34 million pesos (1.3 million GBP) will be allocated 
to install and maintain the water fountains (DOF, 2015).  Besides the lack of 
resources allocated to the water fountains, the quality of water was an issue.  
According to the documentary analysis, water pollution following international 
standards seems to be poorly monitored.  A report analysing samples of 62 water 
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wells throughout the country showed they were all polluted (CONAGUA, 2014b).  
The current environmental norms with pollutant parameters are out of date in 
comparison with international standards as one of the norms cited in the General 
Law is from 1997. According to National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía - INEGI), 70% of all water in Mexico 
has some degree of contamination, and at least 260 sites are highly polluted 
(CONAGUA, 2014).  For instance, a report by a civil society organisation mentions: 
 
The inspections are sporadic, often without sampling, and economic 
sanctions on polluters are minimal or not charged at all.  To 
understand the lack of political will to solve this national problem, it is 
enough to say that there are only five inspectors enforcing official 
standards.  (AguaOrg, 2015b) 
  
As stated by a policy document from the Ministry of Agriculture: 
 
Compared to the European Union, where thousands of compounds are 
regulated and some are prohibited, in Mexico hundreds of toxic 
substances are discharged into rivers, mainly heavy metals.  
(SEMARNAT, 2014) 
 
These findings suggest that neither the resources allocated to provide water are 
sufficient, nor does the quality of water for human consumption comply with 
international standards.  Resources to maintain the quality of water and its access 
are not sufficiently addressed in laws and regulations; instead, the government 
relies on PPPs solve the issue.  According to the INEFED, agreements with private 
partnerships were agreed to monitor the quality of water were considered (León, 
2015).   
 
Bottled water: an opportunity for industry 
As discussed in Chapter 2, trust in drinking water quality among the population is 
compromised.  People choose to hydrate from bottled drinks, either bottled water 
or other bottled drinks (soda, juice, or sugary drinks), as mentioned by a 
Euromonitor report:  
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In many emerging markets, the scarcity of clean water makes bottled 
water a necessary staple rather than a value-added refreshment 
beverage like juice or soda.  (Euromonitor, 2012) 
 
Euromonitor projects that the global production of bottled water will increase to 
100 billion litres from 2013 to 2018, surpassing the previous five-year period by 
over 25 billion litres, making bottled water the world’s fastest growing soft drink 
(Euromonitor, 2014).  This increase in sales has been studied and called ‘the 
commoditization of bottled water’ (Barlow, 2010), with water becoming an 
increasingly profitable opportunity for business.  The price per litre of bottled water 
ranges from US$0.11 in India to US$0.27 in Mexico, whereas carbonated drinks and 
juices range from US$0.61 in India to US$1.27 in Mexico (Barlow, 2010). This has 
caused manufacturers to review their portfolio products (Euromonitor, 2014).  
Additionally, the lack of potable water access, the low quality of drinking water 
available and loopholes in the legal framework for water springs concessions 
become opportunities for businesses: 
 
Demand for clean sources of water in emerging markets and demand 
for a healthier soft drink in developed ones […] make [water] a 
commodity, with brand names easily replaceable by cheaper versions 
and a lack of a compelling reason for consumers to pay more.  
(Euromonitor, 2014) 
 
Companies are using water springs to produce their products, regardless any 
changes to their portfolio (e.g. turning to unsweetened drinks), in soda or bottled 
water production chains.  For example in Mexico, Brazil, and the Philippines, the 
average use of water to produce a litre of bottled beverage was 1.79 litres (Coca-
Cola FEMSA, 2014; The Economist, 2016). 
 
X. Summary 
 
This chapter illustrates how the soda tax development and implementation, and 
associated regulatory measures (e.g. food labelling, market restrictions), raised a 
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range of concerns among non-state actors.  Accounts by soda companies reflect their 
preoccupations and concur with documents of the Coca-Cola Company leaked in 
October 2016, regarding soda companies  ‘public policy risk matrix and lobby focus’ 
(Pfister, 2016), and its global political strategy (Belluz, 2016).   This caused the F&BI 
to invest in actions to manage or mitigate the reputational and economic risks, using 
marketing campaigns, changes in beverage portfolios and price architecture.  The 
F&BI through PPPs, linked corporate social responsibility actions to social policy 
actions, and this was used for negotiation of fiscal benefits.  The production of soda 
and sugary drinks was partially de-regulated at the same time as the soda tax 
became effective, which helped to reduce costs and facilitated market penetration, 
product innovation and diversification across Mexico.  Meanwhile, the consumer 
was surrounded by a retail environment of competing messages and several sources 
of drinks for hydration: sugary drinks in other forms than soda, bottled water, either 
plain or flavoured with juices, low caloric drinks, and sodas that are more expensive.  
For most consumers in Mexico, access to free drinking water is not an option.  
 
The regulatory environment in developed countries has become a major barrier for 
multinational food corporations, similar to the barriers faced by the tobacco 
industry (Basu, Stuckler, McKee, & Galea, 2012).  In response, food and beverage 
producers are moving their markets to emerging economies such as Latin America 
and other developing countries in South Asia and Africa, with hopes to influence 
regulatory actions (Knai & McKee, 2010).  According to scholars, these countries 
represent good opportunities because their legal contexts are generally weak (Knai 
& McKee, 2010), while civil society movements and pressure group actions are in 
their infancy compared to the US and the EU (Gómez et al., 2013).  The soda tax in 
Mexico was an ‘unexpected risk’ for the soda companies as it came from a middle 
income country.  The soda tax regulatory changes had a direct impact on soda 
companies’ reputation and planned corporate activity.  Soda companies experienced 
unexpected regulatory changes in a LMIC, in response, looked to make changes to 
compensate the financial damage, such as trying to reduce the scale of the tax and 
increasing their share of the bottled drinking water market.  A rage of responses to 
maintain revenues had similarly been seen by tobacco companies as a result of 
tobacco control regulation being strengthened in Latin America.  Philip Morris did 
not foresee the introduction of a range of innovative tobacco packaging regulations 
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in Uruguay and actually filed a claim for compensation under international 
investment agreements (IIAs) (Thow & McGrady, 2014).  The soda companies in 
Mexico or elsewhere have not made similar compensation calls as yet, but are likely 
to continue to develop new revenue streams.  
 
In this case remediation actions include the mentioned PPP and also corporate 
political activate (CPA) throughout the debate.  A key CPA was the soda companies’ 
fiscal benefits gained through the process, as those offered. This and other fiscal 
benefits  to foreign investors are likely to have direct effects on consumption pattern 
and may reduce public health policy space, as it happened in Myanmar and Coca Cola 
investments (Thow & McGrady, 2014). 
 
Furthermore, actors from the civil society groups and academics remain part of the 
advocacy network demanding the use of the soda tax revenue for providing water 
fountains to schools and in public spaces.  The policy entrepreneurs in the Congress 
continue to present formal proposals to hold the government accountable for the 
revenues from the soda tax.  At the same time, the soda industry is central for water 
provision, use, management and commercialisation.  This phenomenon accentuates 
a particularity of Mexico and some emerging markets where potable water either is 
not safe to drink, and the government as the provider of the ‘right to access it’ is 
highly reliant on the soda industry who also produce bottled water.    
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Chapter 9. Discussion 
 
 
I. Main findings in relation to research questions 
 
This study assesses and analyses the policy process related to the introduction of 
the soda tax in Mexico by applying elite interviews and documentary analysis.  The 
overarching aim of this thesis is to explain how the soda tax emerged and developed 
as a policy issue in Mexico.  It analyses in detail the contextual factors that facilitated 
the process, the process through which the soda tax became a policy option, and the 
principle actors involved in this process.  It examines how different actors 
contributed to shaping the policy and their reactions since its implementation. 
 
Contextual factors surrounding the soda tax 
Seven main contextual factors were identified that facilitated the soda tax 
implementation. First, the change of government in Mexico providing a policy 
opportunity because of its interest in making reforms; as was the case in the Fiji 
islands when their health taxes were implemented (Thow et al., 2011).  Second, the 
increasing public and government awareness of the evidence for the impact of SSB 
consumption on obesity and diabetes (Chapters 2 and 6).  Third, concerns raised by 
international organisations about the high rates of obesity and SSB consumption in 
Mexico, especially compared with other countries internationally (Chapter 5).  
Fourth, the power gained by national public-interest non-governmental 
organisations due to the financial support by international organisations, through 
new alliances and use of media (Chapters 5, 7 and 8).  Fifth, the new federal 
government’s need for additional revenue streams (Chapter 5) at the same time as 
needing to be perceived as concerned with the populations’ health (Chapter 5).  
Sixth, the parallel negotiations between government and private sector, beneficial 
to the F&B industry that mitigated some of the concerns of sugary drink companies 
nationally (Chapter 8).  And finally, the importance of these political, situational, and 
structural factors merging at a specific point in time (Chapter 5). 
 
Not only the high prevalence of obesity in Mexico and the high levels of soda 
consumption wee factors relevant for having a context suitable for a regulatory 
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strategy as the soda tax, but the drinking water situation and its relationship with 
soda production and availability, as a determinant of diseases allowing to direct the 
revenue to address water access.  There is a situation of power imbalance, as soda 
companies have a prominent role on the economic and political development of the 
country, as explained in Chapter 4.  Water access and quality are compromised, 
while soda producers heavily use water not only to produce sugary drinks and 
sodas, but also to produce bottled water.  Additionally, international trade 
agreements and the sugar production and usage in Mexico reflect the  relevance of 
the sugar cane industry’s for  the country’s economy, as well as why sugar cane and 
soda producers considered the soda tax and any ‘hard regulations’ as a trade.  Thus, 
the importance of such actors as a structural part of the policy arena particularly for 
the obesity strategy and the soda tax; and their influence along the policy process.  
 
Actors and actor networks influencing the policy process 
The network analysis in Chapter 5 revealed important links between actors and 
organisations that affected the participation and influence of certain sectors during 
the design and implementation of the soda tax.  Actors supportive of the soda tax 
initially included legislators from the President’s opposing party (PAN & PRD), 
international organisations, academics and civil society members.  Later in 2013, the 
tax was supported by the Executive power, with stronger support coming from the 
Ministry of Finance compared with the Ministry of Health.  The non-supportive 
stakeholder groups were the food and beverage industry, some consumer groups 
and industry funded non-governmental organisations, which have been described 
elsewhere in analyses of how food industry tactics are used to influence policy 
(Mialon, Swinburn, Wate, et al., 2016; Newton et al., 2016; Yanamadala, Bragg, 
Roberto, & Brownell, 2012).  Mapping the actors involved and exploring 
relationships and links between actor groups, showed how both existing and new 
networks were used to influence the soda tax agenda and implementation (Chapter 
5 and Annex 4).  In several theories of policy analysis, groups and networks 
represent a key element of policymaking (Marsh & Smith, 2000; Silke & Kriesi, 2007; 
Tantivess & Walt, 2008).  
 
According to supporters of the soda tax, the MOH and MOF were initially seen to be 
resisting a soda tax when policy discussions started, and were not always strong 
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public advocates for its development as would have been expected.  This thesis 
showed that they were strongly influenced by individuals and organisations having 
double roles in the process, and this created possible conflicts of interests, which 
were not made explicit.  The analysis of the ‘politics’ stream of Kingdon’s multiple 
streams theory, raised key questions about conflict of interests, accountability 
issues (who is accountable to whom), responsiveness of policy actors to the public 
concerns, and representation and power imbalance of non-state actors during the 
policy debate.  Answers to questions related to concepts of ‘good governance’, go 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, this research enables a window to 
examine particular contextual issues about actor relationships that steered the soda 
tax development in certain directions, such as (i) the inclusion of F&BI members on 
the executive boards of think tanks and civil society organisations’ who wrote 
reports criticising the soda tax effectiveness, and who were part of the national 
board of the policy evaluation process, (ii) the relationships between policymakers 
and F&BI members, impacting the final tax (1 MXP per litre instead of the originally 
proposed 20%) or (iii) the economic support Bloomberg Philanthropies gave to 
public interest civil society groups, allowing these groups to increase their influence 
with the public and policymakers to promote the soda tax. 
 
The sustained and ever-presence of the F&BI throughout the policy process, and in 
relationships with key policy actors, suggest strategies used, often called ‘corporate 
political actions’ and  used broadly by tobacco companies in the past,  were  rapidly 
implemented when the soda tax became a policy option.  Not only having an 
independent scrutiny of existing networks and relationships helped to sustain 
issues of transparency through the process, but helped to understand where the way 
actors framed the problem and the policy might be rooted. Furthermore, to incur 
how remediation actions occurred, and provided evidence of these corporate 
political actions taking place. 
 
Framing the soda tax policy  
As presented in Chapter 6, beliefs of different policy actors were framed in a way 
that facilitated getting a soda tax on the policy agenda.  However, this also resulted 
in a polarised debate about the need for, and implications of such measure.  Frames 
used in the soda tax debate were highly influenced by the evidence on SSBs and 
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health and how this evidence was presented to the public and key actors and used 
to justify actions.  
 
The government framed the obesity policy which outlined the soda tax as a 
continuation of the policy previously started by President Felipe Calderón.  It was 
framed as a policy addressing the weaknesses of the previous one.  Interviewees 
recognised a problem of ‘obesity’ and of ‘high’ consumption of soda.  The ‘high’ 
consumption of sodas was also framed by most interviewees as having a cultural 
meaning for the Mexican population.  This research suggests it is also the result of 
excessive marketing and expanded distribution of sodas bottlers around the 
country.  Additionally, there are normative beliefs that soda consumption is seen as 
a reward, as a result of an addiction, or that drinking water is unsafe.   
 
The ‘obesity problem’ was framed as an individual choice or a choice embedded in 
a certain environmental context.  Therefore the ‘policy solutions’ were framed 
respectively, either as a matter of changing individual behaviour of overweight or 
obese people, or as a need to improve the structural environment where the person 
makes consumption decisions.  These frames are consistent with frames used by 
other researchers in public health and behavioural economics (Beeken & Wardle, 
2013; Drewnowski & Darmon, 2005; Horgen & Brownell, 2002; Magnusson, 2010; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1985).  As it has been suggested by scholars, alternative 
framing of the obesity issue could not only help to reach target audiences but to 
expand to a range of potential partners in the fight.  Also, as in this case, framing 
obesity as a political issue and educating people about the relevance of the 
environment in generating public debate of the different policy options, is a key goal 
for health advocates (Huang et al., 2015).  
 
The solution was framed by policy makers as a policy solution that occurred thanks 
to a ‘multi-stakeholder' collaboration.  The soda tax was also framed as a positive 
solution to increase government’s revenue, and to fund programs to improve health, 
such as water provision in schools and public spaces.  Arguments used by industry 
members to frame it as a negative policy solution were its potential effect on the 
poor and its negative impact on the country's economy.   
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The outcomes of the ‘policy solution’ (soda tax) were framed in multiple, 
contradictory ways, depending on who produced or supported various evaluations 
or reports.  For example, using evaluation data after implementation of the soda tax, 
some academics produced evidence to highlight the positive effects of the soda tax 
on purchases, while academics who received funding of the F&BI tax reported that 
the tax had only a ‘small’ effect on consumption and highlighted important 
externalities such as the economic negative implications for the soda industry in 
Mexico and the relevance for the county’s economy; and the effect the soda tax 
would have on poor families.  Frames on the evidence used to support and oppose 
the policy identified during the debate are similar to those identified in similar case 
studies looking at SSB in New York or alcohol policies in the UK and in the US 
(Hawkins & Holden, 2013b; Nixon et al., 2015; Thow, Quested, et al., 2011).     
 
The soda tax policy formulation process 
Chapter 7 presented findings on how the soda tax was formulated and included in 
the federal government’s policy agenda, after initially being a legislative initiative 
presented to Congress in 2012.  The federal government proposed the soda tax in 
three policy documents: the National Strategic Plan, the Fiscal Reform, and the 
MoH’s Obesity Strategy.  The proposal was modified from its original form (20% tax 
to 1 MXP per litre), however the rationale for the modification was not clearly 
explained.  Findings from the interviews suggest the F&BI lobbied for this change 
directly with the Ministry of Finance, though no public, documented account was 
available.  Lobbying to resist, and later in 2015 to dismiss the soda tax is a strategy 
consistent with the ‘public policy risk matrix’ as outlined in leaked e-mails from 
Coca-Cola in the US, illustrating that the lobby focus should be concentrated on ‘fight 
back’ against the ‘increase product taxes in Member States’ (Pfister, 2016).  Findings 
showed that F&BI used tactics similar to those used by the tobacco and alcohol 
industry in the past (Hawkins & Holden, 2013b; Lee, Eckhardt, & Holden, 2016; 
Nixon et al., 2015; Thow, Quested, et al., 2011).  These are described in Chapter 5 
(funding research, personal double roles, PPPs), in Chapter 6 (framing the evidence 
and the implications of the soda tax) and Chapter 8 (use of marketing, support social 
movements, PPP, tax benefits) and are consistent with what scholars describe 
elsewhere (Hawkes & Harris, 2011; Jacoby et al., 2012; Jensen & Ronit, 2015; Mialon 
et al., 2015; Moodie et al., 2013; Moscetti & Taylor, 2015).  
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Several contradictions were found in respect of the participation of non-state actors 
during the policy formulation.  The perception of whether civil society groups 
advocating for a soda tax were able to fully participate in the process was disputed.  
Accounts and data suggest the F&BI was actively involved in the formal process of 
the policy development, enabling them to undermine policy outcomes.  Results 
suggest the MoH endorsed participation of the F&BI by inviting them to participate 
in the obesity strategy’s workshops, arguing they were a ‘legitimate’ industry and 
needed in the process, and ignoring (or not publicly acknowledging) the potential 
conflicts of interests this entails.  Additionally, the MOH endorsement of the soda tax 
changed throughout the process.  When the MoF initially supported the soda tax, the 
MoH did not make any public endorsement until much later; it was only after the 
first report showing a decrease in sales, that they did.  Existing and new non-state 
actors emerged as important players when the MoH established the indicators for 
monitoring and evaluating the obesity strategy.  Some of the invited participants 
were part of business-interest driven civil society groups, while others were F&BI 
leaders or members of academia who had support from the F&B industry.  Clear 
targets and indicators to measure the impact of the soda tax were not made explicit 
in the policy documents, nor were interviewees aware of any indicators proposed 
for evaluation.  After the soda tax was implemented, three groups reported on the 
effectiveness of the tax on sales, one in favour and two against it.  All three groups 
were found to have ties with actors that might have influenced the tone and framing 
of such results (Chapter 5). 
 
Non-state actors’ activities shaping the implementation of the soda tax 
Some non-state actors’ activities were identified as key factors shaping the design 
and implementation of the soda tax.  These included existing networks (community 
networks) and the building of new coalitions (issue networks) focused on the soda 
tax policy.  Groups supporting and opposing the soda tax also organised public 
demonstrations; used direct lobbying; designed and paid marketing campaigns; and 
published reports to highlight the effectiveness or lack of impact of the soda tax.  The 
contrasting frames used by different actors around the impact of the soda tax are 
discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 8.  All of these actions concurred with research on 
previous case studies and with the frameworks used for the tactics of the tobacco, 
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alcohol and food industries, also gambling, climate change deniers, NRA National Rifle 
Association, etc.  Summarised as “MARSH”: Misinformation, Attack, Recruitment, 
Substitution, Heaps used to influence policy (Lyness & McCambridge, 2014; Mialon, 
Swinburn, Allender, et al., 2016; Mialon, Swinburn, Wate, et al., 2016; Sacks et al., 
2015; Salojee & Dagli, 2000; Stuckler, McKee, Ebrahim, & Basu, 2012).  New 
coalitions built among civil society, academics, think tanks and international 
organisations was a novel network approach in the field of nutrition policy making 
in Mexico. As suggested by Huang, T, et al, (2015) obesity coalitions, among other 
strengths, can control media messages, rather than letting this messages be 
controlled by the industry or diluted by uncoordinated organizations.   Support from 
international actors provided to national civil society groups and academics helped 
change the dynamics of power during the debate, include the support for media 
advocacy actions, and support  to include  some think tanks’ expertise to the case.  
Previously, support from international organisations had been relatively low for 
civil society groups in Mexico advocating for nutrition policies.  Results show that 
such international support is rare, as the nutrition and health sectors in Mexico 
including civil society organisations and related academic groups are heavily 
influenced by the F&BI (Chapter 5 and Annex 4).  Until the soda tax emerged as a 
policy option, the influence of the F&BI was not perceived as a conflict of interest or 
problematic and it continues to be ignored or denied as such by some state policy 
actors (Chapter 8) (Burch, Wander, & Collin, 2010).  
 
Finally, findings outlined in Chapter 8 suggest that there were a range of actions and 
reactions from state and non-state actors after the soda tax implementation.  These 
included a range of actions that had positive outcomes for the soda industry and 
could be seen to mitigate some of the impact of the soda tax, such as fiscal 
agreements between the F&BI and the government; strengthening public-private 
partnerships between government and soda companies, especially for social 
programs and water provision in schools; and reformulation and market expansion 
of the soda industry (Chapter 8).  Both supporters and opponents of the tax 
continued using various methods to publicly frame the impact of the soda tax in 
ways to highlight their contrasting position (Chapter 5).  There were also ongoing 
declarations from academia and civil society organisations about the conflict of 
interest problems in the soda tax and across the wider obesity policy agenda.  This 
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included demands for transparency and accountability for the use of soda tax 
revenues (Chapter 8).  Some of these actions and reactions have also been identified 
in other case studies investigating unhealthy commodities such as tobacco and 
alcohol (Cairney, Studlar, & Mamudu, 2012; Hawkins & McCambridge, 2014;)(Pauly, 
Meapani, Lesses, Cummings, & Streck, 2002).  This thesis therefore sums up the 
empirical evidence of such reactions to a policy measure in different settings. 
 
II. Implications and contribution to knowledge 
 
This study contributes to knowledge in different ways.  First, this work helps to 
understand how strong corporate economic interests influenced nutrition policy-
making in Mexico and how this may be relevant in countries with similar contexts 
(i.e. LMIC) (Clark et al., 2012; Ramos, 2013; Stuckler et al., 2012).  The interests of 
soda corporations often outweigh public health policy responses such as soda taxes 
or food labelling regulation in other countries where lobbing has been highly 
present (e.g. South African soda tax proposal).   
 
Second, it demonstrates that corporate interests continued to have an influence on 
the policy, not only during policy development but also after introduction of the soda 
tax.  This was exemplified through the Fiscal Reform’s addenda published few weeks 
after the soda tax policy document, which excluded certain beverages and provided 
a number of fiscal benefits to the soda companies.  However, by adding the soda tax 
to the Fiscal Reform and publicly debating it, the government positioned itself as 
proactive and concerned about the obesity problem while being seen to ‘punish’ the 
sweetened beverages companies contributing to this problem (Cairney, 2016; Hay, 
2011; Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Schneider & Sidney, 2009).  Consequently, the 
F&BI continued negotiations with the government and ensured that they were 
actively engaged in the issue through corporate social responsibility actions, public-
private partnerships, and ensuring remediation actions were introduced to 
overcome the impact of the soda tax on the soda producers.  Currently, rhetoric 
about multistakholder approaches as a way to build human, financial and regulatory 
capacity for change is dominating the public health agenda, and have been 
recognised by some as successful in obesity prevention programs (Huang et al., 
2015; Perez-Escamilla et al., 2017; WHO, 2014b) Nevertheless literature on the risk 
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of such collaborations in obesity prevention programs or nutrition policy making 
suggest this mechanism legitimates the participation of  “unhealthy commodity 
industries” in the policy process and nutrition program  interventions and incur in 
potential damages, and jeopardize the public health efforts, as it is the case of the 
SUN (scaling up nutrition) movement (Lie & Granheim, 2017). 
 
Third, this work contributes to research on framing in policy debates.  It shows how 
the framing of evidence about the policy problem and the solutions influenced the 
agenda setting.  It exemplifies how evidence related to sugar sweetened beverage 
consumption and obesity and diabetes is presented by academics and think tanks.  
Moreover, it demonstrates how the calls to action from international agencies 
(Mozaffarian et al., 2012; OECD, 2012; WHO, 2008, 2012) influenced the policy 
agenda in Mexico.  While, for the civil society and supporters of the soda tax, solving 
the obesity problem by restricting the soda consumption and providing drinking 
water in schools became a matter of human rights (Chapter 8). It also shows how 
frames about the soda tax effectiveness were contested by those opposing the tax 
(Chapter 6).   Framing access to drinking water and access to good food as a human 
right and as a public good, has become a prominent way that public interest civil 
society organisations are changing the narratives of food as a commodity (Pol & 
Schuftan, 2016).   They use it to keep a vigilant attitude, and bring it to the policy 
debate and negotiations.  This case, was a successful achievement of civil society in 
this matter, as access to free drinking water in public spaces as a human right, made 
the argument for the policy strong amongst politicians and public opinion, leading 
to an assigned budget for that purpose once the soda tax was implemented.  
 
Fourth, this thesis also demonstrates that the soda tax brought new opportunities 
for some actors around the issue of drinking water.  Soda corporations expanded 
their bottled water market.  Concurrently many civil society organisations were able 
to advocate for improved drinking water supply.  This thesis also shows how the 
links between sweetened beverage producers and drinking water government 
concessions are related to the market for bottled water in Mexico (Clapp & Fuchs, 
2009; Farnsworth & Holden, 2006; Salvo, 2009).  Models on the aetiology of obesity 
in Mexico have considered water access as a constraint, and further research is still 
needed to address and support policies for the provision of free drinking water and 
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to avoid loopholes in the current policy proposals to tackle obesity (CONAGUA, 
2007; FAO, 2014). 
 
Finally, this thesis provides evidence about ways in which food corporations wield 
their influence in regulatory actions within the national strategy for obesity 
prevention, and also the soda tax.  This work contributes to the debate on how 
power is exercised, framed and shifted throughout the policy process (Cairney et al., 
2012; Fuchs & Kalfagianni, 2009; Schmidt, 2008; Silverglade, 2010).  It shows that 
Mexico (and Latin America) represents a market opportunity for transnational food 
corporations.  It provides empirical research on how actors from the F&BI framed 
obesity as a personal lifestyle choice, influencing the public perception.  This made 
it easier for companies to obtain public support for ‘soft’ policies aimed at informing 
and educating the consumer rather than changing the market environment.  When 
the soda tax was introduced they were influential in responding to the potential 
threat, in negotiating mitigation measures with the government, while at the same 
time increasing their market share of bottled drinking water. 
 
III. Reflections on the use of theory 
 
This policy analysis was guided by carefully selected theories and frameworks. To 
identify all the relevant factors in the political analysis, the frameworks mentioned 
in Table 3.1 were used; and to formulate the research questions.  The policy analysis 
explored the policy formulation, agenda setting and discussed evaluations of the 
impact of the soda tax.  Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework helped to identify 
the policy, the politics and the problems that collided in the ‘policy window’ when 
Enrique Peña Nieto became President, and considered the particular economic and 
political situation of the country.  Key actors with high influence and power, such as 
legislators, were identified as policy entrepreneurs, as were some civil society 
groups supporting the tax and academics who joined in this supportive ‘issue 
network’. 
 
Framing is related to beliefs promoted and sustained to influence policymakers, 
under a context of uncertainty (Kingdon, 1995) as it was in Mexico with the changing 
government.  As shown in this thesis, the soda tax was framed as a negative solution 
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to obesity but as a positive solution in terms of public finances and as an 
opportunistic move taken by the incoming government.  However, framings that 
considered soda consumers as victims of the soda tax, were contradicted by 
framings that promoted drinking habits as a personal choice and the consumer’s 
responsibility.  These issues and negative framing of the soda tax evaluations played 
a key role in further framing the soda tax as ineffective, and as having negative 
impacts particularly for the poor.  
 
The use of the policy network approach in this thesis helped to reflect on 
relationships and fluctuation of power among actors during the policy process.  This 
approach also highlighted the relevance of coalition building between groups and 
the power of networks in success of the soda tax.  This approach considers networks 
as a type of governance includes participation, responsiveness, and accountability 
(Lewis, 2006; Siddiqi et al., 2009; Tantivess & Walt, 2008).  Participation of different 
stakeholders was exemplified by the rhetoric used by federal governments and 
other actors on the relevance of an inclusive and multi-stakeholder approach to the 
obesity policy.  Responsiveness to the policy and accountability of the process were 
concepts not clearly reflected in the narratives, but were noted as elements of 
concern, when analysing linkages between stakeholders and the role the private 
sector played in the evaluation and monitoring of the obesity policy.  Also, other 
examples included contrasting arguments about the formal representation of actors 
in the tables of discussion, the lack of indicators for the soda tax in the obesity’s 
monitoring strategy, and the calls for transparency and accusations of conflicts of 
interest during the design of the ENCSOD. 
 
Accountability involves one actor answering to the account holder, who will assess 
how well the former fulfils requirements to achieve specific goals (Swinburn et al., 
2015).  In this case, civil society has been the independent account holder towards 
the policy achievements.  Despite this role, the F&BI was legitimised by Government 
throughout the process, and the conflict of interest between the industry’s aims and 
the public health goals was overlooked by policymakers, while being pointed out 
publicly by civil society and other supporters of the tax. 
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Furthermore, the concentration of power remained in the corporate sector.  The 
increasing PPP and SRA represented a ‘horizontal cooperation’ interaction between 
the F&BI and the government, where distribution of power was similar between 
actors (Adams, 2007, p. 135).  Civil society and the legislative power had a similar 
cooperation.  However, this was not the case for civil society’s relationship with the 
federal government, which lacked interaction or was an ‘asymmetric bargaining’ 
interaction where the distribution of power had a hierarchical element, as the power 
remained in the dominant group (the government) (Adams, 2007, p. 135). 
 
This research used several theories in a ‘complementary approach’, using multiple 
concepts or theories to produce a series of perspectives with which to explain 
empirical outcomes.  The advantage of using several theories is to compare a range 
of perspectives, but recognising the different intellectual origins (Cairney, 2016, 
personal communication) (Cairney, 2013b).  Combining several theories might 
imply a practical problem for the research design, however this was not the case for 
this thesis, as several theories were considered before selecting the ones that were 
used in this analysis. 
 
This research provides evidence on how political science offers insights into the so-
called political determinants of health and the constraints and forces that shape 
public policy (Huang et al., 2015). Though this case study is only about the soda tax, 
one of the many population approaches to tackle obesity, it provides insight of a 
novel approach to tackle obesity, and helps to find similarities or divergences 
amongst similar policy analyses whose focus was on other policies such as food 
labelling (Mwatsama, 2016; Wood, 2016), fat taxes (Bødker, Pisinger, Toft, & 
Jørgensen, 2015b),  school food programs, and comprehensive policies to tackle 
obesity  (Patchett, Yeatman, & Johnson, 2016; Pratt et al., 2014; Swinburn & Wood, 
2013).  
 
IV. Reflections on methods  
 
Some challenges were faced and overcame during data collection and the elite 
interviews.  They included the difficulties in recruiting a sample that represented all 
the key stakeholders such as refusal of some actors to participate, the long time it 
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took to make contact and secure the interviews, the challenge  in some situations to 
differentiate and identify when interviewees were speaking on behalf of the 
organisation they represented or voicing their own opinions.  There were also 
difficulties that are inherent in any qualitative interview study such as building 
rapport with the interviewees; and the influence of the location on the interview 
(Green & Thorogood, 2012a).  To overcome some limitations of the interview study, 
a documentary analysis was conducted to validate information, and complement it 
when interviews were denied with key participants in the policy process.   
 
To improve quality assurance and validity of data, the data from the different 
sources were triangulated.  Also the themes and categories emerging during the 
analysis were reviewed and discussed with supervisors.  To ensure research 
transparency and to acknowledge possible flaws during the research process, a list 
of techniques based on Guest, MacQueen and Namey was used (Chapter 3 page 80).  
This list helped me to consider the use of a systematic approach for both data 
collection and analysis (Chapter 3), to adequately describe the context (Chapter 4), 
to use relevant theory (Chapter 3), and reflect on the limitations of this study and to 
situate it in wider literature (this Chapter section ‘Reflexivity and own experience’) 
(Gilson & Raphaely, 2008). 
 
V. Reflection on positionality 
 
One of the main advantages for conducting this research was my previous position 
as a researcher, including the network built during that time, and facilitating access 
to interviewees and other actors involved in the process who supported my 
research by providing references to literature and useful documents.  A second 
advantage was being a native speaker and a Mexican, as there were no cultural 
boundaries to establish rapport, and enable me to understand all interviews content 
and colloquial language.   A third advantage was my training and experience doing 
research on the Mexican setting, especially on qualitative methodologies.  A third 
advantage, was performing this research as a PhD student of a foreign institution 
(LSHTM), as it helped to access high-profile interviewees, as the school is well 
recognised in the area of pubic health in Mexico and some actors were sensitive to 
recognise my new position as an outsider of the process. 
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One negative aspect relate to my position before taking the PhD as some actors 
against the soda tax did not accepted the interview, and didn´t perceived me 
differently from a supporter and advocate of the soda tax.  Other negative aspect 
was that for the second half of the PhD (writing phase) I remained in London, which 
kept distance from the day to day continuing discussions about the soda tax and 
obesity polices. 
 
Regardless of my previous and current position in relation to the topic of research, 
the acknowledgement of such positions provided awareness on the implications 
they had on the research process.  As mentioned in chapter 3, the quality of the 
analysis depends on the skills, time, resources and knowledge of the researcher 
about the context, and those were considered  throughout the fieldwork, discussion 
and conclusions of this research. 
 
VI. Study limitations 
 
One of the main limitations of this research is that it does not compare the soda tax 
in Mexico with the similar situation in other countries.  At the time of the study 
design, few other countries had adopted a tax on sodas, and documenting their 
emerging cases was difficult due to language limitations.  Further, the context of 
some of these countries such as (i.e., Hungary and France) was quite different 
compared to Mexico in a number of factors assumed relevant to the policy process, 
such as national economy, clean water availability, change of government, and 
poverty levels.  
 
Some challenges during the interviews, included the lack of participation of some 
key actors, mainly from the F&BI but also some academics and a representative of 
the media (Table 3.6).  Representatives of the F&BI members and the sugar industry 
either didn’t reply or refused the invitation to participate.  It was assumed that at 
that time (autumn 2014) the interview was probably perceived as a threat or a 
challenge as the soda tax policy discussions were still highly political.  To overcome 
this limitation, the information from industry documents was used, and this 
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attempted to reduce as much as possible the gaps of information required to 
complete a comprehensive and weighted dataset for the analysis. 
  
Some challenges in the documentary analysis were faced.  Some of these included 
the extent of the information available and accessible. As mentioned in page 80, 
several search actions were employed to try to find it.  If, by using any of those 
actions the source document was not found, it was accepted as a lost document.   For 
example, several documents had been removed from the websites of key 
organisations at some point during the 4 years of research (e.g. AMPRAC, 
ContraPeso).   Also, for some secondary documents there was a lack of control on 
how data was collected (in existing documents) especially in historic sources, so 
they are treated as accounts and the method was complemented with the interview 
data.   
 
A further limitation is that the soda tax is a relatively recent health policy used by 
governments, especially in Mexico.  This limits the research in taking a historical 
perspective or analysing the complete policy cycle.  Nevertheless, some scholars 
value approaches to analyse contemporary cases to enlighten policymaking in a 
more efficient and immediate way (Buse, 2008; Gilson, 2008). 
 
Finally, another limitation of this thesis is the exclusion of an originally planned 
comprehensive media analysis which was not pursued due to time constraints.  
Media coverage of the soda tax in Mexico was extensive, and a media analysis would 
have become a large research undertaking which was therefore not included in this 
research.  To overcome this potential limitation, the documentary undertook a 
board search and included more than 100 documents to ensure a comprehensive 
understanding of the policy development.  
  
VII. Study strengths 
 
This thesis also had several strengths that are acknowledged here.  Frist, the 
topicality of the thesis means that it is able to make an important contribution to the 
evidence base and contributes in a timely way to the international debate on the 
introduction of soda taxation in other counters, as a measure to control obesity.  
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Health taxes, and other similar strategies mentioned in chapter 2, are currently 
being discussed in many countries around the globe, and progress is being 
monitored by several groups (Hawkes, Jewell, & Allen, 2013; Swinburn et al., 2013).  
This thesis adds evidence for policy making around obesity, and to use this 
knowledge to inform further national soda taxation policies.   Another strength of 
the thesis is that it used a rigorous methodology, and was conducted by a native 
speaker, with local knowledge and access, reaching an in-depth understanding of 
the policy process surrounding the soda tax in Mexico.  
 
 
VIII. Proposed outputs and dissemination  
 
Papers related to this work are yet to be published.  Four papers are planned, one is 
already ready for submission.  This work will have further dissemination as 
academic and policy papers to strengthen the impact, and to influence future 
research on this topic.  
 
Table 9.1 Proposed papers as outcomes of the thesis with working tile, aims 
and findings to be presented  
Paper Working title Aim Findings in 
chapters 
Paper 1   Stakeholders’ participation 
in the Mexican soda tax 
Examine stakeholders’ 
participation in the design and 
agenda setting of the soda tax 
and how it shaped policy 
outcomes.   
Chapters 4, 7 
Paper 2  
 
Framing debates 
surrounding the design and 
agenda setting of the 
Mexican soda tax 
Analysis of main frames used 
throughout the policy process 
of the soda tax implementation.  
Chapter 6,  
Paper 3 Policy networks contribution 
in defining and framing the 
Mexican  soda tax and its 
impact 
Map and identify policy 
networks in the soda tax policy 
process to identify influence, 
conflict of interest and power of 
the key policy players.   
Chapters 5, 8 
Paper 4   
 
The governance of water 
access in Mexico and its 
relationship with the soda 
tax policy 
To analyse the governance of 
water access and provision in 
Mexico during the 
implementation of the soda tax, 
and related to similar countries 
settings. 
Chapters 3, 4, 8 
and findings 
not presented 
in the thesis 
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IX. Reflections on findings  
 
One of the main issues to reflect upon from this research was how a soda tax policy 
was adopted in Mexico despite the significant influence of the F&BI on the 
government.  This thesis offers two possible explanations: 
 
a) Normative beliefs about ‘punishing’ the powerful corporate actors were 
addressed by the incoming government in the spirit of obtaining approval 
and support for wider fiscal reforms (Le Grand & New, 2015; Schneider & 
Ingram, 1993). 
 
b) The government was seen as focusing on obesity and diabetes as national 
health problems, despite needing money and portraying the fiscal policy 
agenda as positive, as it has been analysed in a global context (Thow et al., 
2011). 
 
c) Strong leadership from civil society groups supporting the initiative. 
 
Beliefs about the benefits of including the F&BI in the policymaking obscured the 
underlying conflict of interests of such participation.  The presentation of selective 
facts and the ‘institutionalization’ of the narratives about multi-stakeholder 
arrangements biases judgments about such participation, which showed power 
imbalances. 
 
The soda tax was an important commercial risk for the soft drink industry, as their 
corporate documents show (US SEC, 2012, 2013, 2014).  However, while publicly 
the 'hard' policy was added to the agenda, the side agreements between the 
government and the F&BI were negotiated outside the public domain.  Such addenda 
and other policy changes occurring simultaneously or immediately after the 
implementation of the tax, as food labelling changes or concessions for provision of 
drinking water in schools, mitigated the impact of the soda tax for the F&BI. 
 
 208 
The lack of safe drinking water was a big political issue seen as being linked to the 
soda tax. The government committed to provide safe water fountains to all schools 
in the country, using soda tax revenues.  Instead, the Minister of Education 
partnered with the F&BI to provide water to schools or communities thereby 
allowing the F&B industry to portray those actions as part of their corporate social 
responsibility actions to ‘help’ consumers, but actually helped them diversify their 
market  to other regions, and changing their beverages portfolio to bottled water 
and non-caloric drinks (Farnsworth & Holden, 2006).  Additionally, the 
normalization of links between actors that have competing fundamental aims 
towards health (F&BI vs MoH) risks jeopardizing the public health efforts of public 
health promoters. 
 
Finally, a novel issue emerges from these findings.  The relationship between soda 
and the lack of safe drinking water supplies in Mexico seems to be linked to soda 
overconsumption.  However, this link was not well established by most of the actors 
interviewed, nor was it stressed in most of the documents reviewed.  Only one actor 
recognised drinking water as a key factor related to obesity, malnutrition and 
poverty in Mexico, but this actor did not relate the water issue to the soda tax policy.  
The worst cases of obesity occur in the same places where the worst problems of 
under-nutrition occur, too.  And it is where we have those problems, where we 
generally have the worst problem of access to water and poverty (Agua Org, 2016; 
AguaOrg, 2015b; Carriedo, 2017; "La crisis del agua de la Ciudad de México,").    
 
Scholars have proposed that actions which include refinement of public information, 
use of effective frames for each population, media advocacy, building citizen 
engagement, and developing a receptive political environment and collaboration 
between stakeholders are relevant to increase popular demand for obesity-
prevention policies (Huang, 2014).    This thesis, demonstrate how some of the 
proposed factors identified as key to proceed with changes in the policy agenda, did 
influence the policy change.   This thesis provides evidence on some of the 
reflections recently proposed by Escamilla, et al ( 2017) on this and other policies 
implemented in LA  suggesting that  some of the key elements for effective and 
sustainable policy, include ‘evidence justifying policy; evidence-based advocacy by 
civil society; political will; and legislation and skilful negotiations across 
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government, academia, the private sector and civil society. Scientific evidence and 
evaluation played an important role in achieving tipping points for policies' launch 
and sustain effective implementation’ (Perez-Escamilla, 2017). 
 
 
X. Recommendations  
 
Several recommendations emerge from the findings of this research. The Mexican 
regulations of water access needs further research concerning their function and 
transparency.  The government issues special permits to corporations to extract 
potable water from springs, while, several urban areas have access to poor quality 
of water, and some rural areas lack the basic service of water regardless of their 
proximity to water springs. 
 
Specific contextual factors should be considered whenever a health tax or a similar 
policy approach is being considered.  First, this can be done by considering the 
determinants of obesity in that particular country or region.  For instance, in this 
case, the companies producing soda and selling bottled water have governmental 
concessions for water springs.  Therefore, besides their commercial interests in 
accessing water, they also have control over water access to the population. 
 
Taxing soda for its sugar content might result in reformulation of sweetened 
beverages so that sugar content is reduced.  However this may not address the 
problem of such drinks being ‘empty calories’ and thus a soda tax may not have a 
real impact on reducing the overall SSB consumption.  This taxing scheme might 
obscure the purpose of the tax while giving leverage to F&B producers to 
accommodate new products that still have health implications. 
 
Finally, reactions to regulations need to be carefully considered by activists, 
academics and other actors in favour of official measures and regulatory measures 
for health.   As Caraher M & Cowburn, G (2015) suggest, public health advocates 
need to develop more skills  as opponents such as the F&BI for the soda tax, use a 
range of arguments to prevent its implementation.  Food and beverage taxation 
policies can have negative externalities in other policy areas which are directly or 
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indirectly linked to the same health issues (e.g. water, reformulation, social 
responsibility actions).  This is an area of research that requires longer term 
evaluations of soda tax policies from all countries that have implemented them. 
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Annex 1: Semi-structured interview guideline 
 
 
Interview datasheet: 
State ………………………………………………. 
Locality……………………………………….Date………/……../201… 
Institution ……………………………………………………………Age……………Sex  M    F 
Level of education……………………………… 
Occupation…………………………………………… 
Present position……………………………………………………. 
Time in the institution………………………. 
 
 
Instructions: 
 
  
The researcher will introduced himself and will present the ID of the LSHTM.  The 
researcher reads the Informed Consent Form approved by the LSHTM Ethics 
Committee.  The interviewee will be informed about the goal of the interview and 
the need of recording for research purposes and confidentiality measures of the 
interview information.  If participant withdraws his participation the fieldworker 
will stop the interview. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. To start, ask questions related to: 
a. Please can you tell about your current job and position?  
 Length on the position 
 Previous job 
 Main activities  
 
NUTRITION AND SOCIETY 
2. About the topic of obesity/food and health, ask questions related to the 
following topics: 
a. What do you think about obesity in Mexico?  
b. Do you consider obesity and diabetes a public problem or not (rather 
a problem of each individual) and why. 
c. Have you participated in the National Strategy for the Prevention and 
Control of Obesity developed by Peña Nieto government in 2013?  
d. What do you think of the Strategy? 
e. Do you know any other policy to prevent obesity in México? What do 
you think of them?  
 Food guidelines in schools?  Marketing food to children? 
Health promotion in schools? 
 Advantages and disadvantages. 
f. Have you engaged with any groups outside your organization on 
these topics in Mexico? 
 Civil society (who? And when?) 
 Media 
 Academia 
 Government  
 Food companies 
 Food retailers 
 
FOOD LABELLING POLITICS  
3. Ask questions related to the Front of Package Labelling: 
a. Can you tell me what you know and think about Front of Pack 
labelling in Mexico? 
 Opinion 
 Knows the objective 
 Did any participants call you or ask your opinion as an 
expert? 
 Knows who participated in the design and implementation 
 Advantages and disadvantages perceived for: POPULATION, 
INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT, INSTITUTION, RESEARCHERS. 
FOOD RETAILERS 
b. Has your organization been involved with the FOPL design or 
implementation? How?  
c. Do you think your organization is a powerful influence on this policy 
or not?  Why? 
d. Who else do you think has influence the FOPL regulation? Why and 
how? 
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e. Do you know who supervise the compliance of the FOPL (the seal and 
the GDA)? (show package if needed) 
 Opinion of these institutions 
 Advantages and disadvantages 
f. What actions do you consider the government (or the responsible of 
the FOPL) needs to do/or change to be an effective strategy? 
 
 
SODA TAX POLICY  
4. Ask the following questions about the Soda Tax in Mexico? 
a. Can you tell me what you know and think about the Soda Tax in 
Mexico? 
b. Do you know why was it introduced? 
 Opinion 
 Knows the objective 
 Knows who participated in the design and implementation 
 Advantages, disadvantages and possible outcomes for: 
POPULATION, INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT, INSTITUTION, 
RESEARCHERS, FOOD RETAILERS, NGOs who promoted it. 
c. Do you know/ imagine/think where the resources are going? 
d. Did any the participants call you or ask your opinion as an expert?  
e. What has been the role of your organization? 
f. Do you know about the constitutional right to access clean and 
drinking water? What are your views of this topic in relationship with 
the soda tax and the quality of water in Mexico? 
g. In your opinion, what weights the most:  the soda tax per se or the 
intense exposure of the topic on the media?  What would you think 
will happen when the intense exposure decreases, but the soda tax 
remains? 
 
POLICY PROCESS AND ACTORS INVOLVED 
5. Ask the interviewee opinion about: 
a. What is your opinion about the participation of food industry in the 
design and implementation of these policies?  
b. What actions do you consider are needed for these policy to be 
effective? 
 Front of package labelling 
 Soda Tax 
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Annex 2: Ethics Committee Approval, Informed Consent and 
Participant Information Sheet 
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Annex 3: Themes and codes used for analysis  
 
Themes for analysis used for interviews and documentary analysis 
To understand the contextual factors that facilitated the development of the soda tax 
Barriers perceived of the context 
Change of government 
Environmental conditions 
Fiscal reform 
Government OR Institutional issues 
Obesity increase 
Opportunities perceived of the context 
Social norms and perceptions (cultural factors) 
 
To analyse the policy-making process surrounding the soda tax 
Drivers for the policy change 
Agenda setting and timing 
Actions involved on shaping the policy design 
Dialog and engagement of the actors 
Means to evaluate, monitor and (or) modify the policy 
Perceptions of the implementation 
H2O issues 
 
To examine stakeholders position and how each one attempted to influence the soda tax 
Implementation 
Approaches to influence perception of the population 
Credibility of the proposal 
Dominant policy narratives 
Engagement and involvement of stakeholders 
Framing the policy 
Framing the problem 
Participation (actors beliefs and values) 
Perception of the obesity policies 
Power of the actors 
 
To document the main policy outcomes of the stakeholders after the policy change 
Acceptability of the policy change 
Accountability after the soda tax 
Changes made to overcome the outcome 
coercive 
conflict of interest 
corruption 
governance 
Main outcomes of the soda tax 
Regulatory, monitoring and voluntary actions emerging as collateral actions by different actors 
right to health 
social responsibility 
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Definition of themes and sub-themes identified in the documentary review 
Theme Sub-theme Definition
Refers to the arguments used by different actors to try to influence opinion.  Could be used to influence consumers opinion, policy makers opinions or other actors such as 
academics or civil  society members.
It includes positioning the issue by itself or accompanied by other issues. 
This are the main strategies different actors have used to increase support to their own benefit.  It  includes calls for the government to regulate, public demonstrations (against/in 
favour of the cause), calls for diverse investment, Promotions, discounts, expanded publicity of products. Use of marketing to promote messages. 
some sources referee to what actions have been recommended or done internationally to credit or invalidate the policy change.
This framing refers to positive and  negative implications soda tax and how such perceptions were framed throughout time (before, during the debate and once the tax was 
implemented)before it was implemented.Coalition building is one of the main strategies mentioned in l iterature and in our data a s a strategy used by different actors to empower their position.
Emerging actions by different stakeholders throughout time are described as part of compromising themselves with a cause occurring at the time of the soda tax ( either directly 
with obesity, soda consumption or other contextual factor such as water availability, drinking water, or environmental issues).
Arguments about the right to have access to healthy foods and limited access to unhealthy foods, the right to accurate information, health and water access.
It includes the main foresight of different actors of the forthcoming policy changes or the current policy changes occurring in the country and how are they related to their own 
means and aims.
All the expressions of the implications of the soda tax
Expressions on how believes what will  work and how will  work.  This theme reveals the links and supporting actions between actors creating networks.
Expressions about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness soda tax, the implications (before it was implemented) and its effects (after implementing it).
Highlighting other effects that the soda tax has, including adaptations of the SSB companies to the new context, changes in strategies and change of paradigms from the civil  
societyEvidence seems to  have competing arguments around the effective or ineffective role of soda tax, and to the type of reports presented publicly.  The framing of certain documents 
highlight the position of the authors about the failure or success of the policy measure.
This theme is to disclose how networks were built around actors who have played a role in the soda tax imitative.  
Civil  society- Academics All type of  interactions between civil  society members (alone or in group) to the academic groups (or individuals).
Civil  society- Food & Beverage industry All type of interactions, collaborations and endorsements between civil  society members and  F&B industry members (or groups)
Civil  society- Government All type of interactions, collaborations and endorsements between civil  society members and  Government members (or groups).
Civil  society- International agencies All type of interactions, collaborations and endorsements between civil  society members and  international agencies.
Civil  society-Journalists/ Media All type of interactions, collaborations and endorsements between civil  society members and  journalists or media (companies or individuals).
Academia- Government All type of interactions, collaborations and endorsements between academics and  government members.
Academia-  Food & Beverage industry All type of relationship between academics and members of the food and beverage industry or any of its endorsed front groups.
Academia- Journalist/Media Interactions or endorsement of journalists or media (or lack of it) with civil  society members.
Government-Food & Beverage All type of interactions, collaborations and endorsements between the government (federal or legislative power) with food and beverage industry's  members.
Government- Journalist/Media Interactions regarding soda tax issue between government members and media members  or journalists in regards the soda tax.
Journalists/Media- Food & Beverage industry Interactions regarding soda tax issue between  food and beverage industry's members and the media or journalists.
Governmental relationships between powers 
(legislative and federal gov)
Looks at the dynamics between actors and sectors (legislative and federal) members  before, during and after the soda tax passed. 
The main argument used to support the thesis about an issue and that ha s been identified as a public problem, according to Laswell policy cycle.
Obesity in Mexico is a public Health problem  Public health is defined as  "the science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health through organized efforts and informed choices of society, 
organizations, public and private, communities and individuals".   By framing obesity as a public health problem,  obliges a response from all  the mentioned sectors and people.
Economic implications of obesity Highlighting the economic impact of obesity is the most used narrative among academics and politicians, but is also used in some documentations of the private sector.
Excess intake of calories & energy balance are the 
causes of obesity
Highlights the multifactorial  causes of obesity, to avoid pointing out a single issue such as sugar or soda
Soda consummation Highlights the excess consumption of soda in Mexico, and as such the need to address it by the soda tax.
Taxing SSBs Highlights the implications and the problems emerging and related to taxing sodas.
Sweetened Beverage Industry Highlights how the main problem is related to the power and the position the soda industry has in the country.
Credibility of the soda tax
Ties between actors
Approaches to influence perception of the policy change
Evidence and sources of credibility
Framing the problem 
Social responsibil ity
Credibil ity of stakeholder actions
Effective or Ineffective
Side effects
Right to health  and healthy environments
Changes in law and reactions of actors
Calls for action
Multicausality of obesity 
Marketing strategies
International actionsImplications of using a fiscal approach to reduce soda 
consumption (both negative and positive)
Coalition building
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International Organisations ........................................................................................................ 248 
Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) ................................................................... 248 
Bloomberg Philanthropies (BP) ............................................................................................ 248 
World Obesity Federation (former International Association for the Study of 
Obesity / International Obesity Task Force)................................................................... 249 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)..................................................................... 250 
Wold Public Health Nutrition Association ....................................................................... 251 
Center for Science in the Public  Interest .......................................................................... 251 
Governmental  Organisations ..................................................................................................... 252 
SSA (Secretaría de Salud - Ministry of Health) ............................................................... 252 
SE (Secretaría de Economía - Ministry of Economy) .................................................. 252 
SHCP (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público - Ministry of Finance ) .......... 253 
SEP (Secretaría de Educación Pública - Ministry of Public Education) .............. 254 
SEDESOL (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social - Ministry of Social 
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COFEPRIS (Comision Nacional contra Riesgos Sanitarios)   .................................... 244 
CONAGUA (Comisión Nacional del Agua – National Water Comission) ............ 257 
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Deputes.............................................................................................................................................. 258 
INEFED (Instiuto  Nacional de la Infraestrucutra Fisica Educativa .....................247                                                                                                                        
Civil Society Organisations and Think Tanks ................................................................... 258 
Asociación Mexicana de Diabetes (National Asociation of Diabetes) ................. 258 
Federación Mexicana de Diabetes A.C.  (FMD- Mexican Diabetes Federation, A.C)
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FUNSALUD (Fundación Mexicana para la Salud- Mexican Foundation for Health)
 ............................................................................................................................................................... 260 
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ContraPESO (Plataforma Estratégica contra el Sobrepeso y la Obesidad) ....... 262 
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El Poder del Consumidor ( The Consumer’s Power) ................................................... 265 
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Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad (IMCO- Mexican Institute for 
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International Organisations 
 
Organisation Background of the 
organisation 
Involvement in the soda tax 
or/and related polices 
 
Pan-American 
Health 
Organization 
(PAHO)  
 
 
PAHO serves as the 
specialized organisation 
for health of Inter-
American Systems and is 
also the Regional Office for 
the Americas of the World 
Health Organization 
(PAHO, 2012).  The area of 
Health Surveillance and 
Disease Prevention and 
Control has the mission to 
strengthen national 
capacities for Non-
Communicable Diseases 
(NCD) prevention focusing 
on the high burden of 
diseases like 
cardiovascular diseases, 
cancer and diabetes and 
their risk factors like 
obesity and physical 
inactivity (PAHO, 2006, 
2008). 
 
In 2011 a group of experts 
from different countries 
including Mexico 
developed a set of 
recommendations on food 
and beverage marketing to 
children supported by the 
PAHO (OPS, 2011).   
 
In 2016 they published the 
Nutrient Profile Model for 
the Region and have 
supported several 
countries to improve their 
policy of food labelling, 
school food programs and 
taxing sodas (PAHO, 2012). 
 
 
PAHO collaborated in the fight of 
obesity in Mexico, as their own 
report mentions (PAHO, 2015) 
and as explained further in 
chapter 7.  However, the PAHO 
Washington office publicly 
supported the tax before the 
PAHO’s Mexican office (ITAM, 
2012; Jacoby et al., 2012).   
 
In 2013, Dr. Maureen 
Birmingham was appointed as 
the new head of PAHO’s Mexican 
office.  Her first public 
appearance was as a guest at the 
presentation of the book on 
obesity edited by the National 
Academy of Medicine on January 
31, 2013.  At that occasion, she 
expressed her concerns about the 
Mexican strategies to address 
obesity and recommended to 
integrate efforts by different 
governmental institutions in the 
fight against obesity, to 
coordinate the regulation of 
marketing food to children and to 
implement strategies such as 
labeling to improve food literacy 
among the population (Jacoby et 
al., 2012; Rivera, 2013). 
 
Bloomberg 
Philanthropies 
(BP) 
BP was founded by Mike 
Bloomberg, the former 
Mayor of New York City.  
In Mexico, BP provided technical 
and financial support for ‘an 
obesity prevention program’ (BP, 
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 The organisation focuses 
on five key areas of 
support: public health, 
environment, education, 
government innovation, 
and arts and culture.  Their 
aim is to create lasting 
change, and spread 
effective programs, 
policies, and strategies to 
other jurisdictions.   As per 
their website, the 
organisation ‘focuses on 
areas where the potential 
for controversy or failure 
keeps others at bay, and in 
particular areas where 
progress accelerates on a 
broad of issues’ (BP). The 
aim is to sway both public 
opinion and government 
officials in order to shift 
policies and advance 
progress.  BP also supports 
public-private 
partnerships to bring 
people ideas and resources 
together globally to 
amplify their impact (BP).  
 
2016), though there is no 
reference to the government’s 
obesity strategy.  They supported 
advocating strategies for banning 
junk food and sugary drinks 
adverting, taxing sugar-
sweetened beverages, promoting 
healthy public sector policies, 
front-of-pack labelling and 
obesity prevention campaigns.   
 
In the fall of 2013, BP civil society 
groups, think tanks and 
academics to propose a new tax 
on sugar-sweetened beverages, 
including funding media 
campaigns in support of the tax 
(BP).   
 
The Bloomberg Philanthropies 
Obesity Prevention Program 
continues to work with public 
and private partners in Mexico to 
ensure that obesity prevention 
remains a topic of public 
discussion and policy focus (BP; 
Donaldson et al., 2015).  
 
World Obesity 
Federation 
(WOF)  
 
(formerly 
International 
Association for 
the Study of 
Obesity (IASO) 
/ International 
Obesity Task 
Force (IOTF)) 
 
Professor Philip James 
originally convened the 
IOTF (International 
Obesity Task Force) in 
1995 to prepare the first 
scientific research report 
on the global epidemic of 
obesity.  The IOTF’s 
mission was to inform the 
world about the urgency of 
the problem of obesity and 
to persuade governments 
to act on time.  It became 
the first policy and 
advocacy ‘think tank’ for 
obesity formed by a global 
network of experts on the 
topic of public health, 
policy and obesity.   In the 
late nineties, it merged 
with the IASO 
During the last decade, the IOTF 
has been monitoring the 
prevalence of overweight and 
obesity in different countries, 
Mexico being one of them.  On a 
visit to Mexico in 2012, Philip 
James recognized Mexico as 
having a public health problem 
with obesity, and was surprised 
how food, beverages and 
pharmaceutical industries have 
major roles as sponsors of forums 
and conferences for topics such 
as obesity, diabetes, nutrition and 
NCDs.  He pointed out that this is 
a sign of their power and 
influence in public policy, and 
urged the authorities to change 
regulations in order to have a real 
impact on obesity (EPC, 2012c; 
James, 2013). 
 250 
(International Association 
of the Study of Obesity), 
formed in 1970 (IOTF, 
2012).  
 
In 2014, the IOFT changed 
its name to World Obesity 
Federation, which was part 
of a rebrand.  As obesity 
became one of the biggest 
challenges, they recognized 
stronger actions needed to 
be taken.  The mission was 
changed to ‘lead and drive 
global efforts to reduce, 
prevent and treat obesity’ 
("World Obesity (formerly 
IASO) History ", 2016). 
 
 
During the soda tax debate, as 
discussed in chapter 8, the IOTF 
signed press releases and journal 
columns in support of the soda 
tax, and later (in 2015) when 
congress voted on removing the 
tax,  in support of keeping it 
(OMENT, 2015).  
 
Inter-
American 
Development 
Bank (IADB) 
 
The IADB is the largest 
source of funding for the 
development of Latin-
America and the 
Caribbean, supporting 
efforts to reduce poverty 
and inequality with the 
goal to achieve sustainable 
and climate-friendly 
development (BID, 2012a). 
 
In 2008, IADB approved a 
conditional credit line and 
its first single operation 
was to support the human 
development program 
Oportunidades, in Mexico.  
In 2009 it approved a 
credit line to the country, 
with the objective to 
improve the nutritional 
component of the 
Oportunidades program 
addressed to the poorest 
population.  It also had a 
component to address 
obesity and overweight 
among  this population 
(BID, 2012b). 
 
In 2010, the IADB authorized a 
loan of 600 billion MXP (31.5  
billion USD) for the program 
Agua Saneamiento e Higiene en la 
Educación Básica.  The program 
was expected to contribute to 
improving the availability of 
water for consumption and 
promoting hygiene.  A fall by 30% 
of the prevalence of infectious 
diseases related to polluted 
drinking water was expected.  
The organisation also reported an 
increase of 5.3% in school 
attendance, reflecting an 
improvement in the incidence of 
childhood infectious diseases 
(BID, 2011).  This loan did not 
address the problem of water 
availability inside schools and to 
date no further public reports are 
available about the loan or the 
program it aimed to help with 
(BID, 2011). 
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Wold Public 
Health 
Nutrition 
Association 
(WPHNA) 
The WPHNA aims to 
promote and improve 
public health nutrition and 
to be a ‘professional voice 
for public health nutrition 
internationally’ (WPHNA, 
2015).   
 
During the soda tax debate the 
WPHNA signed press releases 
and journal columns in support of 
the soda tax, and later (in 2015) 
when congress voted to remove 
the tax,  in support of keeping it 
(OMENT, 2015).  
 
Center for 
Science in the 
Public Interest 
(CSPI) 
The CSPI is a non-profit 
organisation established in 
Washington D.C.  It is a 
consumers’ group who 
provides information 
about food policies and 
politics around them, and 
has provided support also 
to other countries’ 
organisations in the fight 
against obesity from a 
policy perspective. 
 
 
The CSPI supported the 
advocates for the sod tax by 
signing petitions and press 
releases of civil society 
organisations (CSOs) in the 
country.  It also was invited to 
academic forums organized by 
CSOs. 
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Governmental  Organisations 
 
Organisation Background Involvement in the soda tax 
or/and related polices 
Ministry of 
Health (MoH) 
(Secretaría de 
Salud - SSA) 
 
In 2010, under the former 
president, the MoH with 
the advice of the National 
Institute of Public Health 
developed the first 
attempt to include obesity 
in the policy agenda.  
In 2010 the MoH and SEP 
developed the National 
School Food and Beverage 
Guidelines (Charvel, Cobo, 
& Hernández-Ávila, 2015).  
This regulation restricts 
availability of soft drinks; 
established guidelines on 
prepared food, cut points 
on sugars, fat, and sodium 
on food allowed inside 
schools, and distributed 
booklets and other 
educational materials to 
schools, parents and 
personnel in charge of 
food preparation and 
sales; which are part of 
the commission designed 
to monitor and supervise 
food availability in their 
schools (SSA, 2010). 
 
In 2013, when Peña Nieto took 
office, the new Secretary of 
Health was assigned to develop 
the policy to prevent overweight 
and obesity (SSA, 2013a).  The 
appointed Secretary of Health, 
Dr Mercedes Juan, was the 
former head of the Mexican 
Foundation for Health 
(Fundación Mexicana para la 
Salud - FUNSALUD  ) a civil 
society heavily funded by Nestlé 
(Fundación Mexicana para la 
Salud).  The main actions and 
processes of such a strategy are 
described in chapter 7.  
 
Ministry of 
Economy (MoE) 
(Secretaría de 
Economía - SE) 
 
As part of the obesity 
policy launched in 2010, 
the MoE was task was to 
improve the food supply 
chains to facilitate access 
to fruit, vegetables, and 
whole grains (Rivera-
Dommarco et al., 2013).  
Another of its tasks was to 
update regulations and 
support the MoH to issue a 
norm (NMX) on ‘food 
labeling’ to disseminate 
information on healthy 
products (SSA, 2010b).  In 
Regardless of being an entity 
which was perceived as a 
relevant actor for the obesity 
policy by academics (Hernández- 
Avila, 2013) and by the federal 
government in Calderon’s 
mandate (ANSA, 2010), the MoE 
was not involved actively in the 
debate of the soda tax.  
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2011 the norm NMX SSA-
051 addressing this issue 
was modified, but it still 
left out important cut-off 
points for claims on front 
of the package, and did not 
provide the required 
nutritional facts to be 
disclosed for added sugar 
in processed products 
(Stern D, 2011).  
 
In September 2010, when 
the Food Guidelines for 
Schools were submitted 
for public consultation to 
the Federal Commission of 
Improving Regulation) 
(Comisión Federal de 
Mejora Regulatoria 
COFEMER), the MoF was 
under pressure from the 
F&BI to change the 
original guidelines, as they 
were too strict.  When the 
COFEMER published the 
guidelines they had 
weakened from the initial 
document submitted to 
public consultation. The 
criteria for energy dense 
foods was modified,  fruit 
juices with added sugars 
were allowed in all 
primary and secondary 
schools and non-caloric 
sweeteners (called  ‘light 
products’) were also 
permitted in secondary 
schools (Charvel et al., 
2015; Pratt et al., 2014).  
  
Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) 
(Secretaría de 
Hacienda y 
Crédito Público - 
SHCP) 
 
The MoF has had an 
important role in reducing 
the consumption of food 
associated with 
cardiovascular diseases 
and improving diets by 
using fiscal policy.  In 
2010 during the previous 
presidential 
When Enrique Peña Nieto took 
office, the MoF in collaboration 
with the MoH launched the new 
Fiscal Reform.  More details are 
outlined in chapter 7 and 8. 
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administration they were 
to review fiscal tools to 
improve pricing of tasked 
of vegetables and fruits 
and increase taxes on 
sugary beverages and 
unhealthy foods, but there 
were no actions taken 
during Calderon’s 
administration.  
 
During the presidency 
transition in 2013, the 
MoF was in charge of 
developing the National 
Development Plan (Plan 
Nacional de Desarrollo - 
PND), the overall strategic 
plan of the new 
government.  This plan 
addressed the topic of 
obesity.   
 
Ministry of 
Public 
Education   
(Secretaría de 
Educación 
Pública - SEP)    
SEP has been an ally in the 
fight against obesity.  In 
2010 SEP and the MoH 
developed the National 
School Food and Beverage 
Guidelines (Charvel et al., 
2015).  This regulation 
restricts availability of soft 
drinks; established 
guidelines on prepared 
food, cut points on sugars, 
fat, and sodium on food 
allowed inside schools, 
and distributed booklets 
and other educational 
materials to schools, 
parents and personnel in 
charge of food preparation 
and sales; which are part 
of the commission 
designed to monitor and 
supervise food availability 
in their schools (SSA, 
2010).  
 
SEP was not involved in the soda 
tax debate.  However, when the 
water fountains were to be 
installed, SEP launched the 
program called ‘Escuela al Cien’ 
and appointed a subsidiary of 
SEP called National Institute for 
the Educational Physical 
Infrastructure  (Instituto 
Nacional de la Infrastuctura Fisca 
Educativa -INIFED) to install all 
water fountains in schools.  
Details are explained in Chapter 
8 (Inifed, 2015).   
 In 2014 under Pena 
Nieto’s obesity strategy 
the food and physical 
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activity guidelines were 
reviewed and re-
established, but to date no 
evaluation on the 
achievements has been 
reported. 
 
Ministry of 
Social 
Development  
(Secretaría de 
Desarrollo Social 
-SEDESOL) 
 
SEDESOL had specific 
responsibilities in the 
2010 strategy to fight 
obesity.  It was 
commissioned to restore 
public spaces, support 
infrastructure community 
projects and promote 
physical activity (SSA, 
2010).  In addition, 
SEDESOL was assigned to 
increase fruit and 
vegetables availability in 
the subsidiary 
government stores of 
Liconsa and Diconsa; 
whole milk was also 
replaced with skimmed 
milk.  However, two years 
after these actions were 
implemented , an 
independent civil society 
group monitoring results 
showed that the only 
activity that was being 
implemented was the 
promotion of physical 
activity in workplaces 
(EPC, 2012a).   
The SEDESOL 
secretary’sister had a 
high-level positon in 
PepsiCo and they were in 
charged on provide the 
subsidized foods 
(industrialized products 
high in sugar, salt and fat) 
to the ‘Cruzada contra el 
Hambre’ program (ref). 
 
During the presidency of Enrique 
Peña Nieto, SEDESOL changed 
the largest program to reduce 
poverty, from Oportunidades to 
Prospera.  This program 
provided fortified food to 
children and pregnant women, 
health and education.  In 
addition, in January 2013 a new 
program was established called 
‘Cruzada Contra el Hambre’ to 
follow the United Nations 
Programme ‘Hamrbe Cero’ (Zero 
Hunger).  Its aim was to alleviate 
the causes of extreme poverty 
and food insecurity with a 
comprehensive approach that 
addresses all dimensions of 
welfare actions (SEDESOL, 
2016).  When the program 
started several concerns were 
raised about a biased selection of 
target communities, as they were 
located in states with governors 
from the ruling party, and not 
the poorer communities and 
states (Villamil, 2013).  
 
Federal 
Commission to 
Protect Against 
Sanitary Risks 
COFEPRIS is a 
decentralized and 
autonomous 
governmental entity, with 
In 2012 when Peña Nieto won 
the elections, COFEPRIS was in 
charge of the MoH workshops 
organized as part of the 
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(Comisión 
Federal para la 
Protección 
contra Riesgos 
Sanitarios - 
COFEPRIS) 
 
a federal commissioner 
appointed by the 
President.  The institution 
is in charge of regulation, 
control and promotion of 
hygiene and health 
inspection.  During Felipe 
Calderon's government 
(2006-2012)  the Acuerdo 
Nacional por la Salud 
Alimentaria (ANSA – 
National Agreement for 
Healthy Eating) was 
agreed and COFEPRIS was 
responsible for certain 
activates (DOF, 2010).  
Frist COFEPRIS was 
appointed to perform the 
surveillance of each state’s 
progress on sanitizing 
water for human 
consumption.  Its actions 
also included informing 
local authorities about 
their surveillance and 
establishing campaigns to 
improve water usage 
inside homes.  The aim for 
2012 was to have 80% 
supervision of programs 
performed by each entity 
mainly in locations with 
low performance (SSA, 
2010).  There is no public 
document showing 
effectiveness of these 
activities. 
 
With respect to the 
decrease in the 
consumption of sugar and 
fat in beverages, 
consumption of fat, trans 
fats, and sodium, 
COFEPRIS committed to 
very specific actions (SSA, 
2010).  These included the 
establishment of new 
norms to include nutrient 
profiling for the new front 
of package labelling, 
consultation process.  Then in 
2013 it was in charged of the 
consultation meetings for the the 
regulatory sections of the 
obesity policy.   These included 
the front-of –package food 
labelling, and regulations on 
marketing foods to children. 
Since then, COFEPRIS has been 
in charge of developing, 
monitoring and establishing 
criteria for the regulatory 
measures taken in the ENPCSOD. 
 
It is not clear how much they 
comment on the soda tax 
regulatory measure, but they 
were a key actor for the whole 
process of the obesity strategy of 
Peña Nieto’s government.  
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including sodium, sugar 
and fat cut-off points. 
  
COFEPRIS was in charge 
of updating the regulation 
on food marketing to 
children.  But in 2010, the 
former director of 
COFEPRIS launched a self-
regulatory code agreed 
with the food industry 
called Código PABI instead 
of updating the regulation.  
One day after the code 
was launched it, he 
resigned (Theodore et al., 
2016).   
 
National Water 
Commission 
(Comisión 
Nacional del 
Agua - 
CONAGUA) 
 
CONAGUA is a 
decentralized and 
autonomous 
governmental entity, with 
a federal commissioner 
appointed by the 
President.  One of several 
activities of CONAGUA is 
to provide availability and 
access to potable water for 
human consumption and 
to provide water to 
vulnerable populations.  
Felipe Calderon’s 
presidency (2006-2012) 
aimed to increase the 
water supply to the 
population by 50%, as 
many communities were 
still lacking this service 
(CONAGUA., 2008).  
 
In addition, CONAGUA is 
concerned with improving 
water quality, draining 
services and plumbing 
including Programa Agua 
Limpia (PAL) a program 
aimed at providing clean 
water (CONAGUA, 2007).  
Up until 2011 there was 
no public information 
about this program.  
CONAGUA’s activates during the 
soda tax implementation were 
mainly related to water access.  
As one of the aims of the 
government was to use the 
revenues from the tax for water 
provision, CONAGUA was a key 
interpectoral partner to  work 
with.  Therefore, their activities 
are mapped in this research. 
 
Under Peña Nieto’s government 
the law on water was changed 
and the PAL program modified 
to PROAGUA (Programa de Agua 
Potable, Alcantarillado y 
Saneamiento - Potable Water, 
Sewer and Sanitation Program).  
The main goal of the program is 
to support the state and 
municipal governments in 
achieving  the needs of access to 
water for human consumption 
and hygiene in housing, in 
adequate quantity to the rural 
and urban population (Chávez-
Zárate, 2016).   
 
The only information publicly 
available until 2016 was an 
evaluation of its design, but no 
further information about its 
implementation.   
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However, according to 
CONEVAL, an agency 
dedicated to evaluate 
social programs, 
CONAGUA reported that 
the PAL program lacked 
an impact evaluation due 
to budget constraints. 
(CONEVAL, 2012).  
 
 
In addition to these program 
changes, several amendments 
were introduced in the Ley 
General del Agua (General Water 
Law).  Some of them are relevant 
to this project and are discussed 
in chapter 8.  
 
None of the actions reported on 
the documents referred to 
CONAGUA as a government 
organisation involved in 
installing or advocating for clean 
water at schools (with the 
revenues of the soda tax). 
 
Senate (Senado 
de la Republica) 
The upper house of the 
Congress, the legislative 
branch of the Mexican 
government. 
 
A group of senators were the 
‘policy entrepreneurs’ first 
proposing the soda tax in 2012.  
One senator was particularly 
involved in the policy process 
(described in chapter 7).  
 
Chamber of 
Deputies 
(Camara de 
Diputados) 
The lower house of the 
Congress, the legislative 
branch of the Mexican 
government. 
The Chamber of Deputies voted 
on the soda tax legislative 
initiative first proposed and also 
added the snack tax to the 
legislative proposal when voting 
on the Fiscal Reform. 
 
Instituto 
Nacional de la 
Infraestructura 
Física Educativa 
(National 
Institute of 
Education 
Physical Activity 
Infrastructure - 
INIFED) 
 
The institute is part of the 
Ministry of Education and 
is in charge of improving 
the buildings, gardens and 
installations of public 
schools in the country.  
They were commissioned to 
install water fountains in 
primary schools just after the 
soda tax was implemented.  
Some of the regional offices 
partnered with Coca-Cola 
Foundation to do so.  
Civil Society Organisations and Think Tanks 
Organisation Background Involvement in the soda tax 
or/and related polices 
Mexican 
Diabetes 
Association  
(Asociación 
Mexicana de 
Diabetes- AMD) 
The Mexican Diabetes 
Association engages in 
different activities 
supporting diabetics and 
their families, including 
education on healthy 
The Mexican Diabetes 
Association is one of the 
institutions which supported the 
soda tax when it was first 
presented in the Senate (AMD, 
2012).   
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eating, nutrition and tools 
to improve health literacy.   
 
In 2015, they partnered 
with the Coca Cola 
Company to host a 
symposium on physical 
activity, as described in 
Chapter 5. 
 
They supported the initiative 
with the argument that the 
strategy will support the 10 
million Mexicans with diabetes, 
the 10 million people who are 
pre-diabetic, and the children 
who already present risk factors 
for obesity, compromising their 
future (PRD, 2012).   
 
Mexican 
Diabetes 
Federation 
(Federación 
Mexicana de 
Diabetes - FMD) 
 
The Mexican Diabetes 
Federation aims to help 
and support people who 
are suffering from 
diabetes. It has 
associations in different 
locations around the 
country where assistance 
is offered to patients and 
their families.  They also 
help with training 
professionals, family 
members and improve 
public awareness on the 
subject.  The aim is to 
reduce the early signs and 
symptoms of diabetes and 
improve lifestyle changes.  
They also endorse 
products to guide 
consumers in eating non-
caloric sugary processed 
foods (FMD, 2016).  
 
In 2014 links between 
CONACYT, the FMD and 
Coca-Cola became evident 
by supporting the 
Instituto de Bebidas para 
la Salud y el Bienestar 
(IBSB) an organisation 
sponsored by The Coca-
Cola company as a means 
to achieve social 
responsibility actions.  In 
2015, a book called 
‘Hidratación. 
Fundamentos en las 
diferentes etapas de la 
vida’ published by the 
The Mexican Diabetes 
Federation remained silent 
during the soda tax debate.   
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IBSB was endorsed by the 
FMD and by other civil 
society groups, such as  
the Asociación Mexicana 
de Nutriología (AMENAC); 
and by four international 
ogranizations: Federación 
Iberoamericana de 
Nutrición (FINUT), 
Federación para la 
Investigación Nutricional 
(FIN), Grupo 
Latinoamericano de 
Nutrición Comunitaria, 
Fundación Española de la 
Nutrición (FEN).  The 
book targets professionals 
and provides information 
on how to improve 
hydration and the 
relevance of choosing 
better our sources and 
that ‘better adapt to our 
lifestyle and needs’ (Coca-
Cola Mexico, 2015a). 
 
Mexican 
Foundation for 
Health 
(Fundación 
Mexicana para la 
Salud - 
FUNSALUD) 
 
FUNSALUD is a private 
institution and a civil 
society organisation 
whose aim is to contribute 
to science, technological, 
and health policy 
knowledge.   
 
Since 1992, FUNSALUD 
has received funds from 
Nestle (Fondo Nestlé 
Nutrición) for different 
activities.   
 
In 2012 the conducted 
research on obesity, 
mainly focused on 
promoting physical 
activity in schools, 
nutrigenomics and 
variations in genes 
associated with obesity.  
In addition, they 
conducted research on the 
impact of the 
Dr. Mercedes Juan, was the 
Executive President of 
FUNSALUD until December 
2012, and she was appointed as 
Secretary of Health in 2013.  It 
was under her leadership that 
the strategy against obesity, the 
ENPCSOD, became effective.  She 
didn’t have a strong position on 
the soda tax when first proposed 
by the Senate, and later by the 
MoF, as discussed in detail in 
chapter 7.  However, she 
maintained it was being effective 
in reducing soda consumption in 
2014.  After the first discussions 
of the impact of the soda tax 
became public in 2015, and 
concerns about conflict of 
interests in the MoH were raised 
by civil society, she was replaced 
by Dr. José Narro, former head of 
the UNAM (Universidad 
Autónoma de México – Mexican 
Autonomy University). 
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implementation of the 
2010’s School Food 
Guidelines on the 
nutritional status of 
children (Zárate, 2016).  
According to their results, 
prepared food was the 
most consumed and it 
contained a significant 
amount of energy and fat.  
Their conclusion states 
that although the 
regulations inside schools 
are being implemented, 
the recommendations 
have not yet reached the 
food children bring from 
home, with only 1 of 4 are 
compliant with the energy 
recommendations.  Almost 
half of all schools had no 
potable water available 
(Funsalud, 2012). 
 
In their report of activities 
and plans for 2013, 
FUNSALUD planned to 
create a group to follow 
up the actions and policies 
to tackle the childhood 
obesity problem.  In 
November 2012, they 
called for a meeting to 
coordinate three different 
work teams, each assigned 
to develop proposals to 
increase physical activity 
and create healthier diets 
among the population, 
although no further 
information could be 
found on the progress of 
such project. 
 
 
Midete 
Foundation  
(Fundación 
Mídete – FM) 
 
Fundación Mídete is a civil 
society organisation 
promoting the creation of 
strategies for the 
prevention and treatment 
of obesity and 
overweightness.   It also 
On the 5th of December  2012h, 
Fundación Mídete,  with support 
of the 31 members of  the 
Alianza por la Salud Alimentaria, 
and with the support of eight 
Senators and 37 Deputies, 
presented to the Congress  the 
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promotes civil initiatives 
with legislators and 
different actors of the 
government, as well as 
programs and campaigns 
to promote healthy 
lifestyles.  The foundation 
develops proposals, 
information, surveys and 
statistical data for 
legislative changes to 
control and address the 
obesity problem in Mexico 
(Mídete, 2012).  
 
This organisation is part 
of the Alianza por la salud 
Alimentaria (Alianza por 
la Salud Alimentaria, 
2012c; Contrapeso, 
2012c). 
 
soda tax legislative initiative 
(Mídete, 2012).  Thereafter, the 
foundation has been actively 
involved in the public debate on 
the initiative and by making  
public declarations about the 
need for novel integrated and 
multi-sectorial policies (Diaz, 
2013). 
 
Strategic 
Platform against 
Overweight and 
Obesity 
(Plataforma 
Estratégica 
contra el 
Sobrepeso y la 
Obesidad - 
ContraPESO) 
 
 
ContraPESO is the 
strategic platform of a 
consortium of civil society 
organisations, created to 
influence public policies 
that will provide a 
solution to the obesity 
epidemic in Mexico 
(Contrapeso, 2012b).  The 
organisations 
participating in this 
platform are: Alimento 
para todos, Amistad, 
desarrollo y cooperación 
(ADECO), Anima Naturalis, 
Asociación Mexicana de la 
Cruz Blanca Neutral, 
Asociación Mexicana de 
Diabetes, Asociación 
Mexicana de familiares y 
pacientes con artritis 
reumautodie A.C., 
Asociación Mexicana de 
fibrosis quística A.C., 
Asociación Mexicana de 
Leucemia y Gist, 
Asociación Mexicana de 
Lucha, Contra el Cáncer 
 
On the 28th of  September 2012 , 
the first meeting to define the 
ContraPESO’s guidelines against 
obesity was held in the presence 
of Dr. Enrique Gil Bellorin, 
Advisor of Chronic Diseases at 
the Pan American Health 
Organization (PAHO).  The main 
strategies presented in this 
meeting included: to reduce soda 
and sweetened beverage 
consumption, to modify the GDA 
(guidelines daily amounts) 
currently used by the industry, 
to include nutrition education in 
both private and public school 
curricula, to improve marketing 
bans for  junk food, to guarantee 
access to healthy and nutritional 
foods to all consumers; and to 
increase time assigned inside 
schools for physical activity, and 
improving non-motorized 
transport (Contrapeso, 2012c).  
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A.C. Asociación Nacional 
de Síndrome de Williams 
A.C., Fundación 
InterAmericana del 
Corazón México, 
Fundación Mexicana del 
Riñón A.C., Asociación 
Renal Venados, Asociación 
de Salud y Bienestar 
Social, Colegio Mexicano 
de Bariatría, Comité de 
Derecho Humanos Ajusco, 
Fundación Cimab, 
Fundación Mídete, Huellas 
de Futuro, The Hunger 
Project México, Instituto 
de Políticas para el 
Transporte y el Desarrollo, 
Organismo de Nutrición 
Infantil, Organización 
Smiles, Pida, Pueblo 
Bicicletero.org, Red por la 
Salud, Red Mundial 
Suicidiólgos, Respirando 
con valor, Reto, Sociedad 
Mexicana de la Salud 
Pública, Unidos, World 
Diabetes Foundation 
(Contrapeso, 2012a). 
 
 
Aliance for 
Healthy Eating 
(Alianza por la 
Salud 
Alimentaria – 
APSA) 
 
 
APSA is a network of civil 
society organisations, 
social organisations, 
professionals and 
researchers from different 
academic institutions 
concerned with the 
epidemic of 
overweightness and 
obesity, as well as the 
prevailing problem of 
under-nutrition in the 
poorest communities, and 
the risk factors associated 
with these problems. The 
group’s main demands to 
the executive and 
legislative powers are to 
develop and implement 
integral public policies 
 
The main strategies proposed by 
APSA to achieve its aims are: to 
provide healthy foods in schools, 
to forbid marketing to children 
of high energy, salt, fat and 
sweetened foods, to implement a 
food labeling system in food and 
beverages, to provide access to 
potable water, to attend to the 
food security problem, to tax 
sodas and sweetened beverages; 
and to promote breastfeeding 
and traditional diets (Alianza por 
la Salud Alimentaria, 2012b, 
2012c). 
 
On 5 December 2012, APSA as 
well as other organisations such 
as El Poder del Consumidor, La 
Red por los Derechos de la 
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aimed at tackling obesity 
and diminishing the 
under-nutrition in rural 
and indigenous 
populations.  
 
This network includes 
participation of some 
members of the academia 
from different institutions 
such as: Universidad 
Autónoma Metropolitana, 
Universidad Autónoma de 
Ciudad Juárez, 
Universidad Autónoma de 
México, and Universidad 
Mexicana del Norte.    
 
The organisations 
involved in the alliance 
are: Al consumidor, 
Asociación Nacional de 
Empresas 
Comercializadoras de 
Productores del Campo 
(ANEC), CCESC_DDS, 
Centro de Orientación 
Alimentaria, coalición de 
Organizaciones Mexicanas 
por el Derecho al Agua 
(COMDA), Consejo 
Nacional de 
Organizaciones 
Campesinas (CONOC), 
ContraPESO, El Barzón, El 
Poder del Consumidor, 
Foodfirst Information and 
Action Network (FIAN 
MEXICO), Food and Water 
Watch, Fundación Mídete, 
Greenpeace, Grupo de 
estudios Ambientales, 
International Baby Food 
Action Network (IBFAN 
México), Oxfam México, 
Proyecto Planeta Azul, 
Redim, and Semillas de 
Vida, Sin Maíz no Hay País 
(Alianza por la Salud 
Alimentaria, 2012a). 
  
Infancia and la Asociación 
Nacional de Empresas 
Comercializadoras de Productos 
del Campo, endorsed the 20% 
soda tax submitted to the 
congress by senator Mario 
Delgado and Senator Marcela 
Torres.  As per the proposal, the 
purpose of this tax was to fund a 
national program to introduce 
potable water to schools and 
public spaces in the poorest 
communities of the country 
(Rivera, 2013). 
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The Consumer’s 
Power (El Poder 
del Consumidor- 
EPC) 
 
EPC is a civil society 
organisation whose 
mission is to promote and 
defend the rights of 
consumers, to recognise 
new rights that are not 
necessarily the law and to 
support the right of 
consumers to have access 
to public goods.  It was 
established in 2006 with 
the aim of influencing 
public polices and 
corporative practices in 
favour of consumers.  
 
They supported the School 
Food Guidelines in 2010, 
and as part of the Alianza 
por la Salud Alimentaria 
network have influenced 
the implementation of the 
soda tax. 
 
They played a key role in the 
soda tax debate, which is 
described in detail in chapters 7 
and 8 (EPC, 2016). 
Aspen Institute   
 
The Aspen Institute was 
founded in the USA in 
1950 by Chicago 
businessman Walter 
Paepcke.  It is an 
educational and policy 
studies organisation based 
in Washington, DC.  Its 
mission is to foster 
leadership based on 
enduring values and to 
provide a nonpartisan 
venue for dealing with 
critical issues.  The 
Institute has campuses in 
Aspen, Colorado, and on 
the Wye River on 
Maryland’s Eastern Shore.  
It also maintains offices in 
New York City and has an 
international network of 
partners (The Aspen 
Institute).   
 
The institute provides 
regular seminars, policy 
programs, conferences, 
The Aspen Institute was 
appointed by the Ministry of 
Health as a partner on the multi-
stakeholder platform to evaluate 
and to design the indicators of 
the national obesity strategy 
(OMENT, 2014).  It also 
partnered with the think tank 
IMCO, to develop the soda tax 
indicators.  These were not 
published by mid-2016 which 
was confirmed by personal 
communication (Personal 
Communication, IMCO member, 
May 2016). 
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and leadership 
development initiatives.  
The Aspen Institute is 
largely funded by 
foundations such as the 
Carnegie Corporation, the 
Rockefeller Brothers 
Fund, the Gates 
Foundation, the Lumina 
Foundation, and the Ford 
Foundation, by seminar 
fees, and by individual 
donations. Its board of 
trustees includes leaders 
from politics, government, 
business and academia 
who also contribute to its 
support. 
 
In Mach 2014 the Aspen 
Institute Mexico was 
launched.  The director 
appointed was Juan 
Ramon de La Fuente, the 
previous dean of the most 
important public 
university in Mexico 
UNAM (Universidad 
Autónoma de México) 
(The Aspen Institute, 
2014).   
 
Several members of the 
executive board might 
have a conflict of interests 
when it comes to the 
Aspen Institute’s 
resolutions on obesity 
policy.  Some of the 
members include the chief 
of Coca-Cola Mexico, the 
dean of ITAM a well-
known private university, 
and the vice-president of 
Walmart.  Also one of the 
consultants is Jaime 
Zabludovsky, former head 
of ConMexcio (The Aspen 
Institute). 
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In 2013 the Aspen 
Institute launched a 
program called ‘Project 
Play’ to promote physical 
activity with a multi-
stakeholder approach 
including industry, 
government and 
philanthropic 
organisations.  The 
program was expanded to 
other countries such as 
Mexico (The Aspen 
Institute, 2014). 
   
Mexican 
Institute for 
Competitiveness 
(Instituto 
Mexicano para la 
Competitividad - 
IMCO) 
 
IMCO is a non-profit, 
research centre, and a 
think tank.  Its mission is 
to influence public policies 
and design actions to 
influence their execution, 
‘to improve the challenges 
that Mexico is going 
through’ (IMCO, 2016). 
   
The group has a member 
of CIDE (Centro de 
Investigación y Docencia 
Económicas) on its 
executive board.  Also on 
the board are president 
and director of Grupo 
Bimbo, the largest 
packaged food producer in 
Mexico with 11.4% of the 
market share 
(Euromonitor, 2016),  
Jaime Zabludovsky head of 
CONMEXICO a, the 
director of  CONACYT 
(Consejo Nacional de 
Ciencia y Tecnología - 
National Council of 
Science and Technology), 
and the Head of the CEE 
(Consejo Coordinador 
Empresarial - Business 
Coordinating 
Council)(IMCO, 2016). 
 
 
IMCO first started to be involved 
in the Strategy for obesity in 
2014, when they were 
contracted both by the Ministry 
of Health and by the National 
Institute of Public Health (INSP).  
The MoH retained them as 
consultants to design the 
indicators and strategies to be 
presented in detail in the 
National Strategy and for the 
OMENT, in partnership with the 
Aspen Institute and the 
Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo 
León.  In parallel, they 
contracted with the INSP to map 
the policies selected in the 
Strategy and compare them to 
the benchmark indicators 
produced by the Cancer 
Research Institute.  The latter 
resulted in the publication ‘Kilos 
de mas, pesos de menos: los 
costos de la obesidad’ (More 
kilos, less pesos: the costs of 
obesity) published in 2015 
(IMCO, 2015a).  This study 
estimates the social costs of 
obesity, includes expenditure on 
medical treatment and 
productivity losses due to 
premature mortality and work 
absenteeism.  It also reviews the 
public policies that have been 
adopted in the face of this 
problem and compares its design 
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 with international benchmarks, 
providing a number of 
recommendations (IMCO, 
2015a) 
 
Polithink Polithink is an 
organisation specialized in 
advocacy. They use 
lobbying strategies, with 
strategic communication, 
information management 
and political networking. 
 
It is integrated of a 
multidisciplinary team 
with academic, political 
knowledge.  
 
They work with civil 
society organisations, 
mainly in public health. 
They have participated in 
advocacy for the 
prevention of obesity and 
smoking.   
During the soda tax debate 
they were highly involved.  
They supported the first 
legislative initiative with the 
Senator proposing the tax.  
Their participation is 
described in Chapter 6, 7, 8. 
Private Sector 
Organisation Background Involvement in the soda tax 
or/and related polices 
 
National 
Association of 
Producers of 
Soft Drinks and 
Carbonated 
Water 
(Asociación 
Nacional de 
Productores de 
Refrescos y 
Aguas 
Carbonatadas -
ANPRAC) 
 
 
ANPRAC was founded in 
1945 and represents the 
Mexican soft drink 
industry, with 99 
associates.  Their goal is to 
‘represent the Mexican 
soft drink industry in 
defending the common 
interests of its members, 
safeguarding their 
reputation and their 
products in order to boost 
their development and 
growth’ (ANPRAC, 2016a).   
 
The association became 
very active when a soda 
tax was included in the 
plans of the new 
administration.  When the 
soda tax initiative was 
presented to the Senate, 
 
ANPRAC constantly modified 
their website during the time of 
this research, and several 
publicly available reports on 
soda consumption in Mexico, 
which were available to the 
public in the past, have been 
removed.   
 
In 2015, a year after 
implementation of the soda tax, 
they funded a report on the 
consequences and impact of the 
tax, which criticized the strategy.  
The sources of funding were 
published in the press, resulting 
in suspicions of bias in the report 
(Cherukupalli, 2016). 
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ANPRAC released public 
communications opposing 
the soda tax initiative.   
Mexican Council 
of the Consumer 
Products 
Industry  
(Consejo 
Mexicano de la 
Industria del 
Consumo- 
CONMEXICO) 
 
CONMEXICO is a g 
roup that brings together 
43 leading companies in 
the markets of food and 
beverages, alcoholic 
beverages and personal 
care products in Mexico.  
Their mission is to 
‘increase efficiency and 
competitiveness of all 
links in the business chain, 
from the production line 
to the point of sale, to put 
on the market in a timely 
manner, a wide range of 
products that meet the 
needs and lifestyles of 
Mexican consumers’ 
(CONMEXICO, 2013).  
Their activities include 
‘influencing the design 
and execution of public 
and private policies’ and 
‘providing technical 
and/or scientific support, 
to promote a sound 
institutional environment’. 
As per its website 
CONMEXICO also 
‘promote a certain 
regulatory framework’ in 
order to promote 
investment and ‘allow the 
healthy development of 
the industry of consumer 
goods’ (CONMEXICO, 
2013). 
 
CONMEXICO has been active 
before, during and after the soda 
tax was approved.  The group 
published several press releases 
and declarations surrounding 
the fiscal changes to high-calorie 
and soda taxes in Mexico.  It 
played an active role in the 
consultation process of the 
MoH´s policies and as consultant 
for the OMENT.  These activities 
are described in detail in chapter 
7 and 8. 
 
Confederation of 
Industry 
Chambers 
(Confederación 
de la Cámara de 
Industriales  -  
CONCAMIN) 
 
CONCAMIN is a group 
representing all of the 
Mexican industry of goods 
and services.  It is a 
collection of 46 national 
chambers, 14 regional 
chambers, 3 generic 
chambers and 44 
associations of different 
producers in Mexico.  Its 
During the soda tax discussion 
CONCAMIN made several 
publications rejecting such a tax, 
and supported CONMEXICO’s 
and ANPRAC’s position. 
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objective is to promote 
and defend the industry's 
interests.  Its mission, as 
stated on their website, is 
to represent the interests 
of the industrial sector in 
Mexico and give guidance 
on efficiency, 
competitiveness and 
economic interest in 
productive chains.  In the 
opinion of Francisco 
Funtanet Manget, 
president of Concamin, 
sodas and industrialized 
food are being stigmatized 
giving them ‘attributes 
that they don’t have’ in 
relation to the obesity 
epidemic (CONCAMIN, 
2016; Reforma, 2013). 
 
Sugar Cane 
Producers' 
Union (Unión 
Nacional de 
Cañeros- UNC) 
 
In the second half of 2012, 
the price of sugar cane 
produced in Mexico 
decreased sharply, 
although the prices of 
foods using sugar such as 
sweetened bread, cookies 
and soda increased by 
11.6%, 4.2% and 3.4% 
respectively.  The main 
reason for this price fall 
was an increase of 
international imports due 
the policies approved by 
the Ministry of Economy 
in 2012.  This situation 
had implications in 2013, 
as national producers 
protested by closing 54 
centers of sugar 
production.  During the 
second half of that same 
year, the Ministry of 
Agriculture in 
coordination with the 
Ministry of the Economy, 
development banks and 
the sugar cane industry 
agreed certain actions to 
Mexican sugar producers 
disapproved of the soda tax and 
campaigned against it.  When the 
soda tax discussion started, the 
sugar cane producers were 
seeking allies to promote an 
economic policy to control the 
increase of foreign sugar in 
Mexican products (Personal 
Communication, (ITAM, 2012). 
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improve the productive 
chain of sugar cane and to 
end public 
demonstrations and 
closure of factories.  Banks 
were encouraged to fund 
the industry to cover their 
needs in terms of the work 
force and pay them on 
time (Reforma, 2013).   
However, the national 
usage of sugar has 
remained stable, and in 
the past few years there 
has been an important 
increase of imported corn 
syrup.    
 
Coca-Cola 
FEMSA 
 
Coca-Cola FEMSA is the 
largest soda producer in 
Mexico and Latin America.   
It joined the Coca Cola 
Company in 1991.  Coca 
Cola FEMSA started by 
owing 51% of the stock of 
soda in Mexico, though to 
date it only owns 27.4% 
and Coca Cola Company 
the rest.   It is the main 
producer of the Coca-Cola 
in the region along with 
Arca Continental.  It 
started to grow acquiring 
bottlers in Central 
America, Colombia, 
Venezuela and Brazil 
(Coca-Cola FEMSA, 
2015a).  The former 
president Vicente Fox 
(2002-2006) was a former 
CEO of the company, and 
he worked there since 
1964.  During his 
presidency the company 
expanded in the country, 
and was granted water 
wells in the area of 
Chiapas (Nash, 2007). 
 
Coca-Cola FEMSA has been a 
major player in the soda tax 
debate.  It made a number of 
arguments, executed multiple 
actions, and engaged in 
sponsorships and partnerships.  
The actions and their influence 
on the national context are 
described in Chapters 6,7 8.. 
 
Coca-Cola 
Foundation 
The foundation was 
established in 1997, with 
Together with the MoH and the 
Foudntation Movmenet is Health 
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the mission of ´contribute 
with healthy and 
sustainable development 
of communities.  Their aim 
is to join efforts with civil 
society, academics and 
government (what they 
call the ¨gold Triangle¨) to 
improve the leaving of the 
Mexican communities.  
According to their 
webpage they are 
recognized by the 
government as an 
important actor´ to work 
together for the 
community (Fundación 
Coca-Cola). 
(Fundación Movimiento es Salud) 
they have a program called ‘get to 
100’ (Ponte al 100) to provide 
people with healthy eating and 
physical activity. This program 
started simultaneously with the 
new government.  The main aim 
of the program to promote 
health, its conflicting with the 
main aim of the commercial 
interests of the company. 
 
The same year the Coca Cola 
Foundation in collaboration with 
another civil society called 
Healthy Schools (Escuelas 
Saludables) provides 
maintenance and access to 
drinking water to schools.  IN 
2014 they installed 1, 447 water 
fountains in public primary 
schools mainly in rural areas, and 
in low income communities.  
 
ARCA 
Continental 
Arca Continental is a 
Mexican beverage 
manufacturer and 
distributer.  It 
manufactures soft drinks 
of brands owned or 
licensed by the Coca-Cola 
Company in Northern and 
Western Mexico, Ecuador, 
Peru and Argentina.   It is 
the second-largest Coca-
Cola bottler in Latin 
America and the third 
largest in the worlds 
(Arca, 2016).  
 
As a major producer of sodas 
and sugary drinks in general, 
PepsiCo are part of ANPRAC and 
CONMEXICO, and who were 
involved in the debate on the 
soda tax, as explained in chapter. 
 
PepsiCo 
 
PepsiCo is a global leader 
in foods and beverages 
who is increasingly 
producing ultra-processed 
products including Frito-
Lay, Gatorade, Pepsi-Cola, 
Quaker and Tropicana 
with revenues of more 
than $63 billion in 2015.  
In Mexico, they have been 
on the processed food 
Also, as a major producer of 
sodas and sugary drinks in 
general, PepsiCo are part of 
ANPRAC and CONMEXICO, and 
who were involved in the debate 
on the soda tax, as explained in 
chapter 7.  
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market for more than 100 
years, with brands like 
Quaker, Gamesa, Sabritas, 
Gatorade and Sonric's.  
The market share of 
sweetened beverages in 
Mexico for PepisCo is 
6.5%. Coca-Cola leads the 
Mexican soft drinks 
market with 27.4 % in 
2015, followed some way 
behind by Pepsi-Cola 
Mexicana with 6.5% in 
second place and Danone 
de México with 6.5% in 
third. 
For packaged food 
PepsiCo held the second 
largest market share with 
6.4% in 2015 just after 
Bimbo S.A. de C.V. 
(Euromonitor, 2016).   
 
PepsiCo’s corporate vision 
is ‘Performance with 
sense’.  This refers to 
achieving long-term 
financial performance by 
integrating sustainability 
in their production.  The 
company engage in three 
main activities to achieve 
this target: ‘to focus on 
reformulation products, 
on the planet and on the 
people’ (PepsiCo, 2016).   
 
PepsiCo 
Foundation 
The PepsiCo Foundation is 
the philanthropic arm of 
PepsiCo, responsible for 
providing charitable 
contributions to non-
profit organisations. The 
Foundation is in charged 
to development 
partnerships to 
implement sustainable 
programs in marginalized 
regions to improve health, 
the environment and 
education. The foundation 
 
In 2011 the he Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), 
PepsiCo, and the PepsiCo 
Foundation stated a five-year 
public-private partnership (PPP) 
to achieve universal and 
equitable access to safe water for 
people living in rural 
communities, focusing on 
benefiting women and girls in all 
Latinamerican region.   
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aim is to improve 
development in all 
communities and improve 
sustainability. 
 
They are partners of the 
National Commission for 
the Development of 
Indigenous Peoples (CDI), 
the Union of 
Entrepreneurs for 
Technology in Education 
(UNETE), the Mexican 
Foundation for Rural 
Development AC the 
Mexican Association of 
Food Banks (AMBA), Un 
Kilo de Ayuda (UKA), the 
Community Foundation of 
the Northern Border, the 
United Nations Children's 
Fund (UNICEF) and Save 
the Children (PepsiCo, 
2016).  
 
In 2016 they renewed this PPP 
to continue to work in providing 
access to drinking water to 
communities(PepsiCo 
Foundation, 2016) . 
 
National 
Chamber of the 
Sugar and 
Alcohol Industry  
(Cámara 
Nacional de la 
Industria 
Azucarera y 
Alcoholera - 
CNIAA) 
 
CNIAA was established in 
1942 and originally 
represented 51 sugar 
mills located in 9 Mexican 
states.  In 2015 it 
represented 36 of the 54 
national mills, located in 
15 states.  Its aim is to 
represent the interests of 
the sugar and alcohol 
industries to the 
authorities, both in Mexico 
and abroad.  According to 
the Sugar Cane 
Sustainable Development 
Act, it represents the 
interests of all the mills in 
the country.  This group is 
a member of the Board of 
Directors of the National 
Committee for the 
Sustainable Development 
of Sugar Cane, working 
with the congress, the 
federal government and 
CNIAA participated in the sugar 
tax discussion from the 
beginning.  The head of the 
group talked in several academic 
discussions, and in the media.  
CNIAA sponsored a marketing 
campaign to promote sugar 
consumption during the public 
debate and engaged in other 
activities as described in 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
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with the states’ authorities 
(CNIAA, 2016). 
 
Academia 
Organisation Background Involvement in the soda tax 
or/and related polices 
Mexican 
National 
Academy of 
Medicine 
(Academia 
Nacional de 
Medicina de 
México - ANMM) 
 
ANMM was established 
150 years ago, and it is the 
most recognized group of 
medicine in Mexico.  It 
was one of the institutions 
that supported the Food 
Guidelines on Schools 
when they were submitted 
to COFEMER.   
 
Presentation and edition of the 
book on obesity with 
recommendations for a policy 
actions to tackle this epidemic, 
presenting he aetiology of 
obesity, and the main direct, 
underlying and basic causes of 
this problem.  The content and 
suggestions of the ANMM were 
presented in this book and were 
used repeatedly in forums and 
discussions for the soda tax and 
other polices.  It presented 
Mexico’s situation in relation to 
obesity, and made a number of 
suggestions to improve public 
polices tackling obesity and 
diabetes. This book was 
addressed as the white paper for 
the soda tax policy.(Rivera-
Dommarco et al., 2013; Rivera, 
2013).  
 
National 
Institute of 
Public Health 
(Instituto 
Nacional de 
Salud Pública-
INSP) 
 
The National Institute of 
Public Health was founded 
30 years ago, and has 
contributed greatly to 
public health and health 
policy in Mexico.  It is the 
institute in charge of 
conducting the National 
Nutrition and Health 
surveys every 4 years.  It 
also conducts research in 
epidemiology of cancer 
and tobacco use, 
reproductive and 
environmental health, 
vector control and 
infectious diseases, 
nutrition, program 
evaluation and 
development, among 
other areas.  It is a 
decentralized institution 
The institute has been very 
active in providing information 
and research on the soda tax in 
the past few years.  Its members 
have stressed the benefits of 
taxing soda and foods.  Details of 
the role of the INSP are 
discussed in Chapters 5, 6, 7.   
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of the federal government.  
Its mission is ‘to 
contribute to social 
equality and the full 
realization of the right to 
health through the 
generation and 
dissemination of 
knowledge, training of 
human resources and 
innovation in 
multidisciplinary research 
for the development of 
public policies based on 
evidence’ (INSP, 2016b).   
 
National 
Institute of 
Nutrition and 
Medical Science 
Salvador 
Zuviran   
(Instituto 
Nacional de 
Nutrición y 
Ciencias Médicas 
Salvador 
Subirán -
INNCMSZ) 
 
In 1944, the Mexican 
government established 
the INNCMSZ.  This 
institute became 
responsible for working 
on the problem of 
nutrition and of diseases 
resulting from inadequate 
and insufficient food.  It is 
an institution with highly 
specialized knowledge 
developed through 
research.  It performs 
research, teaching and 
high quality care.  The 
institute has been 
involved in the ENPCSOD 
as a partner in the 
monitoring strategy and is 
also involved in treating 
people with diabetes 
(INNCMSZ).   
 
The institute was not directly 
involved in the soda tax design 
or discussion.  However, it was 
appointed by the MoH to 
contribute to developing the part 
of the ENPCSOD related to 
patient awareness and health 
promotion strategies among the 
diabetic population and within 
other health institutions and 
hospitals.    
 
Despite being a public 
institution, several of the 
academics and health providers 
who are leading figures in public 
nutrition receive grants from the 
food and beverage industry 
(INNCMSZ). 
 
Center for 
Economic 
Research and 
Teaching 
(Centro de 
Investigación y 
Docencia 
Económicas-  
CIDE) 
 
The CIDE is a public 
research centre and 
higher education centre 
specializing in social 
sciences, guided by 
international standards of 
quality (CIDE, 2016).  
CIDE publishes scientific 
works in different 
disciplines of science, and 
applied research to policy 
(CIDE).  
During the soda tax debate 
several scholars of CIDE 
published opinions and views on 
the policy, which in general were 
not positive although not as 
strong in tone as other opinions 
published in national journals 
(Ramirez, 2016; Zaid, 2013).  
Some scholars of this institution 
were also invited to comment on 
the first soda tax proposal 
submitted to Congress in 2012.  
 277 
  
National 
Autonomous 
University of 
Nuevo León 
(Universidad 
Nacional 
Autónoma de 
Nuevo León- 
UNAL) 
 
UNAL is the third largest 
university in Mexico and 
the most important public 
institution in higher 
education in the North-
East of Mexico.  It offers 
the largest number of 
academic programs in the 
area.  Its mission is ‘to 
educate high school 
students, technicians, 
professionals, university 
professors and 
researchers to perform 
efficiently in a knowledge 
based society with a broad 
sense of the meaning of 
life and with awareness of 
regional, national and 
global issues’ (UNAL, 
2016).   
 
 
UNAL was appointed by the 
Ministry of Health to develop 
with IMCO and Aspen Institute 
the OMENT strategy to monitor 
the impact and progress of the 
policy actions to reduce obesity 
(SSA, 2016). 
 
UNAL was appointed in 2013 by 
the Ministry of Health to partner 
with Aspen Institute and IMCO to 
develop the indicators for the 
National Obesity Strategy and to 
monitor the milestones reached 
over time.   Until the date of this 
research, no public information 
on their role was available on the 
University’s website.  However, 
in 2015 a report authored by 
members of the UNAL was 
released about the role of the 
soda industry in the country, 
which stated a strong opposition 
on the soda tax. 
 
Autonomous 
Institute of 
Technology 
(Instituto 
Tecnológico 
Autónomo de 
México - ITAM) 
 
ITAM is a private 
university located in 
Mexico City.  It has 
undergraduate programs 
in Accounting, Business, 
Political Science, 
International Relations 
and Economics; and it has 
been denoted as one of the 
best universities of the 
country in economics, and 
business schools in Latin 
America (America 
Economia).  ITAM is also 
considered a think tank as 
several opinion leaders 
teach there.  It has 
produced several 
academics and alumni 
occupying government 
positions.   
 
ITAM's mission is to 
contribute to the integral 
Several academic meetings were 
held in ITAM during the soda tax 
debate in 2012 and 2013.  Some 
academics in this institution 
were also commissioned to write 
reports about the soda tax 
(ITAM, 2012). 
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formation of the person 
and to the development of 
a ‘free and prosperous 
society’ (ITAM, 2016).  It 
aspires to be an excellent 
house of studies and an 
autonomous research 
centre of high quality. 
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Annex 5: Networks and relationships identified during the policy process 
 
 Organizations Mechanism 
Type of network a / 
resources exchange b 
Elements of 
governance c 
Example 
Reference 
to further 
analysis 
Food and beverage constituency building with academics CSO, government and media 
a. Personal double roles  and members of advisory committees between CSO, government and industry partners 
 AI + COCA-
COLA + 
ITAM 
Establishing 
relationships with 
academics, think 
tanks. 
Issue network/ network Accountability 
Participation 
The chief of Coca-Cola Mexico, the 
dean of ITAM a well-known private 
university, and the Vice-President of 
Wal-Mart were part of the  AI.  Also 
one of the consultants is Jaime 
Zabludovsky, former head of 
CONMEXICO (The Aspen Institute) 
 
Annex 4 
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 IMCO + 
CONMEXICO + 
CONACYT 
Establishing 
relationships with 
academics, think 
tanks and the 
government 
Issue network/ cooperation Accountability 
Participation 
The board are President and Director 
of Grupo Bimbo, the largest packaged 
food producer in Mexico with 11.4% 
of the market share (Euromonitor, 
2016), Jaime Zabludovsky head of 
CONMEXICO,  the director of  National 
Council of Science and Technology 
(Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y 
Tecnología - CONACYT), and the Head 
of the Business Coordinating Council 
(Consejo Coordinador Empresarial - 
CEE) (IMCO, 2016) 
Annex 4 
 UNAL + IMCO UNAL soda tax 
impact research was 
sponsored by the 
F&BI. 
IMCO has in its board 
members of the F&BI. 
 
Issue network/ 
collaboration 
Accountability 
Participation 
Responsiveness 
UNAL and IMCO were both appointed 
by the Ministry of Health to develop in 
coordination with Aspen Institute the 
OMENT strategy to monitor the 
impact and progress of the policy 
actions to reduce obesity (SSA, 2016). 
 
 
 FUNSALUD + 
MOH 
Use of the ‘revolving 
door’.  Mercedes Juan 
had various positons 
in the PRI 
administration 
(1988-94) then part 
of the legislative 
commission of health 
(1997-2000) and also 
head of FUNSALUD 
and industry-funded 
research institution. 
Community network/ 
cooperation 
Accountability 
Responsiveness 
 
The head of the MoH (2013-2015) 
was the former head of FUNSALUD 
(Fundación Mexicana para la Salud-
Mexican Foundation for Health) a 
civil society heavily funded by Nestlé 
(Fundación Mexicana para la Salud).  
(ANNEX 4 P. 6) 
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 AI + MOH Establishing 
relationships with 
policy makers 
providing technical 
support. 
 
 
 
 
 
Issue network/ 
collaboration 
Accountability 
Responsiveness 
Participation 
AI was appointed by the Ministry of 
Health as a partner on the multi-
stakeholder platform to evaluate and 
to design the indicators of the 
national obesity strategy. 
Chapter 5  
b. Funding research in academic and governmental settings 
 
 
 CONMEXICO + 
ITAM 
 
 
Financial 
relationships 
compromising the 
shape evidence takes 
on the soda tax 
impact. 
Issue 
network/collaboration 
Accountability  In 2015, a year  after implementation 
of the soda tax, they funded a report 
on the consequences and impact of 
the tax, which criticized the 
strategy(Aguilar et al., 2015). 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 ANPRAC + 
UNAL 
Issue 
network/collaboration 
Accountability  
 
In 2015, a year  after implementation 
of the soda tax, they funded a report 
on the consequences and impact of 
the tax, which criticized the strategy 
(Chapa-Cantú et al., 2015). 
 
Chapter 6 
 COCA COLA  + 
CONACYT 
+FMD 
Relationships 
through a public-
private partnership 
collaborations aimed 
to shape evidence 
Policy 
community/collaboration 
Accountability  
Responsiveness 
 
In 2014 several links between 
CONACYT, the FMD and Coca-Cola 
were evident by the supporting the 
Instituto de Bebidas para la Salud y el 
Bienestar (IBSB ) an organization 
sponsored by The Coca-Cola company 
Chapter 5 
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about sodas and 
hydration 
as a means to achieve social 
responsibility actions.  In 2015 a book 
called ‘Hydration in different life 
stages’ (Hidratación. Fundamentos en 
las diferentes etapas de la vida) 
published by the IBSB was endorsed 
by the FMD and by other civil society 
groups, such as  the Asociación 
Mexicana de Nutriología, A.C. 
(AMENAC) (Coca-Cola Mexico, 
2015a). 
 
 COCA COLA + 
AMD 
Financial 
relationships to 
participate, promote 
research and 
evidence, and frame 
obesity problems. 
 
Community network/ 
collaboration 
Accountability  
 
In 2015, they collaborated with the 
Coca Cola Company to host a 
symposium on physical activity 
(James, 2013). 
 
 NESTLE + 
FUNSALUD 
Financial 
relationships to 
promote research 
Community network/ 
collaboration 
Accountability 
Responsiveness  
 
Since 1992, FUNSALUD has received 
funds from Nestlé (Fondo Nestlé 
Nutrición) for different activities.  In 
2012, the organization conducted 
research on obesity, mainly focused 
on promoting physical activity in 
schools, nutrigenomics and variations 
in genes associated with obesity.  In 
addition, they conducted research on 
the impact of the implementation of 
the 2010’s School Food Guidelines on 
the nutritional status of children 
(Funsalud, 2012). 
Chapter 5, 
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 INNSZ+ F&BI Financial 
relationships to 
promote research 
and evidence and 
frame obesity 
problems. 
Community network/ 
collaboration 
Accountability  
Participation 
Responsiveness 
Although they are a public institution, 
several of the academics and health 
providers who are leading figures in 
public nutrition receive grants from 
the food and beverage industry 
(INNCMSZ). 
 
 
Chapter 5, 
Annex 4. 
c Collaboration with design and implementation  of public polices related to health 
 
 
 BID + GOV + 
COCA COLA 
 
Implement  of 
programs to 
undertake corporate 
philanthropy 
Community network/ 
collaboration 
 
 
Accountability  
Participation 
Responsiveness 
Inclusion of PepsiCo as a private 
partnership.   BID and Pepsico 
partnered on a program providing 
water to poor communities,  and 
Pepsico providing subsidized 
products for the program “Hambre 
Cero” program  SEDESOL, and the 
conflict of interest arising for this 
partnership as the minister’s sister 
was head of marketing at PepsiCo. 
 
The program called ‘Escuela al Cien’  
and appointed a subsidiary of the 
MoEd called National Institute for 
the Educational Physical 
Infrastructure  (Instituto Nacional 
de la Infrestuctura Fisca Educativa -
INIFED) to install all water fountains 
in schools who got funds from Coca-
Chapters 5 
and 8 
 BID + GOV + 
PEPSICO 
Chapters 5 
and 8 
  
PEPSICO + 
SEDESOL 
 
 COCA COLA + 
SEP 
Chapter 8 
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Cola Foundation to install them 
(Inifed, 2015).   
 
 CONMEXICO + 
COFEPRIS 
Build relationships 
by providing policy 
advice on nutrition 
policies (design of 
food labelling) 
 
Policy community/ 
consultancy 
Accountability 
Responsiveness 
Participation 
 Chapter 7  
 CONMEXICO + 
MOH 
Build relationships 
by  providing policy 
advice on nutrition 
policies (part of the 
monitoring strategy 
for the  obesity 
policy) 
 
Policy community/ 
consultancy 
   
 UNAL + MOH Part of the 
monitoring and 
evaluation design of 
indicators 
Issue network / consultancy Accountability  
Responsiveness 
Participation 
 
 
UNAL was appointed by the Ministry 
of Health to develop with IMCO and 
Aspen Institute the OMENT  strategy 
to monitor the impact and progress of 
the policy actions to reduce obesity 
(SSA, 2016). 
Chapters 5 
and 6 
       
International organizations support to advocacy and research  
a Personal double roles and members of advisory committees 
 
 
 BP (funded org) 
+ SENATE 
Collaboration in 
advising the policy 
content 
Issue network  
Accountability  
Responsiveness 
Participation 
 Chapters 5 
and 8 
 PAHO + SENATE  Chapter 7 
 PAHO + MOH 
 
 Chapter 7 
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b Funding research  and advocacy strategies 
 
 
 BB + EPC Funding policy 
advocates to 
support health 
initiatives 
Issue network   
 
Accountability 
Responsiveness 
Participation 
In the fall of 2013, they supported 
their partners to propose a new tax 
on sugar-sweetened beverages, 
including funding media campaigns 
in support of the tax (BP).  The 
Bloomberg Philanthropies Obesity 
Prevention Program continues to 
work with public and private 
partners in Mexico to ensure that 
obesity prevention remains a topic 
of public discussion and policy focus 
(BP; Donaldson et al., 2015).  
 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 8  
 BP + INSP Funding research 
 BP + FM Funding policy 
advocates to 
support health 
initiatives 
c Support in framing the debate for the soda tax 
 
 
 WOF + EPC Public support for 
the soda tax in 
press releases 
 
Policy community  Responsiveness  Chapter 8  
 CSPI + EPC Policy community  Responsiveness  Chapter 8  
Academic collaboration to build evidence and policy making  
 ANM +  INSP Collaboration in 
writing advocacy 
material 
Issue network/ 
collaboration, coordination 
Responsiveness On 30 January 2013, the 
ANMM/UNAM presented the book 
Obesidad en México: 
recomendaciones para una política 
de Estado.  It contains the main 
topics related to obesity, including 
recommendations for a policy plan 
to attend this epidemic. 
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 CIDE + INSP 
+SENATE 
Collaboration in 
advising the policy 
content 
 
Issue network/ 
collaboration, coordination 
Participation Both participated in helping the 
Senate legislative soda tax proposal 
 
 IMCO +INSP Collaboration in 
writing advocacy 
material 
Issue network/ 
collaboration 
Participation 
Responsiveness 
Publication ‘Kilos de mas, pesos de 
menos: los costos de la obesidad’ 
(More kilos, less pesos: the costs of 
obesity) published in 2015 (IMCO, 
2015a) 
 
 
 INNSZ + MOH Collaborations with 
funding research 
Issue network/ 
collaborations.  
Participation 
Accountability 
The institute has been involved in 
the ENPCSOD  as a partner in the 
monitoring strategy and is also 
involved in treating people with 
diabetes (INNCMSZ).   
 
 
 ITAM + INSP Networking and  
cooperation to 
address obesity 
policy 
Issue network Participation 
Accountability 
Responsiveness 
Several academic meetings were 
held in ITAM during the soda tax 
debate in 2012 and 2013.  Some 
academics in this institution were 
also commissioned to write reports 
about the soda tax. 
 
 
Advocacy groups links to the government organizations   
a Advisory committees  
 
 
 CONTRAPESO + 
SENATE 
Relationships to 
find support of 
legislation within 
policy makers and 
with the CSO. 
Policy community / 
coordination 
Responsiveness 
Participation 
La Alianza por la Salud Alimentaria 
as well as other organisations such 
as El Poder del Consumidor, La Red 
por los Derechos de la Infancia and la 
Asociación Nacional de Empresas 
Comercializadoras de Productos del 
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FUNDACION 
MIDETE + 
SENATE 
Policy community / 
coordination 
 
Responsiveness 
Participation 
Camp endorsed the 20% increase to 
soda tax submitted to Congress 
(Rivera, 2013). 
 EPC +SENATE  Policy community 
/coordination 
Responsiveness 
Participation 
 
 
a) Type of network: Policy communities: Networks defining the context of policy-making in specific policy segments. The network links are generally 
perceived as the relational ties between bureaucrats, politicians and interest groups.  
Issue Networks Includes large number of actors. Non-state actors in these networks usually include representatives of private sector, civil society academic 
experts (See Chapter 3, section II Theoretical framework and Chapter 5, section I).  
b) Type of collaboration: Networking, coordination, cooperation, collaboration (Chapter 5) (Vic, 2013) 
c) Elements of governance in relation to power and the cooperation of non-state actors during policy change include participation, responsiveness, and 
accountability (See Chapter 3) (Siddiqi, 2009) 
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